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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1940's, problems associated with the economic 
development of the materially less-advanced countries have received a 
good deal of attention from economists all over the world. Economic. 
development has been rediscovered as both an academic and a practical 
subject of paramount importance. The study of development problems 
has had a stimulating influence on several related economic fields. A 
clear example of such a refreshing and stimulating effect of develop-
ment questions on other areas is the increased attention given to 
international trade. 
In the last thirty years, a substantial number of publications 
devoted to international trade matters in the context of both developed 
and developing countries bears witness to a revived interest in this 
field of economics. Trade is often viewed not only as an exchange of 
commodities and/or services, both also as a means to stabilize political 
relations among nations and to increase world security. This effort 
to achieve the two goals of economic and political stability through 
international trade has resulted in a new concept of mutual cooperation 
known as economic integration. Balassa (5, p. 1) defines economic inte-
gration as a process and a state of affairs. Regarded as a process, it 
encompasses measures designed to abolish discrimination between economic 
units belonging to differeing national states. Viewed as a state of 
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affairs, it can be represented by the absence of various forms of 
discrimination between national economies. 
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Most of the economic analyses of economic integration have been of 
a qualitative rather than a quantitative nature. Some of the most 
recent studies analyze how economic growth and development might affect 
the future growth of world trade, or how the development of a country's 
exports might determine its rate of economic growth. 
The Problem 
Economic integration is an instrument for achieving goals that 
may be economic, political, social, or some combination of these. It 
is generally presumed that the greatest economic gains from integration 
accrue to regions with highly developed trade and economic relations; 
to unions where the partner's industries are at similar levels of de-
velopment and are well diversified; and to groups in which financial 
intermediaries are well established. These conditions were all present 
in Europe before the European Economic Community was formed. In 1948 
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed a treaty that formed 
The Benelux Customs Union and in 1951 the European Coal and Steel 
Company was created by France, Germany, Italy and the three Benelux 
countries (Appendix A). 
Those conditions were not present in Latin America at the end of 
the 19SO's: differences in income levels were considerable; produc-
tive structures varied greatly; and trade within the area was a small 
proportion of the region's total international trade. In a iess devel-
oped region like Latin America where the small size of national markets 
limit domestic production, the possibilities of gains from the economies 
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of Reale associated with integration appear to be great. The larger 
markets of a preference group should lead to lower manufacturing costs, 
higher rates of investment, and more efficient allocation to resources 
within the region. In addition, existing idle industrial capacity may 
be put to use to increase production. If a Latin American common mar-
ket could produce such results, it probably would have a direct and 
important influence on accelerating the economic growth in the region. 
Advocates of economic integration argue that unions increase the 
welfare of the region and cause gains to the world as a whole. For 
the member country there are various economic consequences of joining 
a preference group. As an importer, the costs and benefits for a 
member country include production, consumption and tariff effects. 
a) The elimination of tariffs reduces this source of public revenue 
to the importing country. If in the past these revenues were used 
by the government to build or improve public services then the commu-
nity as a whole may lose by the elimination of tariffs. b) Importer 
countries lose a portion of the domestic production of relatively 
inefficient industries causing employment reductions and a loss of 
producer's surplus in those industries. c) The reduction in domestic 
production in inefficient industries releases factors of production 
which can be shifted to more efficient employment resulting in a benefit 
to the importing country. d) Tariff removal cuts domestic prices of 
imported goods, increasing consumer's surplus. 
The possible gains and/or losses to member countries as exporters 
may be summarized as: a) an increase in the volume of exports causing 
a reallocation of resource towards export based industries; b) an 
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increase in the producer's surplus; and c) higher prices to the domestic 
consumer of exportables causing a fall in the consumer's surplus. 
The net gains or losses to member and non-member countries after 
the formation of preference groups are not easily determined a priori. 
They depend upon the economic forces which predominate in each particu-
lar case, and vary from commodity to commodity depending on the rele-
vant price elasticities. 
The formation of a preference groups also has positive and nega-
tive effects on non-member countries. Some of the negative aspects 
come from the losses in exports to the integrated area due to discrimi-
nation in tariffs. The possible benefits to non-members result from 
the income effect within the market which might lead to an increase 
in non-member exports to the group. 
The formation of preference groups in Europe and Latin America 
are a possible cause of the deterioration of the merchandise trade 
balance of the U. S. which culminated in negative trade balances in 
1972, 1974, and 1976. The literature on the net expected impact of 
preference groups is ample, particularly with regards to the European 
Economic Community. However, little work has been done with regards 
to the combined and interactive effects of the nearly simultaneous 
formation of two or more preference groups. 
Objectives 
The overall objective of this study is to evaluate the economic 
impact that preference groups in Europe and Latin America have had 
on one another and on the U. S. trade position. 
The specific objectives include: 
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1. To develop an econometric model capable of evaluating the flow 
of trade between any pair of countries and/or preference groups; and to 
estimate the parameters of the model. 
2. To estimate the benefits and/or costs of economic integrations 
to the member countries. 
3. To estimate the net impact on the trade position of the U. S. 
as a consequence of the formation of preference groups in Europe and 
Latin America. 
4. To examine the net impact of economic integrations on the 
agricultural trade of U. S. with member countries. 
Organization of the Study 
The remainder of this study is divided into six chapters. Chapter 
II contains a discussion of the main factors that determine the size 
of international trade flow between any pair of countries. A conceptual 
model is developed to a) estimate the forces that determine the flow of 
trade and b) quantify the impact of the preference groups. The sources 
of data, countries chosen, period selected for empirical research, and 
a description of variables are presented in Chapter III. Empirical 
findings are developed in Chapters IV, V, and VI. Chapter IV contains 
a description of the statistical procedure used to estimate inter~ 
national trade flows. Chapter V presents estimates of the net impact 
of economic integrations on member and non-member countries. Chapter 
VI examines some ramifications of the empirical results. Finally, 
Chapter VII contains a summary of the study. Limitations, implications 
and suggestions for further research are also included in Chapter VII. 
CHAPTER II 
A CONCEPTUAL MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 
The commercial relations between any two countries are determined 
by a combination of economic, political, and cultural factors. A 
conceptual model will be developed in this chapter to indicate how 
these factors affect trade. Special emphasis will be given to the 
impact of preference groups on the pattern of international trade. 
In the development of the conceptual model emphasis will be given 
to the relationships between international merchandise trade and 
changes in the factors which affect that trade. The focus of the 
study will be on trade between countries or among groups of countries. 
It is relevant at this stage to ask why countries engage in inter-
national trade. This question has been answered by Kreinin (23): 
Nations trade with each other for fundamentally the same 
reasons that individuals or regions engage in exchange of 
goods and services: to obtain the benefits of specialization. 
Since nations, like individuals, are not equally suited to 
produce all goods, either because they are differently en-
dowed or for other reasons, all would benefit if each spe-
cialized in what it can do best and obtained its other needs 
through exchange. The point is self-evident, for in a free 
society communities would not engage in trade if it did not 
benefit them (p. 217). 
Within the context of international trade theory two basic 
conceptual approaches have been used to identify and explain the 
factors which affect international trade between any pair of countries 
or among groups of countries. These two approaches may be classified 
as price analysis and flow analysis. A brief description of each 
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approach with its advantages and disadvantages should suggest the 
approach to follow in the remainder of this study. 
Price Analysis 
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Many empirical studies in international trade have stressed the 
importance of price and income elasticities of demand and supply for 
exports and imports among countries as determinants of trade patterns. 
The effectiveness of tariff and exchange rate policies are highly 
dependent on the size of import and export price and income elastici-
ties. While there is general agreement that trade patterns are sensi-
tive to changes in relative prices, there has been a controversy 
within the literature concerning the form of prices in international 
trade models, the functional form of the models and the responsiveness 
to price changes among the different countries (12). 
All the studies which have included prices as a determinant of 
trade between countries, or among countries, have tried to estimate and 
evaluate import demand and/or export supply as a function of world 
prices, relative prices and/or relative price levels. Some of the 
more recent studies dealing with this topic include: Adler (l); 
Kreinin (22); Magee and Houthakker (27); Orcutt (29); Richardson (31); 
Takayama and Judge (33); and Maizels (28). 
One of the problems of international trade models which explicitly 
include prices is the frequent omission of monetary and speculative 
factors such as monetary policy, inflation, and exchange rates. The 
exclusion of these factors increases in importance in periods of 
uncertainty. The accepted procedure for incorporating the influence 
of inflation in a connnodity model has been to deflate the data according 
to movements in the general price level. Elliott (14) argued that 
international trade models which respond to prices should designate 
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all prices in a common currency. In their communication on estimating 
national supply and demand equations in a common currency, Bjarnason, 
McGarry, and Schmitz (10) presume that the price series must be con-
verted to a common currency prior to the estimation of supply and de-
mand equations. Another concern is whether to convert the price series 
to a common currency based on yearly exchange rates or to convert the 
price series to dollars at a base exchange rate. They found that the 
base exchange rate is better for conversion than the yearly exchange 
rate. 
Another method which was developed by Elliott (14) estimates 
national supply and demand equations in national currencies and then 
converts the equations to a common currency by multiplying the price 
parameters times the assumed exchange rate. For example, British 
supply or and demand for a commodity may be estimated as a function of 
its price in British pounds. To convert to dollars, the price parame-
ter in tre supply equation and the price parameter in the demand equa-
tion are each multiplied by the exchange rate. The price series in 
national currency may be adjusted for inflation prior to estimating 
national supply and demand equations (14, p. 538). This method has 
an advantage over the methods considered by Bjarnason, McGarry, and 
Schmitz (10), in that it permits consideration of different exchange 
rate situations in successive runs of the model. 
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Flow Analysis 
An alternative approach to explaining international trade patterns 
is based on the presumption of equilibrium world prices over the long-
run. With prices in equilibrium, the factors affecting the trade flow 
among countries are those forces which shift the relevant supply and 
demand curves. The main factors that contribute to a quantitative 
explanation of the size of trade flow between any pair of countries, 
assuming price equilibrium in world markets, may be classified under 
three headings: 
1. Factors affecting total potential export supply of the 
exporting country; 
2. Factors affecting total potential import demand of the 
importing country; and, 
3. Factors representing the resistance to a trade flows between 
the two countries concerned. 
The classical works using the trade flow approach include those 
of Timbergen (35); Linnemman (25); Aitken (2); Aitken and Lowry (3); 
and Ovattara (30). In each of these studies it was assumed that the 
potential supply and/or demand of each country on world markets is 
directly related to the economic size of the country. The resistance 
forces identified by these authors fall into two categories: 
1. Natural trade obstacles; 
2. Artificial impediments. 
In a situation of price equilibrium, total quantity demanded and 
total quantity supplied in the world market are equal (demand includes 
the demand for stocks). Equality of quantity supplied and quantity 
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demanded in the world market implies that over the long-run no country 
has a price level that is "too high" or "too low," since in both cases 
relative prices would not reflect relative factor costs. Adjustment 
through a change in the exchange rate will usually take place such that 
over the long-run, the general price level has little influence on the 
aggregate quantity supplied or demanded by any given country. 
There is another way in which prices may have an impact on 
potential quantity supplied, namely in the case of substantial differ-
ences in productivity and price levels between export industries and 
import-competing activities. A higher-than average productivity level 
in the export industries would lead to a higher-than usual export sup-
ply and a higher-than usual import demand to compensate for the rela-
tively unproductive import competing industries. The greater these 
productivity differences, the greater the role of foreign trade in the 
economy, ceteris paribus. However, the movement of resources would 
tend to equalize productivity and price levels in the relevant sector, 
so that this trade-fostering situation is likely to be a temporary one. 
Moreover, it would be difficult to measure such a difference between 
export price levels and import-competing price levels for all countries 
concerned (e.g. in view of quality differences and product differenti-
ation). Therefore, in the long-run this price effect may also be dis-
regarded in the determination of international trade flows. 
Differences and Similarities Between 
Price and Flow Analyses 
The basic difference between the flow and price approaches is that 
flow models assume a situation of equilibrium in the international 
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market with prices determined by the market, whereas in price models 
prices are an important element in the determination of international 
trade flow between any pair of countries. Both approaches have been 
supported by numerous empirical studies, and a priori it is difficult 
to accept one as better than the other. However, where the scope of 
analysis is very aggregative, then equilibrium prices may be assumed 
and flow models used. But where the study deals with a single commodi-
ty or a group of commodities, or the purpose of the analysis is to 
estimate equations of supply and demand, then prices must be included. 
One distinguishing difference between the two approaches in an 
empirical context is the dependent variable. In flow models, the 
estimating equation measures the value of trade between countries. By 
contrast, in price models the dependent variable is frequently the 
quantity of imports and/or exports which is treated a.s a function of 
income, prices, etc., following the traditional estimation procedures 
for supply and demand. 
The flow and price approaches are really two main branches corning 
from the same analytical tree. The flow approach is preferred for 
evaluating long-run structural impacts. Consequently, the flow approach 
is followed in the remainder of this study assuming a continual conver-
gence to price equilibrium in world markets. It should be strongly 
emphasized that the exclusion of price variables in no way implies that 
prices are not effective in allocating resources. On the contrary, 
prices are assumed to adjust supply and demand quickly to establish new 
equilibria. 
Macroeconomic Forces Affecting the Trade Flows 
The factors that contribute to a quantitative explanation of the 
size of trade flow between any pair of countries may be classified 
under three headings: 
a) Potential export supply of the exporting country; 
b) Potential import demand of the importing country; and, 
c) Resistance forces to trade. 
In this study a fourth element will be added to these three broad 
factors: 
d) Trade preferences. 
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The latter group of factors will receive a great deal of attention in 
this study. Each of the four will be examined in greater detail in the 
following sections. 
Quantity Supplied and Demanded 
The authors that have used the flow approach argue that the 
amount of trade flow originating in a country is closely related to 
the economic size of that country. Therefore, the size of the gross 
national product of the exporting coun,try may be considered as one of 
the forces that plays a part in explaining trade flows. In addition, 
the gross national product of the importing country is relevant as 
well. The factors that determine the quantity of imports demanded for 
any country are considered to be of the same nature as for supply. As 
Tinbergen says: "The amount that can be sold to a particular country 
will vary with the size of that country's· market" (35, p. 263). 
13 
Resistance Forces 
Two factors which impede the commercial flow among nations are 
frequently cited: a) natural obstacles, and b) artificial impediments. 
Natural Trade, Obstacles. The most obvious element among the 
natural obstacles ~o international trade is the cost of transportation. 
Other things being equal, the higher the cost of transportation between 
two countries, the smaller the trade flow. Transport costs are of a 
complex nature, and their relative magnitude is different for each type 
of commodity. Kindleberger (21) says: 
The cost of shipping an article from one country to 
another may be said to depend on a number of considera-
tions: its weight, bulk, value, physical characteristics, 
the distance to be traversed, the mode and speed of trans-
port, the character of the route, the existence of other 
cargoes going between the same point;:;, especially in the 
same opposite direction, and so on (p. 11). 
Transport time is another element that falls in the category of 
natural obstacles to trade. Any transportation process requires time, 
and in many cases time implies a very high opportunity cost. 
Artificial Impediments. Artificial obstacles to trade arise where 
goods are not allowed to pass freely across national frontiers. Usual-
ly these obstacles are particularly important for goods entering the 
country, although sometimes there are substantial barriers for exports. 
The artificial trade impediments are created, maintained, or removed, 
by government action only. The most common artificial impediments are 
tariffs and quotas. Others include health restrictions, exchange con-
trol and domestic purchase programs. 
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Trade Preferences 
Apart from purely economic variables it is likely that 
institutional factors play the most significant role in determining the 
volume of trade between countries. These factors may be grouped under 
two categories: 
a) Physical proximity of countries; and, 
b) Existence of special trade preference agreements. 
Neighboring Countries. The degree of political and socio-economic 
affinity between neighboring countries has an effect on the level of 
trade between them, ceteris paribus. Close political cooperation, and 
a thorough knowledge of each others' culture, language, and institution-
al arrangements will have a stimulating effect on trade relative to 
non-neighbors. The sharing of a border presents the following advan-
tages: 
a) The distances to be traversed are shorter; 
b) Tastes and preferences are more likely to be similar; 
c) Distribution channels can be more easily established in 
adjacent economies; and 
d) Neighboring countries may have a greater awareness of common 
interests and hence be more willing to coordinate policies (7, p. 40). 
Trade Preference Agreements. Trade preference agreements to 
reduce or eliminate barriers to trade among the group and discriminate 
with respect to third countries should affect the pattern of trade 
flows. A frequert objective of trade preference agreements is economic 
integration. The meaning of this concept is not restricted to total 
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intl·gration but encompasses various forms of inte(\ration s1.,1ch as free 
trade areas, customs unions, common markets, and economic unions. Each 
one of these forms of integration has its own characteristics. The 
impact that one particular group has on the trade among members and 
with the outside world, is associated with the type of integration. 
Balassa (5) defines them as: 
Irt a Free Trade Area, tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions between the participating countries are abol-
ished, but each country retains its own tariff against non-
members. The establishment of a customs union involves, 
besides the suppression of discrimination in the field of 
commodity movements within the union, the creation of a 
common tariff wall against non-member countries. In a 
common market, not only trade restrictions but also 
restrictions on factor movements with a degree of harmon-
ization of economic, monetary, fiscal, social, and 
countercyclical policies. Finally, total economic inte-
gration presupposes the unification of economic policies, 
and requires the setting up of a supranational authority 
whose decisions are binding for the member states (p. 2). 
Theoretical Aspects of Economic Integrations 
Trade Creation and Trade Diversion 
Since the time of David Ricardo, a pioneer of international trade 
theory, there was a belief that movements toward freer trade among 
countries improved world welfare. Since trade preference groups 
reduce tariffs among the group causing a movement towards free trade, 
it was argued that they should increase world welfare. 
Viner (43) showed that this argument is not necessarily correct. 
He introduced the concept of trade creation (TC) within a trade 
preference group or area. Trade creation is the rise of intra-area 
imports as a proportion of the total (intra- and extra-area) imports 
of any preference group (7). A second concept is that of trade 
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diversion (TD) which is the replacement of imports from the outside 
world by more expensive imports from integrated partners under the 
shelter of tariff preferences and/or other mutual concessions. The 
difference between the price at which comparable imports could be 
obtained from third countries and the intra-area price represents a 
cost for the importing country. This loss may be outweighed by the 
benefits of integration. Both TC and TD probably are best understood 
in terms of an example. 
Assume a three country world with the United Kingdom (U.K.), 
Germany and France; that all of them are endowed with a limited supply 
of resources; and, that they are using those resources in the most 
efficient form. There are differences in production costs of at least 
one commodity X. Also assume that there are no transportation costs 
and that with trade, the supplier country of X can cover its own domes-
tic demand and the foreign demand. For simplicity consider the 
figures in Table I. 
TABLE I 
HYPOTHETICAL MONEY PRICES OF A SINGLE COMMODITY 
(X) IN THREE COUNTRIES 
* Country Price /unit of X 
France 175 
Germany 130 
United Kingdom 100 
* The numbers are of an arbitrary nature, but they are 
assumed to correspond to the same monetary unit. 
A tariff of 80 percent levied by France will be sufficient to protect 
France's domestic industry producing commodity X. If France joins a 
customs union with either Germany or U.K. it will be better off. If 
the union is with Germany, it will get a unit of commodity X at an 
opportunity cost of 130 instead of producing that unit domestically 
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at a cost of 175. This argument presumes that relative prices in each 
country reflect real rates of transformation and constant costs. It 
follows that the resources used to produce a unit of X in France could 
produce any other good with a value of 175. Since France can import a 
unit of X from Germany by exchanging goods with a value of only 130, 
there will be a surplus of goods valued at 45 accruing to France from 
the transfer of resources out of X when trade is opened with Germany. 
This is an example of trade creation. 
Now assume that before integration France had been levying a 
tariff of 50 percent on imports of X. If the tariff is nondiscrimina-
tory, then France would buy X from the lowest cost source, in this 
case the U.K. If France and Germany form a customs union with a total 
elimination of tariffs, then France will buy X from Germany which is 
protected by the tariff discrimination. This is a case of trade diver-
sion, and since it entails a movement from lower to higher real cost 
sources of supply, it represents a movement to a less efficient allo-
cation of resources. 
Gross Trade Creation 
Gross Trade Creation (GTC) is the change in member country imports 
from other member countries. Within a static world, GTC measures the 
combined effect of: a) the replacement of previously protected domestic 
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production with more efficient production from member countries; b) the 
expansion of domestic consumption due to price and income effects 
caused by a); and,c) the substitution of member imports for non-member 
imports (trade diversion). 
Trade Expansion 
The increment in exports from the preference area to the rest of 
the world due to the increased production efficiencies associated 
with the expanded market within the area is defined as trade expansion 
(TE). The relative price changes causing trade expansion are the con-
sequence of production efficiencies rather than changes in tariff levels 
as in the case of trade creation and trade diversion. The combined 
effect of trade diversion and trade expansion is expected to improve 
the terms of trade and the merchandise trade balance (MTB) of member 
countries relative to non-members. 
Review of Preference Group Literature 
Since Jacob Viner's pioneering analysis of customs unions (43), 
most contributors to the theory of customs unions have evaluated the 
impacts of preference groups with reference to the trade-creating and 
trade-diverting effects of the groups. While a number of criteria 
have been put forward for appraising the chances of (TC) and (TD) in 
a union, it seems to be generally agreed that an a priori judgment 
regarding the net effect of a customs union on trade flows cannot be 
made (5, 7, 26). Jan Tinbergen (35) has suggested an empirical 
methodology to indicate the effects of preference groups. He attempted 
to explain trade flows between member c,ountries and the rest of the 
world, nnd among mt·.mlH·r countrlPs liy a· regres!.;ion 
I 
t•quation witl1 gros~; 
national products, geograhpical distance, and dummy variables for 
preferential effects as the explanatory variables. 
The exports of country x to country m may be estimated by: 
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F 
mx 
aoY 
m 
(2.1) 
where: 
F imports of country m from country x; 
mx 
Ym GNP of m; 
Y = GNP of x; 
x 
Dmx distance between x and m; 
P 1 is m and x belong to the same preference group, and 
mx 
zero otherwise. 
With this model, and using the British Commonwealth and Benelux 
as sample preference groups, Tinbergen estimated the coefficients of 
(2.1). Changes in the coefficients of the dummy variables over time 
were examined to see if there was a change in the trade flow associated 
with preferential trade agreements. His hypothesis was that these 
coefficients should increase following formation of the group. With 
this method it is only possible to determine whether or not these 
special agreements on trade had stimulated trade among the members, but 
there is no way to separate and measure trade creation or trade 
diversion. 
Balassa (7) developed an alternative procedure to estimate the net 
impact of preference groups which started with the Tinbergen model 
without the dummy variable for preferential treatment among countries. 
The estimated coefficients for a1 and a 2 are the income elasticities of 
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tliC' impprtlng country m, and the exporting country x. Assuming tl1;1t 
.income elasticities of import demand would hnve rcma.Lne<l unchanged in 
the absence of integration, a rise in the income elasticity of demand 
for intra-area ~mports would indicate gross trade creation, while an 
increase in the income elasticity of demand for imports from all sources 
of supply would suggest trade creation. In turn, a fall in the income 
elasticity of demand for extra-area imports would provide evidence of 
trade-diverting effects of the union. Thus, comparisons of ex post 
income elasticities of import demand provide estimates of GTC, TC, and 
TD. 
Wilford (45), using Balassa's method, found evidence of net trade 
creation for the Central .American Common Market since the ex post 
elasticities of demand for both total imports and intraregional imports 
exceeded the respective pre-integration elasticities. The problem 
with this method is that it implicitly assumes that all the changes 
in the income elasticities are caused by the formation of the prefer-
ence group to the exclusion of any other economic factors that may 
have affected those elasticities. 
In general, empirical studies which have attempted to measure 
integration effects have been faced with the common problem of isolat-
ing the effect of income growth and changes in other variables which 
normally affect international trading patterns from the effect of the 
integration. The major approaches to this problem have been to either 
examine changes in the market share of imports (or apparent consump-
tion), or to incorporate income directly into the statistical analysis 
by calculating import elasticities of import demand for the pre- and 
post-integration periods, or to use income as an independent variable 
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in a trade flow model. Each of these approaches attempts to measure the 
effect of integration indirectly as a residual. In all cases estimates 
are made of what trade would have been in the absence of economic inte-
gration. These estimates are then compared to actual trade flows to 
obtain the net trade preference effect. 
Development of the Conceptual Model 
Flow of Trade Between Two Countries 
The main factors that determine the size of trade flow between 
any pair of countries have been mentioned earlier. If F is flow of 
mxt 
trade from x to m in year t, then: 
F f (E M R ' p ) (2.2) mxt 0 x m mx mx t t 
where: 
E fl 
xt 
(of the economic size of the exporting country x); 
M f2 
mt 
(of the economic size of the importing country m); 
R f3 (trade resistance forces between m and x); mx 
p f4 (trade preference forces between m and x). mx 
Integration Impact 
An evaluation of the temporal behavior of the coefficients of 
(2.2) may be used to identify trade creation, trade diversion, trade 
expansion associated with the formation of a preference group. These 
trade flows are shown in Figure 1, which depi~ts the usual case found 
in most textbooks. Assume that countries a and b combine to form the 
European Economic Community (EEC). Gross trade creation of a (GTC ) 
a 
EEC 
GT Cb 
Q:----_Grc_a _Q 
U.S. 
Figure 1. Trade Relations Between a Preference 
Group and Non-Members 
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is the additional flow of imports from all other member countries 
associated with the formation of the community. Total GTCEEC is equal 
the sum of GTCa plus GTCb. In the normal case, GTCEEC and TEEEC should 
both be positive, and TDEEC should be negative (a gain for the member 
countries). The change in the merchandise trade balance (6MTBEEC) of 
the EEC is equal to TEEEC minus TDEEC" In this simple model with 
only one preference group, changes in observed trade flows may be used 
to estimate directly GTC, TD, TE, and 6MTB. 
The relationships shown in Figure 1 become more complex _when there 
are two (or morey preference groups. Such a situation is shown in 
Figure 2, which is identical to the first figure except that a second 
preference group has been added. The trade relations between the U. S. 
and the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) are similar to 
those for the U. S. and EEC shown in Figure 1 and can be measured 
directly by evaluating changes in the ex post trade flows between the 
two. However, the TD and TE between the two preference groups are 
confounded. An increase in the trade flow from LAFTA to the EEC could 
be interpreted as either TDEEC or TELAFTA or as a combination of both. 
Moreover, the expected sign of TDEEC is negative while that of TELAFTA 
is positive, so the two impacts will tend to CRncel one another. Ex 
post statistical analysis of the LAFTA to EEC trade flow will measure 
I 
only the net impact of the two forces. This combined effect is 
called net trade diversion (NTD). The. NTD of the EEC is equal to the 
sum of TDEEC and TELAFTA" Consequently, the 6MTBEEC is equal to the 
NTDLAFTA (net increase in EEC exports) minus'NTDEEC (net increase in 
EEC imports). 
EEC 
GT Cb 
GTC 
a 
TD LAFTA 
TELAFTA 
U.S. 
Figure 2. Trade Relations Among Two Preference 
Groups and Non-Members 
LA FT A 
GTCx 
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The member countries of a preference group gain from its formation 
when MTB is positive. Non-member countries ·(such as the U. S. in 
Figure 2) are expected to experience a deterioration in their external 
position as exports decline (TDEEC for example) and imports increase 
(TEEEC). The direction and magnitude of these impacts will be esti-
mated using statistical procedures and data described in the following 
chapters. 
CHAPTER III 
SPECIFICATION OF THE TRADE FLOW MODEL AND 
SOURCES OF DATA 
This chapter contains a description of the data used for the 
empirical analysis and describes the variables which may be included 
in an equation of the flow of trade. 
A Conceptual Model for the Flow of Trade 
Between Two Countries 
In the previous chapter the factors which may contribute to a 
quantitative explanation of the trade flow between any pair of 
countries were classified under four headings: 
1. Factors indicating total quantity supplied by the exporting 
country to the world market; 
2. Factors indicating total quantity demanded by the importing 
country; 
3. Factors representing resistance forces; and, 
4. Trade preference factors. 
These factors may be grouped in a single conceptual expression: 
F 
mxt 
where: 
F 
mxt 
p ) 
mx 
flow of trade from country x to country m in year t; 
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(3 .1) 
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J\ total supply of the exporting country; 
x 
t 
Qm total demand of importing country; 
t 
R resistance forces to trade between m and x; and, 
mx 
P preference factors for trade between the countries. 
mx 
These conceptual factors which explain the flow of trade between 
countries can be measured by proxy variables. 
Both the total supply of the exporting country and the total demand 
of the importing country depend on relative economic size which may 
be represented by gross national product or population: 
(3.2) 
~t (3. 3) 
where: 
GNP = gross national product; and 
N population. 
Resistance factors include natural and artificial obstacles to 
trade which affect transport costs and time. These forces may be 
accounted for by including distance between countries m and x as a 
proxy variable. It is expected that greater distances imply more 
transportation time and higher costs which have a negative effect on 
the volume of trade between the countries conc.erned. 
Then: 
R 
mx 
<I> (DIST ) 
mx 
where: 
DIST = distance between m and x. 
mx 
(3.4) 
While the concept behind the inclusion of preference factors in 
(3.1) is clear, it is somewhat difficult to perceive an appropriate 
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proxy variable for alternative levels of preference. This problem may 
be resolved through the use of dummy preference variables: 
P = y(DNEIGH , D .. ) 
mx mx 1J (3. 5) 
where: 
DNEIGH 
mx 
dummy variable which is equal to one if m and x are 
neighbors and zero otherwise; and, 
D.. dummy variable which takes a value of one if m is a 1J 
member of the ith preference group and xis a member 
f h .th f d h . o t e J pre erence group, an zero ot erwise. 
Ignoring the time subscript for simplicity, expression (3.1) may be 
rewritten as: 
F = f(GNP , N , GNP , N , DIST , DNEIGH , D .. ) 
mx m m x x mx mx 1J (3. 6) 
Assuming constant elasticities in a log-log format, (3.6) may be re-
written as: 
log F 
mx 
where: 
+ s5log DIST + s6DNEIGHT + S7D .. + log E. mx mx 1J 
E is an error term. 
(3. 7) 
The coefficients estimated for the continuous variables in equation 
(3.7) are the elasticities of the respective variables. Equation (3.7) 
may be estimated by ordinary least squares proceeding along the usual 
lines. Two points are worth mentioning. First, the disturbance log E 
t 
(not Et) is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance 0 2 • In this 
case, the distribution of log E itself might be called log normal. 
Second, the conditional variance of log F , given by log GNP , log N , 
mxt m m 
log GNP , log.N, log DIST , DNEIGH, D .. is a donstant and is equal to 
x x mx 1J 
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2 2 
o , where a is an unknown parameter. This variance measures the extent 
to which the flow of trade is affected by any neglected variables (34, 
p. 107). 
Data Sources 
Dependent Variable 
The value of the flow of merchandise trade between any two 
countries is the dependent variable. Trade flows in United States dol-
lars for each pair of countries in the sample were obtained directly 
from the Direction of International Trade (18). and Direction of Trade 
(19), which are joint publications of the United Nations, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Some data were missing or unpublished so it was im-
possible to collect data for all 1722 possible observations from the 
42 countries included in the sample. Trade flow data are either 
reported as f.o.b .. (free on board) or c.i.f. (cost, insurance, and 
freight) according to the country's practice. Generally import data 
are found on a c.i.f. basis. In the few cases where it was reported 
on an f.o.b. basis, it was converted to c.i.f. by an arbitrary upward 
adjustment of 10 percent to account for freight and insurance. The 
size of a trade flow between two countries can be measured at either 
the point of export or the point of import. 'Apart from the above 
mentioned differences in valuation, and minor differences due to time 
displacement during the transportation period., the two measures should 
give the same result. Actually, their correspondence is usually far 
from perfect for a number of practical reasons such as inaccuracies or 
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conceptual differences in foreign trade data collection procedures, or 
changes in the destination of sailing cargoes. The data obtained from 
export statistics sometimes differs substantially from that given in 
import statistics; however, when the primary interest of a study deals 
with the effects of trade on production and consumption, import sta-
tistics are on the whole more reliable than the export (or consignment) 
statistics (13, pp. 123-124; 25, p. 62). Consequently, trade flows are 
measured with import data whenever possible. 
Explanatory Variables 
Economic Size. Several measures of economic size of the importing 
and exporting countries were.collected: gross national product, gross 
domestic product, .national income, and population. All of these data 
were taken from International Financial Statistics (20). When data were 
given in national currencies rather than U. S. dollars, they were trans-
formed to dollars using average annual exchange rates (19). These 
data are reproduced in Appendix B. 
Distance. In previous studies the distance between countries was 
measured as the shortest navigable distance between the main ports of 
the respective countries, plus the overland distances from the ports to 
the economic "gravity points" of the countries concerned (25). A grav-
ity point is that region in which the greatest commercial and industrial· 
activity of the country is concentrated. Appendix C shows the distances 
which were computed between all countries in the sample. 
Neighboring Countries. If two countries are neighbors, it usually 
presents an extra incentive to trade which may be measured by the use of 
a dummy variable. If the importing and exporting countries are 
neighbors then this variable is assigned a value of 1. Otherwise, it 
has a value of zero. Appendix D lists all sample countries which are 
neighbors. 
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Preference Variables. Member countries of an economic integration 
should exhibit definite preferences for trade within the group due to 
the elimination of trade barriers, etc. Dummy variables may be used to 
measure the shift in trade flows which is coincident with the establish-
ment of a preference group. Assuming that there is no correlation be-
tween the dununy variables and the error term, the coefficients of the 
dununy variables may be used to compute the trade impact of the prefer-
ence groups. 
The Sample Countries 
The objective of this study is to quantify the impact that 
economic integrations in Europe and Latin America have had on the trade 
among the members of those groups and with the outside world. Conse-
quently, the sample countries included members of the European Economic 
Conununity (EEC), European Free Trade Association (EFTA), Central 
American Common Market (CACM), Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), 
and the United States and Canada (U~ S. & C.)·. In addition, as many 
non-member countries as possible from the European and Latin American 
regions were included to assure a basis for comparison. 
Belgium and Luxembourg were treated as one country, as were 
Trinidad and Tobago. The reason for this is because in general the 
statistical data are presented in a combined form. The 42 countries 
which constitute the sample are listed in Table II. 
TABLE II 
COUNTRIES INCLUDED IN THE SAMPLE BY PREFERENCE GROUP 
I. United States and Canada (U. S. & C.) 
United States 
Canada 
II. European Economic Community (EEC) 
Belgium and Luxembourg 
France 
Germany, F.R. 
Italy 
Netherlands 
III. European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 
Austria 
Denmark 
Norway 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
IV. Central American Common Market (CACM) 
Cost Rica 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
V. Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
VI. Non-Associated 
>'< 
Finland 
Greece 
T'l:lrkey 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Spain 
Mexico 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
British Guina 
Dominican Republic 
Haiti 
Jamaica 
Panama 
Trinidad and Tobago 
>'< 
Countries in groups I and VI are not members of preference . 
groups. 
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The Study Period 
The period chosen for this study (from 1951 to 1969) is the longest 
period possible given the limited availability of data. This period is 
sufficiently long to permit the evaluation of the trend of trade flows 
in both the pre-integration and post-integration period for the four 
preference groups. 
The EEC was formed in 1958, and the other three groups were offi-
cially created in 1960. Thus, the 19 year period from 1951 to 1969 is 
sufficiently long to accurately establish trade flow patterns before 
and after the groups were formed. By 1951 the dislocations and distor-
tions of World War II had probably disappeared, or at least the affected 
countries were starting a period of recovery from the war. The last 
full year of relative stability with fixed exchange rates was 1969. 
Hence, the world monetary system probably had little net impact on trade 
flows during the study period. 
The following chapter deals with the statistical analysis of 
several empirical models based on the conceptual model. Empirical esti-
mates of the model parameters will be used to estimate the net impact 
that economic integrations have had on the international trade among 
countries and/or groups of countries. 
CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF TRADE FLOWS 
Three forms of the trade flow model will be estimated, each 
representing a different level of disaggregation of the dummy prefer-
ence variables. The structural form of all three is similar. 
Basic Trade Flow Model 
As shown in the previous chapter, trade flows are affected by 
market, resistance and preference forces: 
F = y + P + E 
mx mx mx 
(4.1) 
where: 
F trade flow from exporting country x to importing co~ntry m; 
mx 
ymx portion of total flow attributed to market and resistance 
forces; 
P portion of total flow attributed to preference factors; and, 
mx 
E = unexplained residual. 
The general form of used in all estimations is: 
mx 
where: 
CNP 
m 
GNP 
x 
DIST 
mx 
Gross National Product of importing country' m; 
Gross National Product of exporting country x; 
distance between m and x; and 
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(4.2) 
DNEIGH = dummy variable which is equal to one if m and x are 
mx 
neighbors and zero otherwise. 
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Expression (4.2) is included in the estimating equations in log-log form 
(except for the dummy variable). In the conceptual model both gross 
national product and population were included as proxy variables for 
the size of the economy. However, preliminary estimates showed a high 
degree of correlation (greater than 0.90) between GNP and population 
so the non-economic variable (population) was eliminated in order to 
avoid multicollinearity. 
Empirical Trade Flow Models 
The P portion of (4.1) shows the extent to which trade among 
mx 
member countries differs from what would be expected -based on the other 
independent variables. Three different forms of the P term will be 
mx 
examined, each representing different levels of disaggregation. At 
the most basic level, assume that only gross trade creation (GTC) among 
member countries results from the formation of preference groups. Then 
the impact of the groups on trade flows may be measured by: 
F 
mx 
where: 
[y ] + 
mx 
(4.3) 
D .. = dummy preference variable equal to 1 when m and x are both 
l.l. 
members of group i; and equal to zero otherwise; and 
i preference group identification number: 
1 = United States and Canada, 
2 European Economic Community, 
3 European Free Trade Association, 
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4 = Central American Conunon Market, and 
5 Latin American Free Trade Association. 
Changes in the estimated value of the coefficients a. over time provide 
l 
the basis for measuring the gross trade creation achieved by each 
group. 
A more disaggregated model may be proposed to estimate not only 
GTC effects, but also the repercussions of integration on trade with 
non-members. The trade diversion and trade creation of each group 
relative to all other countries in the sample may be estimated by: 
F 
mx 
where: 
[y ] + 
mx 
5 
l: 
i=2 
b.D .. + 
l ll 
5 5 
(4.4) 
E 1 "f b 1 h .th f d d • i m e ongs to t e J pre erence group an x oes not 
J 
belong to j and zero otherwise; 
th 
= 1 if x belongs to the k preference group and m does not 
belong to k and zero otherwise; and, 
i,j,k =preference group identification numbers. 
The estimated coefficients c. measure the trade diversion (TD) effects 
J 
of group j and the dk measure the trade expansion (TE) with non-members 
by members of preference group k. 
Even greater detail is given by: 
F = [y ] + 
mx mx 
where: 
5 5 
l: l: 
i=l j=l 
B •. P .. 
lJ lJ 
(4.5) 
P .. = 1 if m belongs to i and x belongs tro j and zero otherwise. 
lJ 
The estimates of B .. will show GTC, TD and TE by the specific source 
lJ 
of each. In (4.5) there are five preference groups and a total of 
25 preference variables. The inclusion in the sample of six European 
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countries and six Latin American countries which are not members of 
'f~ 
any group eliminates the risk of falling into a dununy variable trap. 
As the models (4.3)-(4.5) represent little more than different 
levels of disaggregation, the estimates of the coefficients for D .. in 
ll 
equations (4.3) and (4.4) and P .. in equation (4.5) where i 
lJ 
be equal i and j = 2, ... 5. The estimated coefficients were 
j should 
different in some cases, but as shown in Appendix E, they were not 
different at the 0.01 level of statistical significance. Thus, it 
appears that disaggregation is not detrimental to the statistical 
results. 
Estimation Procedures 
The model in (4.3) is conceptually similar to those developed by 
Tinbergen (35), Linnemman (25), Aitken (2), and Aitken and Lowry (3) 
among others. With the use of dummy variables as specified in (4.3) 
only the estimation of gross trade creation is possible, there being 
no way to estimate the external impacts of a particular preference 
group. 
Since the models (4.3) and (4.4) are really subsets of model (4.5), 
the empirical results of these two models are not presented in the text 
but instead are presented in Appendices F and G respectively. The 
coefficients of each model were estimated 19 times--once for each of 
the years in the 1951-69 study period--based on cross-sectional data 
* A situation in which the inclusion of dummy variables in qn 
equation, causes the (X'X) matrix to be singular. For a more complete 
discussion of this topic see Suits (32, pp. 548-551). 
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from approximately 1,100 trade flows among the 42 countries in sample. 
Appendix H has the number of observations per year for the 19 years. 
Each B .. dummy variable coefficient in model (4.5) estimates the 
1J 
amount by which trade from group j countries to group i countries dif-
fers from what would be expected based on the other independent vari-
ables. Changes in the estimated coefficients for any given P .. over 
1J 
the period 1951-69 may be attributed to either secular factors or 
changes in trade relations resulting from the formation of a preference 
group. Prior to the formation of the preference group, the coefficient 
of the dummy variable measures the net trade preference that existed 
among members of a particular group or among members of two groups. 
In the post-integration period the value of the coefficient for each 
preference dummy may be either greater than or less than the pre-
integration value indicating that there has been an increase or de-
crease in trade flows between'm and x. Thus, the net impact of the 
preference group in trade flow is, ceteris paribus, appropriately mea-
sured by the difference between the value of the preference dummy 
coefficients prior to and following the formation of the group. To 
assume that the dummy variables are measuring preference group effects 
requires the strong ceteris paribus assumption that other factors are 
explicitly included in (4.5) are not correlated with P ... All of the 
1J 
P .. shift in 1959 or 1961. Other events that may correlate with these 
1J 
time periods are the Vietnam conflict and a period of extended economic 
growth in the U. S. 
Empirical Results of the Trade Flow Model 
The estimated coefficients of model (4.5), t statistics, and the 
coefficient of determination for each equation are presented in 
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Table III. The coefficients of determination have an average value of 
72 percent which appears to be quite acceptable relative to other 
studies. The average for the study of Tinbergen was 81 percent (35). 
The average value of the coefficient of determination in the study of 
Linnernrnan (25), is 79.70 percent, or 7 percentage points above the 
result obtained in this study. Since neither of these studies has a 
group of sample countries as heterogeneous as the sample used here, the 
slightly lower R2 is easily justified. 
Income Elasticities 
An interesting aspect for the results obtained for the coefficients 
of GNP and GNP is that their values were almost the same in all years 
m x 
and lower than 1.0. This may indicate that with increasing GNP in both 
the exporting and the importing countries, the flow of trade between 
them declines relatively because of more variation in domestic 
consumption patterns in the exporting country and/or more diffused 
domestic production in the importing country, ceteris paribus. A 1 per-
cent increase in the GNP of either m or x will cause an average increase 
in trade between them of 0.73 percent. 
The Effect of Distance 
The distance variable was used as a proxy for resistance forces to 
international trade. The negative sign of the estimated coefficients is 
consistent with expectations. The direct economic implication of the 
distance variable is that the greater the distance between potential 
trade partners, the lower the level of trade, ceteris paribus. 
Variable 
or 
Statistic 
Constant 
log GNP 
m 
log GNP 
x 
log DIST 
mx 
DNEIGH 
mx 
pll 
pl2 
pl3 
pl4 
pl5 
p21 
p22 
p23 
p24 
p25 
p31 
p32 
p33 
P34 
p35 
TABLE III 
ESTIMATED IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND PREFERENCE 
FORCES ON TRADE FLOW = 1959-60 
Year 
1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 
5.60 4.85 6.42 4.41 5.59 
0.82 0.78 0.75 0.76 o. 72 
(21. 87) (20. 57) (22.61) (22.26) (21. 86) 
o. 77 0.74 0.70 o. 71 0.66 
(20. 71) (19.50) (21. 61) (21.12) (20.21) 
-0. 79 -0.82 -0.89 -0.67 -0.81 
(-6.86) (-6.36) (-9. 24) (-7.02) (-8.89) 
0.44 0.43 0.32 0.44 o. 21 
(1. 99) (1.91) (1. 62) (2.25) (1. 08) 
0.99 1. 38 1. 60 1. 59 2.17 
-0.79 -0.61 -0.18 -0.20 0.15 
-0.88 -0.66 -0.49 -0.51 ~o. 24 
0.53 0.60 0.37 0.37 0.57 
0.15 0.39 0.34 0.22 0.25 
0.16 0.57 0.50 0.45 0.93 
-0.52 -0.20 -0.19 0.32 0.37 
-0.43 -0.09 -0.30 0.09 0.15 
-1.09 -0.42 -0.03 -0.01 -0.01 
0.33 0.26 0.40 0.50 0.82 
-0.01 0.30 -0.05 -0.01 0.52 
-0.06 0.17 0.04 0.53 0.59 
-0.08 0.07 -0.19 0.18 0.23 
-0.37 -0.73 -0.33 0.07 0.21 
0.02 -0.21 -0.24 -0.13 0.18 
40 
1956 
6.07 
0.73 
(22.04) 
0.69 
(20.68) 
-0.87 
(09.32) 
0.10 
(0.51) 
2.07 
0.15 
-0.27 
0.27 
0.41 
0.85 
0.19 
0.02 
-0.18 
0. 96 
0.38 
0.36 
0.07 
0.01 
0.03 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 19Sl 19S2 19S3 19S4 19SS 19S6 
p41 0.33 0.47 0.22 0.47 0.73 o.so 
p42 
-0.10 -0.lS o.os 0.23 0.31 0.29 
P43 
-O.S4 -0.34 -0.36 -0.38 -0.14 -0.41 
P44 
-0.97 -0.34 -1.10 -0.20 -0.66 -0.87 
p4S 
-1.21 -1.09 -1.43 -1. 09 -1.ll -0.86 
PSl 0.13 0.47 0.63 0.64 0.84 0.68 
PS2 0.26 0.29 0.44 0.61 0.86 0.60 
PS3 0.17 -0.02 -0.10 0.01 0.2S 0.17 
PS4 
-2.38 -1. 37 -0.86 -0.2S -1.49 -l.S4 
PSS 
-1.06 -1. 37 -1.28 -1.30 -0.74 -0.78 
Coef. of 
Det.* 0.73 o. 71 0.73 0. 71 0. 70 0. 70 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 19S7 19S8 19S9 1960 1961 1962 
Constant 5.SO S.64 S.89 6.86 6.0S 6.24 
log GNP o. 74 o. 72 0.6S 0.66 0.6S 0.66 
m (22.04 (22.84) (19. 71) (20.44) (19.24) (21. 21) 
log GNP 0.69 0.67 0.68 0.6S 0.66 0.66 
x (20.42) (21. 84) (20.98) (20.68) (20. 44) (21. 41) 
log DIST -0.79 -0.82 -0.80 -0.90 -0.83 -0.84 
mx (-8. S6) (-9.10) (-8.60) (-9 .47) (-8.60) (-9.43) 
DNEIGH 0.19 0.30 0.28 0.20 0.3S 0.20 
mx (0.96) (1. S8) (1. S2) (1.12) (1. 92) (1.17) 
pll 1.88 1.81 1.82 1.69 1.81 1. 79 
pl2 0.09 0.2S 0.39 0.16 0.34 0.12 
pl3 -0.37 -0.22 -0.17 -0.40 -0.12 -0.2S 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 19S7 19S8 19S9 1960 1961 1962 
pl4 0.23 0.4S 0.04 -0.4S -0.0S 0.13 
plS 0.27 0.20 0.38 0.16 0.23 0.11 
p21 0.87 0.79 0.38 0.61 0. 77 O.S7 
p22 0.2S 0.18 0.31 0.19 0.48 0.43 
p23 0.02 -0.01 -0.20 -0.43 -0.18 -0.34 
p24 0.14 0.11 0.19 -0.19 -0.20 -0.23 
p2S 0.79 0.72 O.S8 0.49 0.49 O.S2 
p31 0.3S 0.31 -0.01 0.12 0.19· 0.01 
p32 0.43 0.43 0.24 0.03 0.28 0.10 
p33 0.07 0.09 -0.13 -0.31 0.02 -0.16 
p34 -0.02 -0.01 -0.11 -0.24 -0.27 -0.40 
p3S -0.06 0.02 0.03 -0.0S -0.11 -0.13 
p41 o.so 0.6S -0.02 -0.01 0.04 0.09 
p42 o.ss 0.41 0.12 0.20 0.24 0.23 
P43 -0.22 -0.3S -0.23 -0.14 -0.34 -0.14 
P44 -0.73 -0.87 -0.60 -0.89 -O.S7 -0.3S 
p4S -1.12 -1.17 -1.02 -1. 24 -1.10 -1.06 
PSl 0.63 0.70 0.37 0.49 0.47 0.47 
PS2 0.67 0.83 O.S4 0.62 O.S7 O.S8 
PS3 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.11 O.lS o. 0,6 
PS4 -1.14 -0.90 -1. 66 -1.89 -1. so -1. 2S 
PSS -0.8S -0.74 -1.10 -1.34 -1.40 -1.04 
Coef. of 
Det.* 0. 70 0. 71 0.69 0.69 0.69 o. 71 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Constant 5.70 5.97 5.95 6.33 6.03 4.55 5.28 
log GNP 0.69 0.69 0.64 0.63 0.60 0.76 0.83 
m (22.79) (23. 91) (22.05) (22.21) (21.24) (24.54) (25.13) 
log GNP 0.73 0.70 0.69 0.68 0.70 o. 77 0.87 
x (24. 46) (24.41) (23.83) (24.37) (24. 79) (24. 87) (26.75) 
log DIST -0.83 -0.85 -0.86 -0.89 -0.87 -0.81 -0.98 
mx (-9. 74) (-10. 43) (-9.97) (-10.86) (-10.24) (-9.44) (-11.27) 
DNEIGH 0.14 0.15 0.10 0.02 . 0. 08 0.28 0.16 
mx (0.82) (0.94) (0.60) (0.10) (0.48) (1. 55) (O. 77) 
pll 1.83 1.86 2.32 2.53 2.62 2.26 2.06 
pl2 0.15 0.14 0.59 0.67 0.81 0.67 0.48 
pl3 -0.05 -0.11 'O. 30 0.43 0.53 0.45 0.42 
pl4 0.31 0.22 0.41 0.39 0. 71 0.86 1.07 
pl5 0.27 0.19 0.60 0.45 0.50 0.48 0.51 
p21 0.54 0.56 0.85 0.89 0.86 0.83 0.65 
p22 0.65 0.58 0.89 0.95 1.04 1.15 0.93 
p23 -0.12 -0.25 -0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.16 0.01 
p24 0.08 0.11 0.38 0.38 0.17 0.62 1.12 
p25 0.75 0.69 1.02 1.07 1.18 1.10 1. 34 
p31 -0.01 0.02 0.25 0.29 0.30 0.30 0.19 
p32 0.17 0.11 0.34 0.29 0.34 0.55 0.34 
P33 0.06 0.04 0.27 0.27 0.43 0.75 0.74 
P34 -0.19 -0.08 -0.14 0.08 0.14 0.47 o. 70 
p35 -0.03 -0.12 0.07 0.09 0.29 0.35 0.45 
p41 0.18 0.21 0.33 0.17 0.18 0.52 0.55 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 
p42 0.34 0.31 0.48 0.35 0.30 0.78 1.08 
p43 -0.19 -0.19 -0.12 -0.28 -0.25 0.16 0.04 
P44 0.13 0.68 0.98 1.10 1.36 2.46 2.75 
P45 -0.44 -0.33 -0.20 -0.25 -0.45 0.06 -1.01 
PSl 0.39 0.45 0.62 0.60 0.63 0.80 0.76 
p52 0.48 0.37 0.54 0.62 0. 72 0.90 1.06 
P53 0.16 -0.05 0.11 o.il 0.24 0.28 0.59 
p54 -2.82 -3.17 -2.83 -2.13 -2.33 -2.89 -2.88 
p55 -0.60 -0.55 -0.23 -0.09 0.03 0.10 0.39 
Coef. of 
Det.* 0.73 0.74 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0. 74 
* Coefficient of Determination. 
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The estimated coefficients of the trade flow model are not 
inconsistent with those found in earlier studies. Table IV presents 
the average income elasticities for the three different models of this 
study and the coefficient for the distance variable compared with those 
obtained by Tinbergen (35) and Linnemman (25). As can be observed, the 
estimates for models (4.3)-(4.5) are in line with those previous 
analyses. 
The Effect of Neighbors 
The estimated coefficients of DNEIGH exhibit an unstable variable 
trend over the 19 years of the study. The average value of the coeffi-
cient for the overall period is 0.23, but from 1951 to 1961 the average 
was 0.30 and from 1962-69, it was 0.14. The fact that the neighbors 
coefficient fell in the decade of the 1960's may be associated with the 
formation of economic unions. That is, the establishment of preference 
groups may have reduced the previous propensity for trade with 
neighbors. 
Preference Variables 
The results from the trade flow model with respect to the dummy 
preference variables will be used in the next chapter to quantify the 
effect that these economic integrations had on member countries and 
with the outside world. Since there is no null hypothesis with regards 
to the expected value of these coefficients, no tests of statistical 
significance were performed. 
TABLE IV 
ESTIMATED TRADE ELASTICITIES WITH RESPECT 
TO INCOME AND DISTANCE 
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Estimated Elasticities 
Tinbergen (35) 
42 countries, 1959 
18 countries, 1958 
Linnemman (25) 
80 countries, 1958/60 
This study (average 1951-69) 
42 countries 
Model (4. 3) 
Model (4.4) 
Model (4. 5) 
GNP of GNP of 
importing 
country 
0.91 
0.62 
0.82 
0.76 
0.73 
0.73 
exporting 
country 
1.00 
0. 7 l; 
0. 96 
0.76 
0.76 
0.73 
Distance 
-0. 78 
-0.56 
-0. 77 
-0.65 
-0.63 
-0.84 
CHAPTER V 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT 
OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 
This chapter details the procedure used to calculate the economic 
impact of the four preference groups described in the previous chapters. 
The empirical analysis was performed for each post-integration year 
from 1961 to 1969. Since there was little deviation from the trend 
of the estimates, the results from only three years are included here: 
1961, 1965 and 1969. 
Estimating the Net Change in the 
Preference Variables 
The net trade impact of the preference groups on one another and 
on the U. S. and Canada is shown by a change in the estimated coeffi-
cients of the preference dunnny variables of equation (4.5). The 
difference between pre-integration and post-integration values of 
these coefficients is equal to the percentage change in trade flow 
associated with the preference dummy variable. To accurately measure 
the net difference between pre- and post-integration coefficients, the 
* estimates over the 19 year study period are "normalized." 
* The term "normalize" as used in this study has a specific meaning 
and should not be confused with the same term frequently used in statis-
tics. In this study "normalize" is used to identify a technique to 
estimate average values of the preference variables coefficients and to 
calculate the difference of the estimated values with integration and 
without integration. 
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The procedure followed was to regress the estimated value of the 
coefficients for each preference variable on time using a dummy variable 
approach to measure shifts in either the intercept and/or slope associ-
ated with the formation of the preference groups (15, 16, 32). 
There are 25 separate equations to be normalized corresponding 
to the number of preference variables in equation (4.5). The dependent 
variable is the estimated coefficient for each preference dummy: 
(5 .1) 
where: 
the estimated coefficients of preference variable for trade 
f h .th i h .th . . . rom t e J export ng group to t e i importing group in 
time period t where t = 1, •.• , 19; and, 
D = dummy variable for integration equal to zero prior to 
integration and one thereafter. 
The coefficients b1 and b3 of (5.1) measure the integration 
induced shift in the intercept and slope respectively. The estimated 
coefficients of (5.1) are presented in Table V. 
The coefficients of (5.1) were estimated for the period 1951-69 
for 22 of the 25 preference variables. The three exceptions were s12 
(imports of U. S. & C. from EEC), s21 (imports of EEC from U. S. & C.), 
and s22 (trade among EEC countries). Each of these fluctuated so 
greatly during the 1951-53 period that it was difficult to get meaning-
ful results if these years were included in the normalization. A possi-
ble reason for the instability in those three years might be the 
consequences of the World War II and the Marshall Plan (8, pp. 158-62). 
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TABLE V 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS OF THE MODEL USED TO 
MEASURE THE NET IMPACT OF THE 
PREFERENCE VARIABLES* 
Estimated Coefficients R2 
Dependent A A A 
bo bl b b3 % Variable 2 
A 1. 3296 -0.3707 0.0673 0.0100 57.78 611 (7. 0287) (-0.6436) (2.2106) (0.2148) 
1312 
-0.1680 0.0314 0.0857 -0.0360 63.12 
(-0.8694) (0.1126) (1.4714) (-0.5929) 
A 
-0.7368 -0. 5727 0.0572 0.0419 88.93 B13 (-7.3911) (-1.8866) (3. 5626) (1.6948) 
A 0.7350 -2.1909 -0.0795 0.2065 78.33 614 (6. 2653) (-6.1321) (-4.2064) (7.0890) 
s15 
0.2873 -0.6557 -0. 0018 0.0510 50.95 
(3.8435) (-2.8802) (-0.1509) (2.7499) 
s21 0.5952 -0.2566 0.0612 -0.0298 38. 77 (3. 7209) (-1.1116) (1. 2688) (-0.5923) 
s22 
0.3787 -0.6803 -0.0382 0.1283 91.68 
(3. 3584) (-4 .1806) (-1.1243) (3.6135) 
623 
-0.3170 -0.3991 0.0550 -0.0136 56.58 
(-3.0999) (-1. 9310) (2. 7181) (-0.5748) 
624 
-0.7584 -0.3684 0.1272 -0.0310 69.85 
(-3.6560) (-0.8787) (3.0984) (-0.6427) 
625 
0.2015 -0.5940 0.0880 -0.0001 85.15 
(1. 9926) (-2.9055) (4.3962) (-0. 0007) 
S31 
0.1324 -0.3705 0. 0105 0.0161 11. 20 
(1.1293) (-1.0371) (0.5601) (0.5558) 
s32 
0.1837 -0.4291 0.0166 0.0183 15.49 
(1.4373) (-1.1022) (0.8073) (O. 5778) 
A 0.0854 -1.4621 -0.0154 0.1252 75.99 
B33 (0.8276) (-4.6494) (-0.9305) (4.8823) 
A 
-0.3731 -1. 4321 0.0402 0.0824 64.38 
B34 (-2.5959) (-3.2716) (1. 7375) (2.3079) 
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TABLE V (Continued) 
Estimated Coefficients R2 
Depe.ndent A A A A 
Variable bo bl b2 b3 % 
A 
S35 -0.1241 -0. 9169 0.0151 0.0605 72.57 (-1. 7106) (-4 .1480) (1. 2911) (3.3583) 
B41 0.5374 -1.1086 -0.0298 0.0846 37.55 (4.1470) (-2.8088) (-1.4272) (2.6286) 
A 
S42 -0.0529 -0.7380 0.0442 0.0389 63.64 (-0.4158) (-1.9017) (2.1548) (1. 2306) 
S43 -0.4642 -0.2356 0.0280 0.0088 57.99 (5.8956) (0.9825) (2.2121) (0.4505) 
-0.6643 -4.5322 -0.0106 0.4202 95.51 
S44 (-3.6023) (-8.0697) (-0.3573) (9.1739) 
A 
-1.1893 -0.2724 0.0095 0.0523 58.57 
S45 (-5. 7258) (-0.4306) (0.2854) (1. 0142) 
A 0.4683 -0.5888 0.0163 0.0302 29.29 
S51 (4.3563) (-1. 7985) (0.9418) (1.1325) 
A 0.3467 -0.6128 0.0410 0.0200 52.27 
S52 (3.2847) (-1. 9061) (2.4123) (0.7663) 
S53 
0.0284 -0.5306 0.0140 0.0315 42.56 
(0.3369) (-2.0648) (1.0360) (1. 5068) 
A 
-1. 3293 1.0107 -0.0033 -0.1368 54.13 
S54 (-3.1753) (0.7927) (-0.0501) (-1.3163) 
A 
-1.1695 -2.3245 0.0207 0.1867 86.96 
S55 (-7.8413) (-5.1177) (0.8643) (5.0410) 
* t-values are in parentheses. 
Secretary of State George C. Marshall presented a plan for the 
reconstruction of Europe in a speech at Harvard University on June 5, 
1947. Any further American assistance, he declared, "should provide 
a cure rather than a mere palliative'' (44). Under the Marshall Plan, 
shipments of food, steel, coal, cotton, petroleum, farm machinery, 
mining machinery, electrical equipment, and motor trucks, were sent 
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to Europe. These shipments were in form of aid such that statistics 
on commercial trade between U. S. and Europe were distorted throughout 
the period of the Marshall Plan. By 1954 trade was dictated primarily 
by market forces so the period (1954-69) was used to normalize the 
preference coefficients for trade between U. S. and Canada and Europe. 
The Net Impact of Economic Integrations 
In the absence of any a priori expectations with regard to the 
behavior of the preference dummy coefficients, the net change in these 
coefficients was measured by equation (5.1). The coefficients of (5.1) 
measure both intercept shifts and slope shifts of the preference dummy 
coefficients. The estimated coefficients of (5.1) may be used to deter-
mine the average net impact of the formation of the preference group 
in each of the post-integration years realizing that the net impact 
may change over time as measured by the b3 coefficient in equation 
(5 .1). 
Estimation of the net integration impact requires the conversion 
of the b1' and b3 coefficients in (5.1) into dollar values for each Bij. 
In any post-integration year, the impact of integration is the 
difference between estimates of (5.1) when D = 1 and when D = 0. This 
difference gives the magnitude (in log terms because the dependent 
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variable in (4.5) is in logs) by which normal trade between the two 
groups has been modified. 
If t is any post-integration time period and F is the observed 
ot 
trade flow between any two groups (ignoring the subscripts for the 
importing and exporting blocks for simplicity), and F is expected 
et 
trade flow assuming no integration, then by (4.5): 
and by (5.1): 
Substituting St in (4.5) by its estimated value and giving the value 
of 1 to D for trade between the two groups, then: 
If integration had not occurred, the value of D would be zero and 
the trade flow in t would be estimated by: 
The net impact of the integration is the difference between the 
observed trade flow and the expected trade flow: 
Taking antilogs: 
F 
~= 
F 
et 
If a 
antilog 
= antilog 
F 
ot 
a 
(bl 
A 
+ b3t) 
(bl + b3t), then: 
(5. 2) 
(5.3) 
(5. 4) 
(5. 5) 
(5. 6) 
(5. 7) 
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Then in any post-integration year, the change in trade between two 
preference groups is estimated by: 
llT 
t 
F 
ot 
F 
ot 
a 
(5. 8) 
where llT measures either GTC, TD or TE depending on the preference 
groups considered. 
As explained in Chapter II, shifts in trade between two preference 
groups (excluding U. S. & C.) might be caused by TD of one block or TE 
of the other or a combination of both effects. Unfortunately, ex post 
statistical analyses measure only the net impact of the two forces. This 
combined effect is net trade diversion (NTD) which may be expressed as: 
NTD.. TD .. + TE.. (5. 9) 
l] lJ lJ 
when i and j 2, ••• , 5 and i I j. 
There is no a priori expectation about the sign of NTD since it 
depends on which force is greater: substitution of imports or expansion 
of exports. 
Once NTD is known, it is possible to compute the change in the 
merchandise trade valance (llMTB) of one block with respect to another: 
llMTB . . = NTD . . - NTD .. 
l] J l l] 
(5.10) 
where i and j 2, .•• , 5; and i I j. 
The change in the merchandise trade balance (llMTB) of any of the 
four preference groups with respect to the U. S. and C. is simply: 
TElj - TDil (5 .11) 
where j and i = 2, •.. , 5 and j = i. 
54 
Estimates of Gross Trade Creation, Trade 
Diversion, Trade Expansion, by 
Preference Groups 
The observed trade flow F of trade among the different blocks 
o(ij) 
of countries are presented in Appendix I for the period 1951-69 and the 
estimated flow of trade F if integrations had not occurred are 
e(ij) 
given in Appendis J for the post-integration period (1961-69). These 
data are summarized in Table VI which shows the net change estimated 
for each trade flow. Table VII shows the observed trade flows as a 
percentage of what was estimated without integration. The diagonal 
elements of Table 5.3 show the gross trade creation caused by each of 
the four preference groups. It is expected that integration will result 
in positive GTC; i.e., that the diagonal elements of Table VII will be 
greater than 100 percent. Of the four groups, CACM had the greatest 
relative gain with intra-group trade expanding more than 31-fold in 
1969. GTC for EFTA and LAFTA were below 100 percent level in 1961 the 
first complete year of integration, but by 1965 and 1969 both blocks 
had increased GTC considerably. 
European Economic Community 
As expected GTCEEC was positive and increased over the years from 
almost $6.1 billion in 1961 to nearly $30.1 billion in 1969. More than 
83 percent of the intra-EEC trade in 1969 may be attributed to gross 
trade creation resulting from formation of the group. 
As expected, TDEEC (with the U. S. & C.) and NTDEEC (with the other 
three groups) were all negative. The total net trade diversion of the 
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TABLE VI 
ESTIMATED NET CHANGE IN TRADE FLOWS ASSOCIATED WITH THE FORMATION 
OF PREFERENCE GROUPS: 1961, 1965 AND 1969 
Importing ExEorting GrouE 
Year Group u. s. & c. EEC EFTA CACM LAFTA 
------------------millions of dollars-------------
1961 u. s. & c. 
-2' 135 -1,999 -415 19 -328 
EEC -2,020 6,070 -5,163 -102 -1,252 
EFTA -471 -1,266 -359 -22 -242 
CACM -42 -44 -4 3 2 
LAFTA -1,084 -791 -221 -9 -181 
1965 u. s. & c. -2,739 -4,163 251 227 366 
EEC -4,177 14,547 -8,156 -198 -1,188 
EFTA -456 -1,161 2,121 -13 -7 
CACM 49 -33 -5 llO 1 
LAFTA -559 -852 -76 -71 371 
1969 u. s. & c. -4,144 -7 ,5ll 1,157 326 1,216 
EEC -8,837 30,050 -ll, 977 -253 -1,731 
EFTA -321 ....:820 5 ,377 9 227 . 
CACM 165 
* 
-4 246 2 
LAFTA -65 -734 93 -231 922 
'/( 
Less than 0.5. 
Year 
1961 
1965 
1969 
TABLE VII 
ACTUAL TRADE FLOWS WITH INTEGRATION AS A PERCENT OF 
ESTIMATED TRADE FLOWS WITHOUT INTEGRATION 
Importing ExEorting GrouE 
Group u. s. & c. EEC EFTA CACM 
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LAFTA 
--------------------percent---------------------
u. s. & c. 77 .1 69.5 89.5 108.4 91.0 
EEC 55.8 207.8 58.2 49.2 55.2 
EFTA 82.5 79.7 91. 9 59.2 77 .8 
CADM 83.7 73.4 87.1 109.5 143.8 
LAFTA 77.4 67.6 83.2 61.1 76.3 
u. s. & c. 80.2 60.2 105 .8 247.6 111.6 
EEC 49.5 347.1 55.1 43.5 55.2 
EFTA 87.9 85.7 151. 6 82.2 99.1 
CACM 117.4 85.7 90.2 587.6 177 .2 
LAFTA 87.4 73.2 94.4 35.4 161.0 
u. s. & c. 83.5 52.1 125.1 565.6 136.8 
EEC 44.0 579.8 52.2 38.4 55.2 
EFTA 93.8 92. 2 250.2 114.3 126.2 
CACM 164.7 100.2 93.4 3155.1 218.5 
LAFTA 98.6 79.3 107 .1 20.5 339.7 
EEC relative to all other countries included in preference groups and 
U. S. & C grew from $8.6 billion in 1961 to $22.8 billion in 1969, as 
shownin Table VIII. The total NTCEEC increased from $-2.5 billion 
in 1961 to $7.3 billion in 1969 which indicates that the EEC has sus-
tained a relatively strong net trade creation effect within the group 
and also has shown a considerable trade diversion effect with other 
trading partners. 
European Free Trade Association 
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The results obtained for EFTA show that TDEFTA (with U. S. & C.) 
and NTDEFTA (with the other three groups) were negative as expected in 
1961 and 1965, but in 1969 they were positive with respect to CACM and 
LAFTA. Since many of the exports of EFTA from Latin America are primary 
products, the demand for them is very inelastic and they generally are 
free of duties or pay a relatively low tariff upon entering EFTA coun-
tries. Since many of these goods are not produced within EFTA, the TD 
effect of EFTA on Latin American countries has been minimal. 
Central American Common Market 
The countries in CACM presented a relatively strong NTC increasing 
from $-84 million in 1961 to $410 million in 1969. There is, however 
no evidence of TDCACM (with U. S. & C.) or NTDCACM with the other three 
groups. These results for CACM are consistent with a priori expecta-
tions. The level of industrialization of the members of the market and 
the relatively low income and population size of the market suggest 
that it would be difficult for CACM to compete either in price or 
quality with goods produced in U. S. & C., Europe, and other more 
Preference 
Group 
EEC 
EFTA 
CACM 
LAFTA 
1961 
Total Net 
Trade 
Diversion 
TABLE VIII 
ESTIMATED TOTAL NET TRADE DIVERSION AND TOTAL 
NET TRADE CREATION 
1965 
Total Net Total Net Total Net 
Trade Trade Trade 
Total Net 
Trade 
Creation Diversion Creation Diversion 
1969 
Total Net 
Trade 
Creation 
---------------------------------millions of dollars---------------------------------
-8,534 -2,465 ".""13,718 +829 -22,797 +7,253 
-2,001 -2,360 -1.638 +484 -905 +4 ,471 
-87 -84 11 +121 +163 +410 
-2,104 -2,285 -1,558 -1,187 -936 -41 
Vl 
CXl 
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advanced Latin American countries. Moreover, the possibilities of 
substituting many imported products with domestic production is not 
too great due to the small size of the total market. Consequently, the 
primary effect of CACM appears to have been a better allocation of re-
sources within the area wnich has caused considerable gross trade 
creation among the members. 
Latin American Free Trade Area 
As expected TDLAFTA (with U. S. & C.) and NTDLAFTA (with the 
other three groups) were negative in all years except NTDLAFTA with 
respect to EFTA in 1969. 
The LAFTA countries have gained at the partial expense of the CACM 
countries. As the trade between CACM and LAFTA generally consists 
of agricultural products, raw materials and semi-manufactured goods 
which are relatively abundant in the LAFTA countries, the discrimina-
tion in tariffs put CACM. at a comparative disadvantage with respect 
to LAFTA countries. This is reflected in the increase in NTDLAFTA 
with respect to CACM. In 1969 exports of CACM t9 LAFTA accounted 
for almost $60 million which is only 20 percent of what estimated 
trade between both groups would have been if they had not formed com-
peting preference groups. 
The Effects of Preference Groups on Trade of 
the U. S. and Canada 
Trade with EEC and EFTA 
Those who are concerned about possible adverse effects of 
European integration on the U. S. and Canada have focused mainly on the 
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effects of tariff preferences. When members of the EEC lower tariff 
barriers to one another but maintain an average of existing tariff rates 
against outsiders, this will obviously provide competition advantages 
to producers within the EEC. The same sort of discrimination against 
U. S. and Canada exports will occur within the EFTA, even though each 
EFTA country is free to retain its present tariff rates against 
outsiders. 
Without any empirical analysis, Emile Benoit (9, p. 173) argued 
that the formation of a second trade block in Europe, (EFTA), would 
have an additional adverse impact on U. S. trade. But so long as EFTA 
remains independent of the EEC, the effect on U. S. trade should be 
smaller than that of the EEC. The reasons that Benoit gave were: 
first, the volume of U. S. exports to EFTA is about a third less than 
to the EEC. Second, EFTA confines itself to tariff reductions on 
nonagricultural items. Third, for most of the country's tariffs (with 
the exception of the U.K.) were already relatively low so the degree of 
tariff discrimination in those markets would be limited. Fourth, the 
smaller countries in the EFTA will, in many cases, be unable to dis-
place U. S. exports even when favored by a tariff differential, because 
they lack the industrial capacity. As expected, TDEEC and TDEFTA (with 
respect to U. S. & C.) were negative. These results (which are summar-
ized in Table IX) are in line with the predictions of Benoit. The EEC 
presented a substantial trade diversion effect relative to the U. S. & 
Canada, increasing from $-2.0 billion in 1961 to almost $-8.9 billion 
in 1969. The formation of EFTA did not greatly affect the exports of 
the U. S. & C. to them as Benoit predicted. TDEFTA (with respect to 
the U. S. & C.) fell from $-47 million in 1961 to $-321 million in 1969. 
Year 
1961 
1965 
1969 
TABLE IX 
ESTIMATED TRADE DIVERSION OF PREFERENCE GROUPS 
FROM THE U. S. AND CANADA 
Preference Group 
EEC EFTA CACM 
61 
LAFTA 
----------------millions of dollars------------------
-2,020 -471 -42 -1,084 
-4,177 -456 49 -559 
-8,837 -321 165 -65 
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Trade with CACM and LAFTA 
The empirical results suggest that neither CACM nor LAFTA have 
diverted imports from the U. S. and Canada. This is shown by the 
decrease in TDCACM and TDLAFTA over the period from 1961 to 1969. 
In fact, in 1965 and 1969 TDCACM was positive with respect to the U. S. 
& C. as shown in Table IX. The potential gain in exports of U. S. and 
C. to CACM accounted for almost $165 million in 1969 compared to paten-
tial losses of exports to LAFTA countries of almost $65 million. 
Internal Trade Between U. S. and Canada 
Internal trade between U. S. and Canada increased by 292 percent 
for the period 1961-69 from a total of slightly more than $7 billion 
in 1961 to $21 billion in 1969. The total trade of U. S. and Canada 
with the four preference groups plus trade with one another accounted 
for $18.7 billion in 1961 with 38.2 percent of that total accounted 
for by trade between the U. S. & C. By 1969 total trade amounted 
to $39.8 billion with 52.6 percent of it corresponding to commerce 
between U. S. and Canada. Thus, there has been an increase in trade 
between these two countries in absolute and relative terms. However, 
as shown in Table VI this increment in trade has been less than expected 
resulting in a negative GTC between the two countries as a consequence 
of the formation of EEC, EFTA, CACM and LAFTA. 
A significant share of the increase in trade that did occur 
between U. S. & Canada may be attributed to the United States-Canadian 
Automotive Agreement since most of the increase in U.S.-Canada trade 
came after 1965 when the agreement was signed. Essentially this 
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agreement adopts some features of Bladen's duty-free scheme together 
with built-in safeguards that ensure a specified level of Canadian 
automotive production in the future. It also includes some protection 
features for the American producers (17, p. 17). 
Comparisons With Other Studies 
In general the empirical results obtained are consistent with the 
expectations based on customs union theory. The results were also in 
line with those of Aitken and Lowry (3). They found that GTC of CACM 
and LAFTA has increased progressively through the post-integration ~ 
period and that neither CACM nor LAFTA have had a significant TD effect 
on trade of other Latin American countries. However, the results of 
this study do show a significant NTDLAFTA with respect to CACM. 
The results of this study were also in accord with those of Aitken 
(2) with respect to the impact of EEC on trade with EFTA countries. He 
found an increasing TDEEC effect (with respect to EFTA) between 1961 
and 1967. The results of this study also showed an increasing NTDEEC 
effect over the period 1961-69. Aitken also found a cumulative growth 
in GTCEEC and GTCEFTA over the respective integration periods. Aitken's 
results gave a GTCEEC of $4.2 billion in. 1961 and $11.2 billion in 
1967. This study presents a GTCEEC of $6.1 billion in 1961 and $18.9 
billion in 1967. GTCEFTA for Aitken grew from $126 million in 1961 to 
$2.5 billion in 1967 compared with $-359 million in 1961 and $3.6 
billion in 1967 found in this study. Thus, both studies agree on the 
trend for GTC estimates, but there are differences in the magnitudes of 
the estimates. 
To a large extent, these differences might be due to differences 
in the methodologies used. Aitken, for instance, measures the post-
integration preference effect as being the absolute value of the 
preference dummy coefficient. This study uses the estimated diffetence 
in the value of the preference coefficients if integration had occurred 
and if integration had not occurred. Other differences include the 
data base, sample composition, and period of analysis. 
The results for CACM found in this study were similar to those 
obtained by Wilford (45), although the methodologies are completely 
different. He worked with comparisons of ex post income elasticities 
of import demand for extra- and intra-area trade before and after the 
formation of the customs union, assuming that the income elasticities 
would have remained unchanged in the absence of the common market. 
The results for the EEC in this study also compare favorably with 
those of Kreinin (24). He found NTC for the EEC of $8.9 billion in 
1969-70 compared to the 1969 estimate of $7.3 billion shown in Table 
VIII. The difference may be explained by: a) Kreinin's exclusion of 
any consumption effect or TE effect; b) Kreinin's estimates are based 
only on trade of manufacturers; and, c) differences in methodology 
and composition of the sample. 
CHAPTER VI 
EVALUATION OF THE IMPACTS OF 
PREFERENCE GROUPS 
This chapter examines the position of each block with respect to 
the others in terms of changes in merchandise trade balances (~MTB). 
A second section provides a brief analysis of the effect of economic 
integration on the agricultural trade of the United States. 
Estimated Change in Merchandise 
Trade Balances Caused by 
the Preference Groups 
The change in merchandise trade balance (~MTB) of a particular 
group of countries with respect to another block of countries is the 
difference between net trade expansion of one and net trade diversion 
of the other. Since ~MTB measures the net difference between the 
increment in the exports and the reduction in imports caused by inte-
gration, the member countries of a preference group should improve 
their external position with respect to other blocks. Thus, the 
expected sign for ~MTB is positive for a successful integration. 
General Expectations 
One of the main purposes of economic integrations is to organize 
the economics of the member countries in a way that will permit them 
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to compete more effectively in world markets. If this competitiveness 
is achieved, then the change in the merchandise trade balance (tiMTB) 
of the group with respect to other countries should improve. This 
means that the group has a net benefit on the foreign account of member 
countries which is one of the primary objectives of economic 
integrations. 
Given the characteristics of the four preference groups· in this 
study, it can be expected that: 
a) All groups should have a positive tiMTB with respect to the 
u. s. & c. 
b) The two European groups should present positive tiMTB with 
respect to the two Latin American groups because the more developed 
European countries are in a better position to capture the gains 
from integration. 
c) Within continents, larger groups should dominate smaller 
groups. 
Empirical Results 
The estimated change in merchandise trade balances for each group 
relative to all others are shown in Table X for 1965 and Table XI for 
1969. 
United States and Canada. As expected, the U. S. & C. position 
with EEC, EFTA and LAFTA deterioriated due to a substantial decline in 
U. S. & C. exports (TD of the preference groups) and the small increase 
in imports from the groups. The deterioriation of the merchandise 
trade balance of the U. S. and Canada with respect to the four groups 
TABLE X 
ESTIMATED NET CHANGE IN MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCES 
CAUSED BY PREFERENCE GROUP FORMATION: 1965 
ExEorting GrouE 
Importing Group u. s. & c. EEC EFTA CACM 
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LAFTA 
----------------millions of dollars-----------------
u. s. & c. 0 +14 +708 +179 +926 
EEC -14 0 
-6' 996 -165 -335 
EFTA -708 +6,995 0 -8 +68 
CACM -179 +165 +8 0 +71 
LAFTA -926 +335 -68 -71 0 
All Preference 
Groups -1,827 +7,490 -7,050 -244 -196 
All Preference 
Groups plus 
u. s. & c. -1,827 +7,504 -6,342 -65 +730 
TABLE XI 
ESTIMATED NET CHANGE IN MERCHANDISE TRADE BALANCES 
CAUSED BY PREFERENCE GROUP FORMATION: 1969 
ExEorting GrouE 
Importing Group u. s. & c. EEC EFTA CACM 
68 
LAFTA 
-------------------millions of dollars--------------
u. s. & c. 0 +1,326 +1,478 +162 +1,281 
EEC -1,326 0 -11,157 -253 -997 
EFTA -1,478 +11,157 0 +13 +134 
CACM -162 +253 -13 0 +233 
LAFTA -1,281 +997 -134 -233 0 
All Preference 
Groups -4,247 +12,407 -11,304 -473 -496 
All Preference 
Groups plus 
u. s. & c. -4,247 +13 '733 -9,326 -311 +785 
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was $-1.8 billion in 1965, falling to $-4.3 billion in 1969. Although 
this figure is only 0.4 percent of the 1969 GNP, it represents a sub-
stantial decline in the relative bargaining position in the international 
markets of U. S. & C. 
EEC. This was the only group to improve its external position 
relative to the other three preference groups. This means that the 
formation of the EEC has produced the desired results: it has resulted 
in gross trade creation (as shown in the previous chapter); and, its 
relative position with respect to other preference groups and the U. S. 
& C. has improved. 
EFTA. This group improved its f'.MTB only with U. S. & C. The most 
negative effect was caused by the EEC which is not unexpected given the 
characteristics of the countries in both groups and the differences in 
forms of integration. 
As indicated before, EFTA was expected to gain relative to the two 
Latin American groups. However, the results obtained in this study show 
a deterioration in the f'.MTB of EFTA with each of them which shows that 
the gains from integration do not automatically accrue to the more 
developed economies. 
CACM and LAFTA. The net increase in LAFTA exports to CACM was 
greater than the net increase in LAFTA imports. Consequently, the f'.MTB 
of LAFTA with respect to the CACM countries was positive. CACM improved 
its MTB only with respect to EFTA reinforcing the finding iri. the 
previous chapter that CACM had not produced the anticipated external 
effect. Wionczek (46, p. 102) has argued that "CACM represents the 
70 
most successful example of regional integration in the entire under-
developed sector of the world." In light of the results of this study, 
his argument can be accepted only if it refers to the creation of trade 
within the area. 
Impact of Integration on U. S. 
Agricultural Exports 
In the remainder of this chapter the emphasis will be on the 
effect of preference groups on the agricultural trade of the U. S. 
This section embodies two departures from the previous analyses: first, 
agricultural trade (rather than total) will be evaluated; and second, 
only the U. S. (without Canada) will be considered. U. S. and Canada 
were separated for this section as a matter of convenience. There is 
no a priori expectation that integration has affected U. S. and Canadian 
agricultural trade differently. The criterion for evaluating the impact 
of integration on U. S. agricultural exports will be the share of total 
U. S. exports to each group which is accounted for by agricultural 
products. 
By looking at the trend over time of U. S. agricultural exports 
as a percentage of total, it is possible to infer what happened to 
the trade flow of agricultural products as a consequence of each prefer-
ence group. If, for example, the share is constant then agricultural 
products were just as affected by trade diversion as non-agricultural 
products. If the share of agricultural exports of U. S. with respect 
I 
' 
to total exports increases after the formation of the preference group, 
then agricultural exports were more affected by the TD effect than 
non-agricultural commodities. 
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General Expectations 
Due to the characteristics of the EEC and EFTA the agricultural 
exports of the U. S. might be more affected (negatively) by the forma-
tion of EEC than EFTA. There are three basic reasons to expect this. 
(1) EFTA is a free trade area in industrial products only since agri-
cultural products were excluded from the treaty. (2) Some of the 
members of EEC are food surplus countries while EFTA includes several 
of the highest per capita importers of agricultural commodities in the 
world. (3) The EEC has implemented a relatively strong common agricul-
tural policy which encourages production and restricts imports from 
non-members. Both the EEC and EFTA caused trade diversion with the 
U. S. & C. Hence, the share of exports from the U. S. which are agri-
cultural should increase if there were no TD of agricultural goods; and, 
the share for EFTA should increase more rapidly than for the EEC. 
The agricultural exports of the U. S. to CACM are not expected to 
be affected negatively by the formation of CACM since most U. S. agri-
cultural exports are temperate climate products that cannot be produced 
within the region. The agricultural exports of U. S. to LAFTA may not 
be affected by the formation of LAFTA since agricultural products are 
not covered by the treaty and agreements. Moreover, since LAFTA didn't 
cause strong trade diversion with respect to the U. S. and Canada, the 
post-integration share of U .. S. agricultural exports_ to LAFTA may be 
equal to or higher than the share before integration. 
Empirical Results 
EEC. Contrary to expectations, the share of agricultural exports 
from the U. S. to the EEC fell considerably from the pre-integration to 
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the post-integration period. Before the formation of the EEC the 
agricultural share of exports was 41 percent (Table XII). In the post-
integration period (1959-69) the share of U. S. agricultural exports to 
EEC averaged 35 percent or six percentage points lower than in the 
previous period. Since total U. S. exports to the EEC showed a rela-
tively strong trade diversion effect, these results seem to indicate 
that the agricultural exporters to the EEC have suffered more than other 
sectors as a consequence of the preference group. 
EFTA. The share of U. S. agricultural exports to the members of 
EFTA fell from 47 percent in the pre-integration period to 32.5 percent 
in the post-integration period. This result is contrary to expectations 
on two counts. First, it was expected that the share would probably 
increase showing that U. S. agricultural exports were not adversely 
affected by EFTA. The fact that the share did decline means agricul-
tural trade suffered a greater loss than other sectors. Secondly, it 
was expected that the impact of the EEC would be more adverse than for 
EFTA. In fact, EFTA seems to have been the more disruptive of the two. 
A possible reason for the reduction in agricultural exports of 
U. S. to EFTA may be stagnation in the total agricultural imports of 
the United Kingdom. Possible reasons for this include preferences for 
trade with commonwealth countries, the devaluation of the pound, and 
rising domestic production. 
CACM. Contrary to the expectations, the agricultural share of 
U. S. exports to CACM declined after the formation of CACM. The pre-
integration average share was 30 percent of total exports compared to 
22 percent after the formation of the group. 
TABLE XII 
U. S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE 
OF TOTAL U. S. EXPORTS 
IMPORTING GROUP 
YEAR EEC EFTA CACM LAFTA 
1951 56.70 55.21 32.19 16.55 
1952 53.90 44.22 33.48 20.88 
1953 49.14 49.55 33.97 16.94 
1954 49.72 50.42 32.17 15.25 
1955 40.33 42.53 32.08 14.73 
1956 43.07 46.74 27.08 15. 96 
1957 39.44 45.29 25.90 13. 65 
1958 40.16 47.87 27.66 13. 94 
1959 47.59 48.38 28.29 15,!+5 
1960 40.14 40.29 26.93 15. 7j_ 
1961 40.16 41.81 26.31 18.06 
1962 39.06 41.82 23.47 16.27 
1963 36.56 39.55 21.06 19.85 
1964 38.27 36.49 20.41 18.64 
1965 36.29 30.84 19.96 15.48 
1966 35.94 33.74 21.16 15.35 
1967 31.65 27.19 21.43 15.22 
1968· 27.86 21.49 22.51 13.79 
1969 22.47 19.51 19.22 11.87 
Pre-integra-
tion average 41.38 47.05 29.97 15.90 
Post-integra-
tion average 34.84 32.49 21. 72 16.05 
Sources: First four columns (39, 40, 41); last column 
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WORLD 
27.15% 
22.80 
18.19 
20.39 
20.75 
22.02 
21;80 
21. 72 
22.66 
23.72 
24.21 
23.49 
24.21 
24.27 
22.96 
23.03 
20.49 
18.21 
15.85 
22.12 
21.85 
(38). 
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LAFTA. As expected the agricultural exports of U. S. to LAFTA 
have remained stable over the integration period. Since there has been 
some mild TDLAFTA with respect to the U. S., the agricultural sector 
has fared relatively well in the LAFTA countries . 
. ~ ' 
CHAPTER VII 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Since World War II one of the distinguishing characteristics of 
international commercial relations has been the presence of bilateral 
and/or multilaterial agreements among governments which encourage freer 
movement of goods across their borders. Among the purposes of economic 
integration are: the reduction and/or elimination of tariffs and other 
barriers to trade between member countries; and, the. regulation of 
trade with non-member countries. By forming preference groups, members 
hope to protect the integrated markets, expand production, reallocate 
resources in a more efficient manner, and be more powerful (more com-
petitive) in the international markets. 
The literature on the economics of preference groups is ample. 
Many studies have analyzed the possible impacts that integration could 
. have on international trade flows. However, little work has been done 
with regard to -the combined effects of two or more preference groups. 
This study is a quantitative evaluation of the effects that economic 
integrations in Europe and Latin America have had on member countries 
and the outside world, with a strong emphasis on the effects on U. S. 
trade. 
Objectives 
The primary objective of this study is to estimate the impact that 
the European Economic Community, the European Free Trade Association, 
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the Central American Common Market, and the Latin American Free Trade 
Area have had on trade within the groups and with the rest of the world. 
The specific objectives are to: 1) estimate the coefficients of an 
econometric model which permits the determination of the forces that 
influence the flow of trade between any two countries; 2) estimate the 
net trade gains associated with the preference groups; 3) estimate the 
impact on the trade position of the U. S. and Canada as a consequence 
of the integrations; and, 4) examine the impact that these economic 
integrations have had on the agricultural exports of U. S. 
Procedures 
Cross-sectional trade flow equations were estimated relating the 
total flow trade between any two countries to the economic size of the 
countries (gross national product), resistance factors to trade (the 
distance between countries), and a dummy variable for neighboring 
countries. Dummy variables were added to the estimating equations to 
measure the shift in trade flows which are coincident with the estab-
lishment of the preference groups. Based on the assumption that there 
is no correlation between the dummy variables and the error term, the 
coefficients of the dummy variables for integration were used to com-
pute the trade impact of the preference groups. 
Since there were five groups, a total of 25 dummy variables were 
estimated based on cross-sectional data from approximately 1,100 trade 
flows among 42 countries. The trade flow equation was estimated in log-
log form for each year in the 1951-69 period. 
Each preference variable coefficient estimates the amount by which 
trade from one group of countries to another group of countries differs 
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from what would be expected based solely on the other independent 
variables. Changes in the estimated coefficients over the period 1951-
69 were attributed to either secular factors or changes in trade rela-
tions resulting from the formation of a preference group. Prior to the 
formation of the preferential trading blocks, the coefficients of the 
dummy variables measure the net trade preference that existed among 
members of the two groups. In the post-integration period the value 
of the coefficient for each preference variable may be either greater 
than or less than the pre-integration value indicating an increase or 
decrease in trade flows between the groups following integration. Thus, 
the net impact of the preference groups on trade flows was measured 
by the difference between the value of the preference dummy coefficients 
prior to and following the formation of the groups. 
The preference group related changes in trade flows were estimated 
using a regression procedure in which the estimated coefficients of 
preferential variables were regressed on time (to eliminate secular 
shifts), and dummy variables to measure shifts in the intercept and 
slope associated with the formation of the preference groups. The 
results of this procedure were transformed to dollar value estimates 
of what trade would have been in the absence of integration. The net 
impact of the integrations is then measured by the difference between 
the flow of trade with and without integration. 
The estimated differences between trade flows with and without 
integration show gross trade creation (GTC), trade diversion (TD), 
trade expansion (TE), and net trade diversion (NTD). Aggregation of 
these gives total net trade diversion (TNTD), total net trade creation 
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(TNTC), and the change in the merchandise trade balance (LlMTB), caused 
by the formation of the preference groups. 
Findings and Conclusions 
Impact of Economic Integrations 
Each of the. four preference groups (EEC, EFTA, CACM and LAFTA) 
presented evidence of gross trade creation (GTC) among member countries 
which is consistent with prior expectations. Of the four groups, CACM 
had the greatest relative gain with intra-group trade expanding more 
than 31-fold in 1969 as shown in Table XIII. The on1y group that in-
creased its total net trade diversion with respect to the other three 
preferential groups plus U. S. and Canada was the EEC. The TNTDEEC 
with respect to the other four groups grew from al:nost $14 billion in 
1965 to almost $23 billion in 1969. 
The results indicate that the EEC has been the group which has 
captured the greatest gains from integration. These six countries 
presented a relatively strong net trade creation effect within the 
group, and showed a substantial trade diversion with respect to the 
imports from non-member countries. 
The other common market (CACM) produced the desired res1 lts with 
respect to trade creation among the five members. Apparently protected 
industries within CACM could not fully substitute the imports from 
outsiders, which is reflected in the lack of trade diversion with the 
U. S. and Canada and the three other preference groups. However, as 
mentioned before this was the group which presented the greatest rate 
of increase of GTC among its members. 
Preference 
Group 
EEC 
EFTA 
CACM 
LAFTA 
TABLE XIII 
TRADE CREATION AND TRADE DIVERSION RESULTING FROM 
PREFERENCE GROUP FORMATION: 1969 
Gross Trade Creation Total 
% of estimated Net 
intra-group trade Trade 
Amount w/o integration Diversion 
($ million) (%) ($ million) 
30,050 580 -22,797 
5,377 250 -905 
246 3155 +163 
922 340 -936 
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Total 
Net 
Trade 
Creation 
($ million) 
+7,253 
+4,471 
+410 
-14 
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Theoretically it is expected that each group will experience a 
negative trade diversion and a positive trade expansion with the U. S. 
and Canada since they are unprotected. The effect of each of these 
changes is to improve the merchandise trade balance of the preference 
groups, ceteris paribus. As shown in Table XIV, the impacts relative 
to U. S. & C. were as expected except for the negative TEEEC and posi-
tive TDCACM' Nonetheless, the merchandise trade balance of U. S & C. 
was adversely affected in 1969 by each of the preference groups. 
As expected the EEC improved its external position relative to the 
other three preference groups increasing from a positive ~MTB with 
respect to them of almost $7.5 billion in 1965 to $12.4 billion in 1969. 
The ~MTB of EFTA with respect to the other three preferential groups 
deteriorated from $-7 billion in 1965 to $-11.3 billion in 1969. A 
high proportion of this deterioration was caused by trade with the six 
EEC countries. The conunercial relations between CACM and LAFTA after 
the formation of the two blocks has been relatively more favorable to 
LAFTA, which has improved its ~MTB with respect to CACM from $71 million 
in 1965 to $233 million in 1969. 
The results of this study show that all groups (except CACM) 
experienced trade diversion with respect to the exports of the U. S. to 
them. But these results do not indicate which sectors of the U. S. 
economy have suffered the greatest displacement as a consequence of 
trade diversion. If it is expected that U. S. agricultural exports 
were not affected as much by preference groups as non-agricultural 
exports, then the percentage of U. S. exports which are agricultural 
should increase. The sununary data in Table XV may be used to test 
this hypothesis. 
TABLE XIV 
ESTIMATED TRADE EXPANSION, TRADE DIVERSION AND CHANGE 
IN TRADE BALANCE OF PREFERENCE GROUPS WITH 
RESPECT TO THE U. S. AND CANADA: 1969 
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Preference 
Group 
Trade 
Expansion 
of Group to 
u. s. & c. 
Trade 
Diversion 
of Group to 
u. s. & .c. 
Change in 
Merchandise Trade 
Balance of Group 
with U. S. & C. 
--------------millions of dollars---------------------
EEC -7 ,511 -8,837 +1,326 
EFTA 1,157 -321 +1,478 
CACM 326 165 +162 
LAFTA 1,216 -65 +1,281 
u.s. 
Exports 
to: 
EEC 
EFTA 
CACM 
LA FT A 
ALL COUNTRIES 
TABLE XV 
AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS OF THE UNITED STATES 
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL EXPORTS, BY 
IMPORTING GROUP 
YEAR 
1955 1965 
- - million of dollars -
40% 36% 
43% 31% 
32% 20% 
15% 15% 
21% 23% 
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1969 
22% 
19% 
16% 
12% 
17% 
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The percentage of U. S. exports which are agricultural fell for 
the EEC, EFTA and CACM. For LAFTA, however, there was no change rela-
tive to the agricultural share of exports to all countries. 
Several conclusions may be derived with respe~t to the U. S. 
agricultural exports to these four preferential groups: 1) the TD 
impact of EEC and EFTA on U. S. agricultural exports was more severe 
than on non-agricultural items; and, 2) since there was no trade 
diversion by CACM with respect to the exports of U. S. and the ratio 
of U. S. agricultural to total exports to CACM fell, there must have 
been a substantial net increase in non-agricultural exports from the 
U. S. associated with the formation of CACM, ceteris paribus. 
Other Conclusions 
The results of this study have shown that the formation of economic 
preference groups has had a considerable positive impact on the trade 
flows among the member countries. This impact has been greater for 
the two groups formed along the lines of a common market than for the 
free trade areas. 
The results also suggest that a portion of the deterioration of 
the United States trade performance in the last decade may have been 
caused by the formation of various trading blocks or preference groups. 
The U. S. merchandise trade balance with respect to the four preferen-
tial groups was almost $1.83 billion less in 1965 and $4.25 billion 
less in 1969 than it would have been if the pr~ference groups had not 
been formed. The actual MTB of the U. S. in 1969 was $1.6 billion 
which is $4.0 billion less than the 1955-65 average MTB. Thus, nearly 
all of the deterioration of the 1955-65 MTB levels in the U. S. can be 
"explained" by the estimated impact of the four preference groups 
included in this study. Since 6MTB is estimated for the U. S. and 
Canada combined, this conclusion is overstated to some extent. 
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The impact of the MTB on the average American was higher prices 
paid for imported goods relative to domestic products and a possible 
reduction in the level of potential employment due to losses in foreign 
markets for domestic products. The increase in prices for imported 
goods combined with the cheapening of U. S. exports will likely affect 
the real wage negatively if nominal wages don't adjust at the same rate. 
Limitations of the Study 
The results of this study are contingent on the validity of two 
critical assumptions: 1) that equilibria between supply and demand 
forces exist in all international markets; and, 2) that changes in the 
coefficients of the preference variables in the post-integration years 
are entirely caused by the formation of the preference groups. The 
bases for these assumptions and the implication of their possible vio-
lation will be briefly discussed below. 
The exclusion of price variables from the flow equations stems 
directly from the assumption of long-run equilibrium in international 
markets. This assumption in no way implies that prices are not effec-
tive in allocating resources. On the contrary, prices are assumed to 
adjust quickly, and supply and demand are assumed to be sufficiently 
responsive to these price changes to maintain or continually approach 
equilibrium over time. It is the level of this equilibrium rather than 
the process of achieving it that is the focus of this study. 
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The assumption of equilibrium of demand and supply forces in 
this study has possibly contributed to some bias in the estimat~s. The 
data were assumed to have been generated under general equilibrium 
conditions. Frequently, countries which are experiencing rapid infla-
tion increase imports and reduce exports resulting in an external dis-
equilibrium. A possible way to reduce any errors caused by periods 
of inflation or deflation is to use three or four year average data 
instead of the annual data as used in this study. 
Another basic assumption is that all change (other than secular 
change) in the coefficients for the preference variables following the 
formation of the preference groups is entirely caused by the formation 
of the respective groups. Implicitly, this assumes that there are 
no other factors which may be correlated with the preference variables. 
In the earlier 1960's when the preference groups were formed several 
other important events occurred in the world which could also be corre-
lated with the preference dummy variables such as: the Vietnam con-
flict; a period of extended economic growth in the U. S.; the improve-
ment in the political and economic relations between the U. S. and 
Latin America; plus many other factors which could affect the flow of 
trade among countries. 
The findings of this study are restricted to the period 1951-69. 
The extent to which the empirical results can be expected to be valid 
for years to come depends on the behavior of a number of external 
factors underlying the analysis. The results for the EEC and EFTA 
could certainly be different for a similar study which extended the 
analysis to the decade of the 1970's due to the inclusion of the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark as full members of the European Economic 
Community. On the other hand, the impact of EFTA as a group has 
probably declined considerably with regards to both member and non-
member countries. 
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In 1969, five members of LAFTA (Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
and Peru) formed the Andean Group and later Venezuela joined as a 
regular member. This new sub-group may well change the pattern of 
inter-LAFTA trade due to a new set of regulations among the members of 
the sub-group. 
Need for Further Research 
The results in this study were obtained from a very aggregative 
data. The flow of trade between any two countries in any particular 
year is the total flow of goods between the two countries in the 
respective year. Research which separates trade flows into at least 
two parts: a) non-agricultural trade, and b) agricultural trade is 
warranted to examine which sector of the economy is more affected by 
the formation of preference groups. Additional research which esti-
mates the effect that economic integrations have on the individual 
country economies rather than the whole group is suggested. The 
results of such a study could show which countries within a preference 
group receive the greatest benefits and which suffer as a consequence 
of integration. Studies with a longer post-integration period could be 
of great value. A longer post-integration period would include such 
important events as the devaluation of the dol~ar, the end of the 
Vietnam War, the Arab-Israeli War, the oil embargo, the addition of 
three new member countries to the EEC, and the conflict between 
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Honduras and El Salvador which probably affected the commercial 
relations among the CACM members. The inclusion of these factors might 
_ change the empirical results found in this study. 
A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 
1. Adler, F. Michael. "'The Relationship Between the Income and 
Price Elasticities of Demand for United States Exports." 
The Review of Economic and Statistics, Vol. 52 (1970), 
pp. 313-319-. 
2. Aitken, Norman D. "The Effect of the EEC and EFTA on European 
Trade: A Temporal Cross-Section Analysis." American 
Economic Review, Vol. 63, No. 5 (December, 1973), pp. 881-892. 
3. Aitken, Norman D. and William R. Lowry. "A Cross-Sectional Study 
of the Effects of LAFTA and CACM on Latin American Trade." 
Journal of Common Market Studies, Vol. 11, No. 4 (June, 1973), 
pp. 326-36. 
4. ALALC-BID-INTAL. Siente Anos de Accion de la ALALC. Instituto 
5. 
--- --para la Integration de America Latina INTAL. Buenos Aires, 
Argentina: Impreso en la Argentina, 1968. 
Balassa, Bela. 
Illinois: 
The Theory of Economic Integration. 
Richard D. Irwin, Inc., 1961. 
Homewood, 
6. Balassa, Bela. "Towards a Theory of Economic Integration." Kyklos, 
Vol. XIV (1961), pp. 1-17. 
7. Balassa, Bela. "Trade Creation and Trade Diversion in the European 
Common Market." The Economic Journal, Vol. 77, No. 305 
(March, 1967), pp-:-1-21. 
8. Benns, Lee F. and Mary Elizabeth Seldon. Europe 1939 !.£ the 
Present. New York: Meredith Publishing Company, 1965. 
9. Benoit, Emile. Europe at Six and Sevens. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1961. 
10. Bjarnason, Harold F., Michael J. McGarry and Andrew Schmitz. 
"Converting Price Series of International Traded Commodities 
to a Current Currency Prior to Estimating National Demand 
and Supply Equations." American Journal £f Agricultural 
Economics, Vol. 51 (February, 1969), pp. 189-192. 
11. Brown, Robert T. Transport and the Economic Integration £i_ South 
America. Washington, D. C.: The Brooking Institution, 1966. 
88 
12. Chenery, Hollins B. and Alan M. Strout. "Foreign Assistance and 
Economic Development." .American Economic Review, Vol. 56, 
No. 4, Part 1 (September, 1966), pp. 679-733. 
13. Durand, E. Dana. Country Classification. International Trade 
Statistics, (ed. by R. G. D. Allen and J. Edward Ely). New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, London: Chapman and Hall, 
1953, pp. 123-124. 
89 
14. Elliot, David P. "Converting National Supply and Demand Equations 
to a Connnon Currency for Internationally Traded Connnodities." 
.American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Vol. 54, No. 3 
(August, 1972). 
15. Gujarati, Damodar. "Use of Dummy Variables in Testing for Equality 
Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions: A 
Note." The .American Statistician, Vol. 24, No. 1 (1970), 
pp. 50-52. 
16. Gujarati, Damodar. "Use of Dummy Variables in Testing for Equality 
Between Sets of Coefficients in Two Linear Regressions: A 
Generalization." The American Statistician, Vol. 24, No. 5 
(1970), pp. 18-21. 
17. Helmers, Henrik O. The United States - Canadian Automotive 
Agreement. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1967. 
18. International Monetary Fund. International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Direction of International Trade. Annual 
Issue, Washington, D. C., several issues. 
19. International Monetary Fund. International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development. Direction of Trade. Washington, D. C., 
several issues. 
20. International Monetary Fund. International Financial Statistics. 
Washington, D. C., Annual Supplement, several issues. 
21. Kindleberger, Charles P. Foreign Trade and the National Economy. 
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962. 
22. Kreinin, Mordechai E. "Disaggregate Import Demand Functions 
Further Results." The Southern Economic Journal, Vol. 40, 
No. 1 (July, 1973), pp. 19-25. 
23. Kreinin, Mordechai E. International Economics: ~Policy 
Approach. 2nd Ed. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 
Inc., 1975. 
24. Kreinin, Mordechai E. 
Investigation. 
Trade Relations of the EEC: An Empirical 
New York: Praeger Publisher, Inc., 1974. 
25. Linnennnah, Hans J. An Econometric Study of International Trade 
Flows, .Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Co., 1966. 
90 
26. Lipsey, R. G. "The Theory of Customs Unions: A General Survey." 
Economic Journal, Vol. 70, No. 279 (September, 1960), pp. 496-
513. 
27. Magee, Stephen P. and H. S. Houthakker. "Income and Price 
Elasticities in World Trade." The Review of Economics and 
Statistics, Vol. 51, No. 2 (May--:--I969), pp-.-111-125. 
28. Maizels, Alfred. Export and Economic Growth ££ Developing 
Countries, London: Cambridge University Press, 1968. 
29. Orcutt, Guy H. "Measurement of Price Elasticities in International 
Trade." The Review of Economics and Statistics, Vol. 32, 
No. 2 (MaY":-1952), pp:- 117-131. 
30. Ovattara, Alassane D. "Trade Effects of the Association of 
African Countries with the European Economic Community." 
International Monetary Fund, Staff papers, Vol. 20, No. 2. 
(July, 1973), pp. 499-543. 
31. Richardson, J. David. "On Improving the Estimate of the Export 
Elasticity of Substitution." Canadian Journal El_ Economics, 
Vol. 5 (1972), pp. 349-357. 
32. Suits, Daniel B. "Use of Dummy Variables in Regression Equations." 
Journal of the American Statistical Association, Vol. 52, 
No. 280 (December, 1957), pp. 548-551. 
33. Takayama, T. and G. G. Judge. "An Intertemporal Price Equilibrium 
Model." Journal of Farm Economics, Vol. 46, No. 2 (May, 
1964), pp. 447-486: --
34. Theil, Henri. Principles of Econometrics. New York: John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc., 1971. 
35. Tinbergen, Jan. "An Analysis of World Trade Flows." 
World Economy, Suggestions for.§!!!. International 
Policy, Twentieth Century Fund, New York, 1962, 
Shaping the 
Economic 
pp. 262-293. 
36. U. S. Department of Agriculture. European Free Trade Association. 
Agricultural Trade Statistics, 1961-1967. ERS Foreign 271, 
~y, 1969. 
37. U. S. Department of Agriculture. Statistics.£!!. the European 
Economic Community, Vol. 2, Agricultural Production and 
Consumption, ERS-Foreign 46, July, 1963. 
38. U. S. Department of Agriculture . .!L_~ Foreign Agricultural 
Trade Statistical Report, Calendar Year 1975. A supplement 
to the Monthly Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United 
States, Washi~gton, D. C., May, 1963. 
39. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. U. S. Foreign 
Trade: Exports, World Area by Commodity Grouping, Washington: 
U. S. Government Printing Office, several issues. 
91 
40. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. ~~Exports 
of Domestic and Foreign Merchandise. Washington: U. S. 
Government Printing Office, several issues. 
41. U. S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Country .£y Country Group, Washington: 
Printing Office, several issues. 
Census . .!:G_~ Exports: 
U. S. Government 
42. U. S. Department of the Navy. Distances Between Ports. HO. Pub. 
No. 151. Oceanographic Office. Washington: U. S. Government 
Printing Office, 1965. 
43. Viner, Jacob. The Customs Union Issue. New York: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, 1950. 
44. Weil, G. L. A Handbook of the European Economic Community. 
New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1965. 
45. Wildford, W. T. "Trade Creation in the Central American Common 
Market." Western Economic Journal, Vol. VIII, No. 1 
(March, 1970), pp. 61-69. 
46. Wionczek, Miguel S. Economic Cooperation in Latin America, 
Africa and Asia. A Handbook of Documents. The M.I.T. 
Press, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, 
Massachusetts, 1969. 
APPENDIX A 
92 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF 
PREFERENCE GROUPS 
European Economic Community 
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In 1947 the United States announced the Marshall Plan as a means 
of assisting European recovery from the ravages of war. In 1948 the 
organization for European.Economic Cooperation (OEEC) was created to 
help carry out the Marshall Plan through joint estimates of require-
ments and coordination in the distribution of Marshall Plan aid among 
the affected countries. In 1948 the first concrete step toward country 
integration in western Europe occurred when the Benelux Customs Union 
was established covering Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. 
In 1951 the European Coal and Steel Community was organized including 
the Benelux Countries plus France, Germany and Italy. The six members 
of the European Coal and Steel Community signed the Rome Treaty in 
1957 which laid the foundation of the European Economic Community. 
The treaty became effective on January 1, 1958. 
The treaty says that the purpose of the EEC is to establish an 
ever closer union among the peoples of Europe. Although the Rome 
Treaty itself deals with economic affairs, it has been rather generally 
understood that countries whose economies are closely integrated v:ill 
tend to develop common views on political matters. Indeed, measures 
leading to closer political union among the EEC countries are still 
under active consideration (37, p. 2). 
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Matters included in the treaty cover all major segments of 
economic life such as free movement of capital and labor, harmonization 
of wage rates, conditions of employment, health and retirement benefits, 
the right of free business establishment, agricultural policy, coordi-
nation of fiscal and monetary policies and conunon conunercial policies 
for trade in both agricultural and nonagricultural products. Both an 
investment bank for the member countries and a development fund to aid 
associated overseas countries and territories are also included in the 
treaty. 
European Free Trade Association 
The European Free Trade Association (EFTA) was formed in January 
of 1960 by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the United Kingdom. The EFTA members agreed to eliminate trade 
restrictions on industrial products moving between member countries. 
Tariff reductions on most industrial goods began in July, 1960 and 
all tariffs were eliminated by December 31, 1966 (36, p. i). 
In contrast to a Customs Union Arrangement such as the EEC, EFTA 
members maintain their own external trade policies. Domestic policies 
on agricultural production also vary widely among EFTA members from 
direct government payments to limited price supports. Agricultural 
trade has been influenced through preferences as in the U.K.-Conunonwealth 
Agreement and Portugese-African ties. Bilateral agreements between 
Denmark and the other EFTA members also affect agricultural trade 
patterns. 
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Central American Connnon Market 
The first attempts to bring about some degree of economic 
cooperation among the Central American republics goes back to the begin-
ning of the 1950's. The idea of Central American economic integration 
belongs to the United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, 
upon whose initiative a Central American Economic Cooperation Committee 
was formed in 1952. 
The first formal multilateral cooperation mechanism in the region 
was the Multilateral Treaty on Free Trade and Central American Economic 
Integration signed by El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras in 1958. 
The treaty provided for the establishment of a common market through 
the gradual addition of products to the free trade list by interested 
parties over a period of ten years. 
A new and broader treaty, signed in December, 1960 in Managua, 
Nicaragua, by El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua (with 
Cost Rica delaying its formal entry until July, 1962) for the purpose 
of superseding the 1958 treaty, committed the contracting parties to 
free all regional trade and establish a common market by mid-1966 (46, 
p. 102-104). 
Latin American Free Trade Area 
In February, 1960, seven Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay) signed the Monterideo Treaty 
which formed the Latin American Free Trade Area (LAFTA). Later on, 
other countries were added to the group. Colombia (1961), Ecuador 
(1961), Venezuela (1966) and Bolivia (1967). The first negotiations 
realized under LAFTA were held in July of 1961. 
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The Montevideo Treaty countries had a population of 210 million of 
inhabitants in 1968 which represented more than 90 percent of the popu-
lation of Latin America and more than 93 percent of its gross national 
product. The estimated population for the year 2000 is 600 million for 
the LAFTA countries, which is twice the 2000 estimate for U. S. (4, 
p. 16). 
APPENDIX B 
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EXCHANGE RATES FOR SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
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1959 27~.o'J 55.23 45. 2 {~ ~ • "-~ ? (] 
196? 3Cle6V 61.10 45.6f3 ~ • 2c ?.o 
1961 328.4-: 66.53 46.tc ·'.2r;."'6 
1962 36 t. 2'~ 74.39 4 7 .c - - • 2r 26 
-
1963· '+ l 2. (.. .) 83.47 47.82 r.2·20 
1964 4-50. 7 ) -)2.5.J 48.31 \' • 2-,- 2 (, 
1965 45 l. 8 (' 99.23 48.76 ~. ';?(" ?6 
1966 $32. C> '~ 107.9C 4-9.tc , . • 2(26 
t967 574.BC 116.45 49e5S ,... • 2·~ 26 
1968 63(l.~~l.~ 127.64 4-9 •. 9 1 r .,?_,~26 
1969 7.34.0G 143.20 5~. ~ 2 ' • 1951 
197n 82c; • 2 r, 147.64 5"'. 7 7 C.1Rl':0 
1971 904. 2) 162.76 51.2:: ,, .t8C'" 
----------------GE~MANYt .~.--------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
195':'> 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
196'1 
1961 
1462 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
GNP IN 
DOMl::.STIC 
~~38.~!:KY 
(i31LLIONS) 
ll9e:S') 
136.6) 
147.i.; 
157.9!) 
1 BC • 4 iJ 
198.80 
216. 3,:.; 
231.50 
25Ce90 
296.bO 
326.2) 
354.6C 
377. 61') 
413.d] 
46C.4) 
490.71';. 
4 94. 6 () 
538.SO 
602.20 
085.70 
761. 80 
GNP IN 
Q.Ql...b~B.~ 
(LlILLION:>) 
2:;.45 
_j2.S2 
35.02 
37.6C, 
42.95 
47.33 
5l.5C 
~-s.12 
59.74 
7( .67 
a.::.5-1 
8d.65 
94.4() 
L' 3. 45 
11 ~. H 
122.67 
123.65 
134.63 
152.90 
187.33 
218.03 
iJ(lfJU-
bl!lJ.L~-­
(»4ILL[lr--,;) 
48. ·"'· 7 
4·"'o6i-' 
4 9. 1 ~ 
5 1).17 
c:,~. 7 ": 
51. 4 -, 
52.'.:•(; 
S?.'.:17 
5 3.? c 
54. -~ ~ 
54. 7 7 
55. 4 :3 
56. l, 
56.84 
57e4E 
51.1~ 
58."<' 
58.71 
6').t::) 
61.2<; 
EXCHANGE 
--8~.1£ __ 
($/UNIT) 
.~.2381 
.... 2381 
C.23C11 
c .23131 
~·1.2JP.l 
:o.21n1 
r .2JKI 
( .2"361 
.... ,.2.:3[<1 
c.2Je1 
..... :;?ti 7C 
.- • 2 !-.). '" 
f' • .,'.'~:), , .... 
r'I • 2 '3 r .-
-.25 1 ".0 
;·.2~r" 
• .• 251<) 
·~·. 27 32 
··· • :~M62 
----------------~----ITALY---~-------------------
1951 
195.~ 
1953 
1954 
1455 
1Y56 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
GNP IN 
DOME.ST IC 
~J.lB8~~~y 
(tHLLIONS) 
10499.Cf 
11289.C. 
1 .~4 ao. o c 
13324.(-0 
14641.(') 
15900.("() 
17ca1.ro 
1 d.34{~ .c .J 
194 37. 0 0 
21(.710< ·' 
2336.J.::,:; 
2633•).·'.\} 
31201.1·0 
34179.GO 
3b8l8eCC 
39829. ('" t; 
43553.(;} 
4 7 1 .]4. it 
514~6.1'(1 
58261 •• : .) 
63127.f'J 
GNP IN 
OOb~AB.~ 
(BILLION'.:;) 
16.80 
18.('b 
19.9H 
21.32 
2J. 43 
25.45 
27.33 
29.34 
3 1 • 1 (· 
3J.71 
3'!.38 
4 2. 1 3 
~('\.(2 
54.69 
58.91 
63.7J 
69.68 
7'.:>. 41 
82.33 
93.22 
ll".·1.82 
POPU-
b~I.lb~--
( 1"1 ILL IC~S l 
4 ., • " c; 
47.3::; 
4 7 .6' 
47.91 
4 8. 2 '~ 
48.47 
48.74 
49. "' 4 
49.Jf 
49. 6 {~ 
49o9C 
S':' • 24 
50.64 
51.1?. 
51.c.Sr: 
51. q 7 
s 2 • v.o.; 
52. 7..; 
5 3. 1 1 
53.61': 
~4 .... l 
f-: )(C:;~~~j-J~ 
__ i_:_~lt __ 
( <£ / J~H T ) 
r,.~"lb 
... ' ... l :::, 
.... 1 0 
• ··" ·· 1 n 
'• ''lt) 
r • :'" (" lb 
.. • er 1.:; 
'~· • r .... l 6 
(" • ~ ·' l 6 
'. : ~- l 6 
;_; • '•,.., 1 6 
'·. 16 
r.: r-. t 6 
; • r-~ f' 1 6 
·~ • ·:· (' 1 6 
'*".r~tf-. 
.... ,,.. 1 b 
,.. • :,.~ 1 r, 
100 
-----------------NcTHERLANuS---------------------
<.iNP IN 
UO~ESTlC GNP IN P~PU-
rg~g_ ~~88!,;~£;..! QQl...!...~!ifi b:~Ilh~--
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
195:> 
1950 
1957 
195d 
1959 
1961,) 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1'-166 
1967 
1968 
196::} 
197() 
1971 
( cl lLL I uN s > (UILLlaNS) (MILLICNS) 
21.7.'.I 
22.69 
24w2C 
2 7. ( ·' 
3·J. 2 8 
.:S2 • S7 
35.36 
35.93 
38.44 
42. 7.:S 
45.2 9 
481 52 
52.86 
62.15 
69.37 
7':3J. 41 
84.00 
91. ~J 7 
l 02. 34 
114.98 
12~.55 
5.72 
5.97 
6037 
7. 1 1 
7. '..) 7 
d.57 
9.31 
9.4t> 
10. 1 ~ 
ll.2t:.> 
12.3h 
1 .3. 4 ,.. 
14 • o·; 
1 7. 1 7 
l 9e 1 D 
2C • 8 3 
23w2C 
25.J7 
28. 2."l 
31. 76 
3o. '=l7 
l (\. 5 ' 
lC.61 
1".75 
1"1 •. '39 
1 1. -
1 1 • 1 t.., 
1 1 • 3 ''3 
11. 4 ~ 
11 • 6 4 
1 1 • 8 -, 
11.97 
12.1 3 
12.2'; 
12.46 
12. 6" 
12.74 
12.87 
1 3.,.. :" 
11. l <;; 
~ l«:HANG~ 
--~~I~-­
< :t;/UN IT) 
'}. 2032 
~.2632 
·'.'. 26 32 
c.?o3?. 
0.2532 
n. 2632 
.J. 2632 
·J.2632 
'.'.'. 2632 
~.\. 26 32 
0.2729 
('!. 2762 
C.2762 
(\,2762 
0.2162 
0.2762 
~). 27 62 
O.d762 
n.2152 
Cl. 2762 
n.2854 
-------------------AUSTRIA-----------------------
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC GNP IN ~uPU-
l:~AB '~BB~~~y QQ!...bAB~ bAil&~--
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1964'.'· 
1961 
1962 
1963 
196q. 
19o5 
1906 
1CJ67 
l96d 
1969 
19 .,,, 
1 <Hl 
< BILL IONS> (8ILLIUNS) (MlLLICNS) 
69e6C 
31J,6r" 
8.3eCO 
93.20. 
1C7.o<; 
118.<"J 
1.3;),8( 
13o.7:: 
1<+313C 
163.20 
ld:J,8C 
19~~.3:; 
2(.;7. y~ 
227. 1 ·) 
247.4r'l 
2.67.o'-• 
2.84,9\l 
302.tll'.) 
332.10 
373.91 
415.7~~ 
3.26 
3. 77 
3. 4(" 
3. 5l1 
4el4 
4,54 
::>. 0 ~ 
s.20 
5.51 
6.2.a 
o.95 
7. 4':) 
7.97 
8.73 
9.S2 
1:.29 
Ll.96 
1 i. oo 
12177 
14.38 
16.67 
6 .9 .3 
6. 92 
6 • 9 :' 
6.94 
6e95 
6. 9'"1 
6.97 
6.c;is 
7. •" 1 
7.1'~ 
7. r <; 
7. 1 3 
7. 1 7 
7. :~ 2 
7. 2 ~i 
7. 2..., 
7. J ;:_ 
7.3~ 
7.37 
7. ~:; 
7. 4 t": 
~XCHANGE 
__ BAI& __ 
($/UNIT) 
t:l .0468 
o.?468 
o.C41~ 
0.0385 
r.0385 
~.0.385 
0.~385 
0,C385 
.· .C:?b'S 
r;,0385 
f'oC:!85 
c: .o "'85 
o.c.J~::> 
0."185 
,.. •. , 3 f3 '3 
r.,.. 385 
i"e•'.1"385 
'"'.~31'15 
c • .:, 385 
"'.('< 185 
...... ~r.1 
101 
102 
-------------------DENMAR~-----------------------
~NP IN 
thJMESTlC GNP !N POPU- cXCHANt3E 
!t;;.Afi ~~~B.I;;t:i~Y Q!JL.LaaB?i .bAil£D! __ --Ei~lt __ 
(31LLIONS) (BILLIONS) {MlLLICf\SI ($/UN IT) 
1951 23. c 7 3e34 4.30 ,., • 144 d 
1952 24.o• 3e56 4.J:; ·: • 14 4 ·'3 
1953 26.3d 3.82 4.37 1:.144~ 
1954 G7e63 4.CC 4. 4 l o. 144 e 
1955 28.85 4.18 4.44 0.144~ 
1956 30.8d 4e47 4.47 I'\ e 14 4 ;i 
1957 32.82 4e75 4. 4 c; ".i. 144d 
1958 .34.33 4.97 4. 0) 1 :') • l i• 4 '.S 
195() 38.11 5.52 (~., 5 ~ .144~ 
1960 41.13 5e96 4o5P ,.. • } l. 4 i3 
1961 45.58 6.6" 4.61 (). 1448 
1962 51.37 7e44 4.6 c:; , . • 144.d ... 
1963 54.55 7.91 4.ne ". l44b 
1964 62.4 6 9. r 4 4.7? :". 1441:\ 
1965 71) • 1 6 lr>.16 4. 7 f: .-~.1448 
1966 76.72 11. 11 4.H' C'.144~ 
1967 84.J.3 12.21 4. "-i4 .~.144/'i 
1968 92 •. ., 6 12.C.7 4 • ·3 E "I .. l .3 3 '3 
1969 104.64 13.74 4.8<> ..... 1 ., 1 J 
1970 115.63 15.41 4. 9.'3 (! • l 3 .J j 
1971 127.34 1 7. l d 4.9t "" .1349 
--------------------NORWAY-----------------------
l>NP IN 
DOMESTIC t.NP IN POPU- E..:XCH.~NG~ 
rgas. ~YB!i~~~:! QQ!...bABa bAilfb __ __ !i~I£ __ 
(SILL IONS) (BILLIONS) OHLLICNSl ($/UN IT) 
1951 ld.68 2.62 J.3~ ,.. • 14 (' ,. 
1952 2J.64 c.. 89 J. 3 2 '.: • l 4 ,., .... 
1953 20 .a 7 2.92 3. 3,, ~.11+·• 
1954 22.sa 3. 16 3. 3c; ·.14:·· 
1955 23.99 3e36 3. 4 ~, ·.14:-" 
1956 27.l"JY 3e79 3. 4 '.1 .• 14 :' ~. 
1957 28.79 4. 03 1.4 ~ ~·. 1 4 .: • 
1958 28.ob 4. ·\) 1 i. 5 2 "el4'"n 
1959 3C.42 4e.26 j. 5 '5 ':l. 14 , .. 
1960 32.34 4e53 ].Se ~ • l ,'.I, •) 
1961 35.24 4e':}3 ~ • .:, 1 (\ • l 4 ... 
1962 3 7.99 5.32 3.64 ~~.14: ' 
1963 4C .9 7 S.74 .~. 6 7 ·;. 14·'~(.1 
1964 45.30 6.34 "J. 6 'j ~ • 14 "~ 
1965 ~.>·"'. 2 1 7.r.'.3 :t. ? 2 r-, o 14 'I'' 
1966 54. (_; d 7.ob j' 7 ':: 0. 1 1+ '· ~ 
1Y67 6•"".. l 3 ei.42 3. 7 '1 ,· .• l 4 ,, r"· 
1968 b4el7 '1• 98 .3 • R ;! t' • l I+ r " 
1969 6~.G 3 9. i~=, .-1. iJ 5 ,,.. • 1 .:.. .. ~ .~ 
1970 8J.46 11. 2 b 1.r~f! .... 14·:(• 
1971 Q~~.18 1 ~. :3 1 3. 9 t'. •' • l 42. 1) 
103 
-------------------~J~TUGAL----------------------
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC v1'-IP I t~ P~J ">lJ - t'XCHANGE 
Y.~~8 ~11£!~.\i~~y Q:Jl..b.~82 1.~llh~-- __ }~I~--
(dlLLl01'JS) ( fH LL [•.JN.:>) ~ILL 1 c !\i:; ) ($/UN l T) 
1951 43eo2 1 ::i. 17 >-\ • 'J. I J ('· • --~4 7 p, 
1952 44.52. l '.>. 4 8 '.3 • -) .• ''.347B 
1953 49. 3 :.: l l. 15 d. 5 r • J4 78 
1954 5' : • t.> c· l 7 • oO 3. ':) 7 
·• 51.+ 713 
1955 :>3.5r ld.61 ·3. ·S 1 r. )4 ·7~ 
1956 57.4(, 19.9•::> 3. 6 :i •, • :~4 7 ti 
1957 6 :, • 2n 2 '• 94 d. Sf ('.3478 
1958 61 • 9,i 21.sJ 8.7? ,.., • 14 78 
1959 66. l ,.,, 22. .-;iq d. 7 ;~ ,.. • )A. 7 d 
196" 72040 .(2 •-:;. 1 p. a. 'i::: ·•. . '14 7tl 
1961 77.2il 26.35 -~. ,3 '.i : .• J478 
1962 82.9.'.i 26.83 a. c; 7 " . 34 7>-3 
1963 89.20 31 ,.. ') • '-·· t:_. 9. ,• 4 'i. '4 7 i3 
1964 97.40 .33.88 '1 • : l " • . ·v+ 71'1 
1965 107.80 37.49 9 ') .. \..; . 34 78 
1966 1 17.t3C 4('.97 9. ~· • -~ 4 ! f_< 
1967 132.10 45. 'J4 '°). 3 p, .~) . 34 7 ,, 
1968 149.l'J 51e8b 9. 4 f; r • 34 7t:l 
1969 163.')•.) 55.69 9.55 . ~4 7 il 
l 97C 183.SC 63. -~2. 8.?5 )·,. 3-'.! 7 f~ 
1971 2CJ • 1 C 69.~9 i:3 • ':J.:: (, . ~4 7 (\ 
--------------------SWEuEN-----------------------
GNP [N 
DuMESTIC GNf.' IN POOU- C: XCH.~NG C: 
.Y~~!l k~E!i~~~.Y Q.!J!...baa~ b~I.l~b< __ __ E6I..t __ 
(BILL IUNS) (t:HLLIUNS) (;\1{LLIC!\S) ( t;/Ur·~ IT) 
1951 36.62 7. () 8 7. 1 /' • l '-: :~ ~ 
1952 40.35 7.ac 7·. l J r. . l ·~ j j 
195) 41 • 37 a. c ··· 7 • 1 1 ( . l j 3 .3 
1954 44.08 s. 52 7. ~ ~~ ( . l 'J:" 1 
1955 47.37 9. lu 1.2t .:'. 19 J 3 
1956 51.48 9.95 7. 3~ ( • 1; 3 1 
19'57 55.46 1c. 7 2 7.37 • 1 ·:i? -~ 
1958 56.25 11.26 7. 4 .·~ r . 1').33 
1959 62.02 11.99 7. 4 '~ , . . 1933 
l 9o0 67.60 l .J. l 7 7. 4 t- ,, • 1933 
1961 73.70 14 • .2S 7. 5 .- - 1) j 3 • 
1962 80.40 l~.54 7. 5 •; J • 1 :) 3 3 
1963 87~20 16.86 7.6 '~). 1?33 
1964 97.60 ld.87 7. t , . . 1SI33 
' 
1965 1 Cd• CJ 2\.. ~1d 7. 7 -~ - 1 q:~] • 
1966 117.4~ 22.69 ·7. 8 l , . 1 :i-.n 
1967 126. 4 ) 24. 43 7. f 7 ,. . 1 c] 'l 
' 1968 139.6•J 26.98 7•. 9 I "I. 19] 3 
1 96':, 151 .46 t:'.9. 28 7. ';l 7 ~ . 192 .3 
1970 168.98 32.66 ... ~. j~ ~ :" . 1'.j3 3 
1971 181.77 J~. '.')4 B • 1 l (t • 1 :i 5 ~' 
-----------------SWITl~HLAND---------------------
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC G1\IP I 1\1 P'JPU- rXCtil\NGE 
Y.~AB. ~~BBi;b!~ '! Q.Qb.b.~B.~ bAI..l ~ti __ __ 8..6.!£ __ 
(BILLIUNS) (blLLlUN.3) (MILLICl\5) ( .J;/lJNl T) 
1951 2. l • 9 ,, 5. 1 0 4.75 '°lo2'327 
1952 2 J. t)" 5.35 4. '.) 1 l'.".·.23?7 
1953 24. 1 c :_,. b 1 4. r .~ 0.2327 
1954 25et.>C 5. 9t.> 4. (;i 2 "'·232.7 
1955 27.3) b.35 4. r; ~ ···.2327 
1956 29.JO 6.82 5 •..• 4 C.2327 
1~57 30.90 7. 19 "). 1 3 ~.2327 
1958 31. 5..:; 7.33 5.? . r.2::,21 
195g 3 3. 3,1 7.87 c:;. 2 t: <·.2327 
196('1 37.1;) bo63 5 •. ~ ') 0.2327 
1961 41.s.; 9e6b "i. s ,. c.2327 
1 -l6?. 46.,~o lC.7·., 5.60 0.2327 
19f.3 !:J·J. 4 ·"I 11.7:3 5.77 C.2327 
1964 55.5(: 12. '} 1 5. ·~ 7 ''·2·~21 
196:) 6"' • r. 0 13.96 5.94 0.2327 
1966 64. (),') 1 5 ... 3 6. (:· ' 0.2321 
1967 68.80 16.Cl fJ 0 r 7 C'.2327 
196d 74. 20 17.27 ., • l ,, r'· .2327 
1969 80.70 18.713 be22 c. 2327 
1970 88.80 2C.6b 6 • l r; 0.2327 
1971 10Ge80 24.-53 6. 2 '3 0.2434 
---------------~UNITEU Kl\IGUUM-------------------
GNP IN 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1950 
1957 
1958 
195Y 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1g6J 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
196•3 
196'1 
19 7i) 
1971 
00·'-1E,S TIC 
~\JBB.~t:-!Si;Y 
(BILLIONS) 
14.76 
15.sa 
l 7. '.:' 6 
18. 0 1 
19.28 
2C' • 89 
22. 1 l 
23.06 
24.24 
2::.. 7 2 
27. 4 7 
2d.86 
30.68 
33.32 
35. 83 
38. l 8 
4:'. 20 
4-3.16 
4o.32 
:,').67 
5:>.99 
GNP IN 
D0bb~8~ 
(BILLIONS) 
41.33 
44.46 
47.77 
5~'. 4 3 
:33. 9d 
58. 4·~ 
t:l l. 91 
64.t.7 
67.87 
7 2. ·~ 2 
76. ')2. 
BO.Bl 
ds.qo 
93. 3'" 
lOC.32 
1c6. 9·.l 
111.2.3 
l'J3.58 
111.17 
121.61 
136.1'7 
PtJPU-
b~l.l~~-­
(1•tILL[CNS) 
sn.sc 
50 • 7 '2 
5 <': • IJ c 
51.::: ~ 
5 1 • .? ) 
S I • 4 1 
5 l of 1 
51.d4 
5 2. 1 ..3 
52."''3 
S2.i3~ 
c:; 3 • .3 4 
") 3. 6 4 
54. 
54.17 
54. 6 !':; 
54. o<:; 
5'5. ") .. 
55. ~:._, :.3 
EXCHANGE 
--B~I£ __ 
($/UNIT) 
2.r."<:1' 
2. 8('!'l(' 
2. 8•) 00 
2.800:) 
2. ~(' c 1 
2. 81"10•'"1 
2 • 131 CG 
2eFVJ0 
-~ • ar c- ..... 
2. st' c r~ 
2. ~r: f ·~ 
2 •IV•)'." 
2.d~,·"'"' 
2.767~ 
2.4,.,00 
2. 4 .... ("'· ..... 
2.4~"'!('(1 
2.432) 
104 
------------------CUSTA RICA---------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
19'.:6 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1 :; 6 3 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
197') 
19.,1 
GNP IN 
DUMESTIC 
~~ti~tt!k!'. 
(.JILL.IONS) 
1. 4 2 
l. 5 7 
1.76 
1.92 
2. (')9 
2.10 
2.34 
2. 4 1 
2.54 
2.74 
2e89 
3.12 
3.41 
3. !:>3 
3.87 
4. 1 5 
,.._ .49 
4.93 
5. 5::) 
6.36 
6.51 
GN;:> IN 
.QQb.6..~t:!~ 
( tH LL I UNS) 
'· 2:::. 
':'. 2 6 
.) • 3 1 
.} • 3 4 
.. , • j 7 
'.J. 39 
Ce42 
0.43 
0.45 
J.49 
t.52 
,·. :; 3 
' • 5 .s 
0.6J 
C.68 
'."1. 74 
C.84 
:) • 9 '~ 
l • r .J 
PCJPU-
!::AlJ_G~-­
(M[LLICt\S) 
~. ,q s 
~. 9 2 
l • -, 
1 •. ~ 7 
1 • l 1 
1 • 1 '3 
1. 2 ~ 
1.2''3 
1 • 3 • 
1 • j 4 
I.Jg 
1 0 Lt 4 
1 • 4 <:; 
1 • : 4 
l • 5 <; 
1 • f ., 
l • 7 4 
1 • 7 -~ 
F:: l( (: l i A N G 1=: 
__ itlE __ 
(J;/U'<IT) 
"".17~1-) 
• l ldf:; 
' ' • 1 7 ~' ,., 
• 1 / ~~c 
'. 1 7•Jo 
'·. 1 7,-3(· 
·.170'"> 
•' • l lt.' 1:1 
"·.11><-::i 
<_. e } 7 C) (• 
r·.1717 
,, • l 5' -· 
: . • l "'> ,.,,_; 
'. 15( q 
:~ .• l ")f" ·,J 
'. 1 5 •, q 
, .• 1 5 (' ,, 
.• 1 5 - :.1 
... • 1 :, r. 9 
.• 1sr'J 
·· .• 1sc ·1 
-----------------EL SALVADOR---------------------
GNP IN 
OuMESTI c GNP IN pr_iou- fXCHANG'C 
!'.!i.~8. £~88~£KY QQ 6s. b.~ !:i ~ !::~ll];,,t! __ __ !B.I~--
( 3ILLIONS) ( IJILLIONS > ( r-1 ILL I c I\ s) ( 1>/Ut'J IT ) 
1951 1 ·" r• • \,• 0 C.42 1 .9 1 !~ .• -'+ ~· ( ,. 
1 952 l .( 9 r .44 1 • <; 7 ~ . 4 (" (' r1 
1953 1. 1 6 c. 46 2 ,. ? • 4 . .. -. 
1954 l • 2'-> c. 5C " . r 
"' 
• l~ -~: 
1955 l • 29 (' .52 2 • 1 {~ . (~'' 
1 956 1 .34 (). 54 ; . ~ .. ~ . /~ ,.._ . 
1957 l • 4 () (", .56 ? • t:? f, - • 41"" . 
1958 1 • 38 (). 5::, ') • 3 '? • .'.! 
1959 1 • 34 -~. 54 2. .Jc; .4 
1 96~ 1 .4 1 ;,:•. 5 7 ? .4 4[' .. ."\ , • 
1961 l .44 \.; . 57 ? • ':) 
' 
- • 4' 
1962 l • 59 :) • 64 ? • t:, "l - 4 ' -. 
1963 l .68 ~ .67 ?. l L'. • 4.· ... 
1964 l • 8 !::) ('. 74 .2. c ,. • :~ .--
1 965 l .9 7 c 79 .., 93 - 4 "'. ~ '' • <. . . 
1Y66 2.c 9 J. 84 3. .. 4 • 4'' ( . 
1 967 2. 2 (1 J. 5~8 3. l "' -• .::+,i' 
,.._."I 
1 968 ? . • 2 7 0.g 1 I'' ., ~ 7 ....... 4 r-. . , -. '·-
1 969 2. 36 
'· 
')4 
' 
-~; . 
• 4' . 
1970 2 .54 1 ,. 2 ,j • 3 . 4; •, 
" 
.. ,, 
1<)7 l 2.66 1 • ., 6 1.fi'5 • •1- .... i ·1 
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------ --- - - -- - ---- -t,\) AT L.MAL A- - -- -- - - --- ----- -----
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
Gt·~P 11\1 
i..>u~LSTIC 
c. bl ti 8.~ t! ~ '.!: 
(BILLIUNS) 
i.1 .68 
·~. 69 
"}. 7 3 
0.77 
.. , 
• a 1 
·}. 90 
0.93 
'j. (,} 7 
1 .0 3 
1 • '.) 3 
1 • :: 6 
1. l 3 
1. 25 
1. 28 
1.31 
1.36 
l .4 2 
l. f;) 7 
1 • 61:3 
1 .86 
le9C 
(;Nf-' IN 
Q\db.b.t.B.~ 
(lJILLIUNS) 
( • c,e 
(.:. 69 
(). 7 J 
·:'. 77 
. 81 
-:: • 90 
." 9 ·; . ...) 
(j • 97 
i.c 3 
1. 0 _j 
1. (. b 
1 • 13 
1. 25 
1 • .2 8 
l • 31 
1 • 36 
1 .42 
1.57 
1. {J8 
1. 86 
1. 9( 
PDPU-
b~IJ.Q~--
(MILL I (1\:0,) 
2. ,l ~ 
? • 9;: 
, 
., . .· (; 
J. 1 !:; 
] • 2.1': 
_, • .3 = 
3. 4 5 
~. ~: 5 
3.ts 
3. 7 ": 
~J. '! 3 
4.~ ") 
4. 1 ·] 
4. j" 
4. 4 /j 
4.-:; c 
4.72 
4.'-'t 
5. ~~ 1 
5. l c; 
S.3~ 
':XCHANGE 
--~11It. __ 
(•f./UNI T) 
1 . ., ... (' (' 
1 ..... (' ( ...... 
1 . ·""" (' ~" ('\ 
1 . '. ~- : . :1 
1 • )r· r. (' 
l •."I'.') ( r 
1 •,... ,. r ."" 
l . _:'.- :' ~~ 
1 • 1",... ,. ,.., 
! • cc .. ~ . 
·' 
l • £'•' j "\ 
1 • r ,- ::· r: 
1 ,-..r ,. . . . ' 
1 . :r .. -
1 . ., - ( " 
1 . :· (".' ;".,.. 
1 • .., f", ,,.. ~ 
l .. , 
1 • .)t' 
! • 1"' /"• ~· (" 
1 • r r : I"'; 
---------------~---HONDURAS----------------------
GN~ IN 
DOMESTIC GNP IN PflPU- ':XC11ANGL 
!~~~ ~~atig,t!~r QQlaL.~8.~ !..~Il&;.~-- __ :.;:~It __ 
(BILLIONS) (OILLIONS) (MILLICl\S) (1;/UNIT) 
1951 ;:' .46 1).2.3 1 4" • ·-s,- ' . ~
1952 (). 4 9 0.24 1 c:.., •' . c;· . .._; ._. 
1953 .:. .57 r.. 28 1. 5 7 " ·-· ....... •1 . .... )" 
1954 J .s8 0.2<1 l • b 2 .. • '5"' ·' '1 
1955 C.63 Oe31 l . (:· .. ., • 5~ ( 
1956 n.64 i:.1 • 32 1 • 7 l -~. 5'"" ._ .. , ... 
1957 ;J. 6 9 ,., • 34 1. 7 7 • l-) .. 'I 
1958 o.71 o. 3t> 1 " " . ~' . .;::: t'_ •• ~5 ... t ., 
195-l \'.'. 75 0.37 1 •FA - .• ~~1-"i ~· -
196'.l c.77 (~. 3q 1 • f ': ,. • c:;r r •'\ 
1Q6l 0. 7 ·} Ci. 39 1 .9 l • ~(I ~ 
1962 {,. 84 .~. 4 2 1 • 9 7 \ • ~) ,._ ! . r 
1963 o.B6 i. 4 3 2. 4 ('. • L_Jr ; r 
1964 1). 9 1 :·,. 46 2. • 1 l f' • ;.:ir .. "' 
1965 i.c 1 ·~'. :::, 0 2. l :~ .... I.") ·•, 
1960 1. (' 7 n.53 2. C' •:': ·"> • ~) .... ( r.· 
1967 1 • 1 4 i"'""'. 57 ,., , "I .~ --::- ...., r· ,... ..._. _, , .. ) 
1968 l. 25 '). ~2 2.4 l . .., £:- r .. ) . ,. :" 
l 969 l.3C l). 6 5 2.4-:; " S"' -·,.... •... 
197". 1. 3 .;, (). 08 2.5.::! ~.5~·~. .~ 
1971 1. 4 'I- o. 72 2. b 3 ' . ~), .. ( ,... 
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-------------------NICARAGUA---------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
l Yt.>9 
1960 
1 ')61 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
197C 
1971 
GNP lN 
DOMESTIC 
s;;!.!!i!i~ti~Y 
(BILL lUNS) 
NeAe 
NeAe 
1. 95 
2 .t 2 
2.14 
2.17 
2.38 
2 .38 
2.42 
2.61 
3. (.. 7 
3.2d 
3. (j 1 
4. l i} 
4e2d 
4.60 
5.17 
s. 4 8 
5.90 
6.36 
GNP [N 
QQb.b.AS?.2 
(OILLILlNS) 
N • A• 
N.A. 
0. J l 
0.32 
(J. 33 
(). 3 'J 
c. j:j 
i). 35 
r.31 
:.40 
0.44 
,-, • 4 7 
il. ':i4 
c.59 
0.61 
r·. ob 
0.74 
r •• 7 b 
(). 84 
•). 9 l 
POPlJ-
.l..Ail£b __ 
U41LLICN5) 
1 • r ·; 
1 • 1 2 
1 • l "'; 
l • ? ;·~ 
1 • ? 2 
1 • :? 6 
1 • 2 q 
l -~, . . 
1 •. -~ 7 
1 • 4 1 
1 • 4 5 
1 • :; .~ 
1 • '5 4 
1 • {, ' 
lof,f; 
1 • 7 ,: 
1 • 7 ;7 
1 • 6 4 
1 • 9 l 
l. 9 2 
f:XCHANGE 
__ 3.AI~-­
C $/UN IT> 
( .!515 
·"'. 15 1 5 
'"·.l~)15 
:'). 15 1::, 
:.i.1515 
"1.1515 
0.1515 
;"\.1461 
;1. 1429 
0.1429 
r, e 1429 
('. 142'4 
0.1429 
,'.".1429 
G.1429 
c. 14 29 
r:.1429 
0.1429 
c-.1429 
C.1429 
('l.142q 
------------------~ARGENTINA---------------------
1951 
1952 
195l 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
195'} 
196J 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
196<J 
1 g 7'.:. 
1971 
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC 
~i1B.fi~i::!~.:! 
( c3 l L L I u N S ) 
D.95 
1 • 1 2 
1.29 
1 .45 
1. 7 1 
2.11 
2. 71 
3.85 
7.37 
11 • 9 1 
14.77 
1-3.45 
25.b6 
.Jo.<.: 4 
<+4. 9 1 
:>t>. 7 1 
68.32 
r).5·~ 
93.76 
114.27 
GNI-> 11'4 
12.Qb.b~B~ 
( b I LL I UN~' ) 
1 3. 4( 
1 s. ch' 
l~.l\\ 
19. 9::. 
22.s2 
1 3. 4·· 
11.:;;2 
1.3. )4 
11.25 
12. 12 
14.36 
13.5~ 
13.35 
1 7. 9S 
21. 5 1 
21.84 
17.:~4 
l "'· !:>2 
22.74 
24. 75 
2::.. b<::'. 
PflPU-
!_.~IJ£b __ 
( t.1 1 LI- I C I'. S ) 
l 7. "; ., 
17.-17 
l'"l.~ 2 
1 P, • ':H: 
18.-il 
l').;:q 
19.h<; 
2r'•f"; 
1 q. :> 7 
1 c; o 9? 
2f"' • ~ 4 
2r·. 5 4 
2' • 8 ": 
? 1 • l 7 
2 1 • 4 s 
2 1 • '.3 ;::; 
22. 1 h 
2?. !:l ~ 
.>.]. 2 l 
23. ~ :~ 
EXCHANGE 
-B~.I£ __ 
{$/UNlT) 
14.H"8::5 
l4.!C49 
14 .n 3')!." 
13. 75 81 
13.1684 
6. l 76 5 
4. 25:"12 
3.621'.~ 
1. 52 66 
1. 2095 
1 • 21':' 7 3 
"·9177 
0.7237 
C.69<)6 
0. :'l96 8 
,~. 4864 
C. 29C? 
r.~357 
(' • 28 5 7 
'). 2640 
r.2260 
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--------------------su~1v1A----------------------
1 q51 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
GNP IN 
uuME:STIC 
~b!B.!:if;.t!l~1. 
(BlLLIUNS) 
NeAe 
N.A. 
Ne A• 
N.A. 
NeAe 
N.A. 
N.A. 
3e3b 
3.86 
4 .4 8 
4.87 
5.33 
~.74 
6.4 6 
7.ld 
l.95 
8 .. 98 
10.19 
11.07 
11.81 
12.97 
(:;1>1P IN 
Q.Jk~~a~ 
(OILLILJNS) 
""•A• 
Ne A• 
"-•A• 
Ne A• 
NeAe 
Ne A• 
Ne A• 
·["'. 28 
Ge33 
0.3g 
~'. 4 1 
(·· 4t:> 
Ge48 
c.54 
(: • 6(1 
0.67 
o.76 
;.} • d6 
C.93 
C·. 99 
1.09 
PUPU-
L.~Il£.b __ 
(r~ILLICNSl 
··-~. ( ·; 
3 1 ., . . . 
3. l :1 
3.2~ 
3. 2" 
3. 3.., 
3. := l 
3.~6 
3.41 
3. 4:: 
3. ') ... 
4. "I 2 
4.12 
4.?. :~ 
4. ,3..:: 
4. 4 "; 
4.56 
4 .61". 
4. 8 ~ 
4 .9:: 
5. ~ t; 
FXU1t.NGF 
__;::~I.t._ -
(li/U'\JIT) 
N • Ae 
"'. I),. 
N •I\• 
NoAe 
N.A. 
N.A. 
~~•A• 
• !'"~ 4 2 
~. -u42 
,-.~'342 
;' • "''342 
r_:.('842 
'.\."£}42 
r.'"'342 
r..r·342 
C'.')842 
r.'.'84? 
I"·• r. g4? 
0ef'd42 
--------------------8RAZIL-----------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1959 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
19 7(' 
1971 
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC 
s;. \JB. B. !it:!~ y 
( 8 1 LL 10 i'll S ) 
('. 30 
..... 40 
0.60 
... so 
1 ..... () 
1. 2:) 
1 • ~:: 
2.~0 
.~. 74 
4.(;4 
1_,.55 
11.86 
22.91 
.30.4-J 
53.2.:S 
9be96 
1 Jl .88 
2:-;4. 7() 
271.8,') 
GNP IN 
QQl..!.~B~ 
(BILLIONS) 
16.22 
21. u 1 
26.17 
17.72 
17.36 
17.2.3 
2C • 6 5 
2".''e 65 
17.03 
20. 12 
2c. '77 
19. 31 
23. 1/6 
25.9d 
2u.Bu 
24.52 
27.lB 
31.23 
32.q6 
45.61 
::..1. 34 
POPU-
b~IJ~~--
( ;"'ILL IC~;::;) 
5 3. 5 ·1 
55.1': 
56.74 
5"3. 4 4 
n0elF 
61.SP 
63.3:' 
6:'l.74 
6 7. 7' 
69.7~ 
7 1 • d 1 
74. 1,., 
76.:::;: 
78.f)J 
Fl 1 • 3 ' 
a3.:J; 
a6.")c 
99. j" 
9 2. 2 c0 
qz.rh 
g 5. 4 1 
t: ><ChANGE. 
__ 3~:t __ 
( 'S/UN IT) 
54. ,' s ') 1 
54. •' j,2 j 
52 • J4 L3 
2 ... :,. :.->? q ." 
21.6944 
11.~-,4,o, 
1 7. ?~ 7 7 
1 J. ?o J4 
a.s1 '? 
7 • jf~ l F, 
5 • I t.l ~if'. 
? • 9t+ a·~ 
1 • 9<~ 4 ·~ 
1.1341 
0.5732 
"~ • 4 hr r:) 
''.39')"", 
.-.1150 
r.249~ 
~.2?28 
·i. 1889 
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---------------------Cl-i l LE-----------------------
1951 
1952 
t )53 
1954 
195:3 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
196".'l 
1961 
1962 
196J 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1q67 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
uNP. IN 
DOMESTIC GNP IN 
~~SE~~~! Q~bbA8~ 
POPU-
bAll~~--(81LLIUN5) (BILLIONS) (MILLICNS) 
c.20 
~.20 
e.35 
o.5a 
1.r.3 
l eu3 
2.27 
2.96 
4.14 
4. '.) s 
4 .oJ 
5.5 7 
d.24 
12 .49 
17.55 
2'~ • 3 1 
Jl.81 
42.88 
62.40 
9(>.32 
123.22 
3 • S·' 
4ed2 
4. -J~ 
6.Jq 
o. 33 
4.85 
4. 4 :: 
4.22 
t+. 4 ·"' 
3e8<J 
4.41 
5.27 
5. l 1 
5e4 l 
5.5a 
be34 
6.32 
6e27 
6.Yl 
7.77 
lOeOH 
6. l ·'i 
6.29 
I). 44 
6. (; "' 
f.:>. 7<., 
6. 9 F, 
7. l c+ 
7. 3? 
7.-::, ~ 
7. c, c:; 
7. ,y {'. 
::i. 1 ;~ 
~1 • ~-> .... 
"3. 7 l 
R • ~1.C 
9ol4 
9 • .3 '.". 
9 • ') 7 
·:i. e ~= 
d. y c:; 
C:XCHANG~ 
_£:iAifi. __ 
($/UNIT) 
1 7. 75<.J8 
16.22.37 
14.1822 
1<"'.9177 
6. 161:\9 
?...9747 
1 • q3 35 
1. 42 77 
l.'"'616 
.1. 9")32 
:j.9524 
':'. ~4 5 7 
':ohl9-l 
~. 4 3 7<) 
r.317q 
·'. 2(,!'i7 
n.19r\7 
').1463 
o.11r·o 
''.f:uo·· 
'" .• 081·~ 
-------------------COLOMBIA----------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
t 95'} 
196!') 
1961 
1962 
19b3 
1964 
1965 
196a 
1<)67 
1968 
1969 
197~ 
1971 
GNP IN 
DlJMESTI C 
~~!iB!;;~!l;Y 
CBlLLIJNS) 
8.85 
9.57 
1'l.65 
12.68 
13.18 
14.77 
11.5q 
2f". 2 9 
23.34 
26.45 
3 1) • C3 
33.70 
42.71 
52.96 
59.90 
72.37 
,"j l. 61 
94.42 
l·J~.28 
127.(.J 
l :)(i. •J ~ 
GNP Ii-I 
Qi.11..!..~ !3 ~ 
(B[LLIONS) 
3. 75 
3.83 
4.26 
s. ( 7 
s.27 
5e91 
5. 2!.l 
3.1~ 
4. l 7 
4. 1 l 
4.5o 
5 • ..;.4 
4.76 
6~ 1 7 
5. 6 ~:.~ 
5. dC 
5. 9 l 
6. 29 
6. ·~ J 
7.47 
POPU-
b~Ilib __ 
(MILLICl\S) 
11. 6? 
11.q<; 
12.]7 
12.77 
13.17 
13. 5') 
14. "' • 
14.4t! 
14.'";14 
15.~~ 
1 s. a., 
to.4c. 
16 • .::i 4 
17.48 
l A•~ 4 
18.6.~ 
19.?2 
19 .-~ 3 
2 1 • 1 c 
21. 7 7 
EXCtlANGt: 
--~61[ __ 
($/UNIT) 
0.4'.?37 
('; • 4f' r: 2 
0. 399·~ 
1.· • 4" ·: ·~ 
•). ;~<.; 82 
c.1,;7~ 
". • l l b'.3 
~·. 1 ':)54 
;·. 1::;? i 
·'." • 16 1 "> 
r·.1115 
'".1117 
-·.t"'J'" 
, .(~774 
'". •"'7 1 1 
.... ~ t-:<? rs 
.~.0581 
~. ;.:54 1'.) 
~· • !' .. 4~~H 
109 
• 
-----~~-------------ECUADU~----------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1956 
195-J 
19b0 
1961 
1962 
196.3 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
GNP IN 
D01'4EST l C 
~\JBB..G.~~.Y. 
( 1:3 ILL IONS) 
7. 6 l 
8.55 
9.C 6 
1r.·•1 7 
1 1::. 74 
1"'.90 
11. b 3 
l:!.,;5 
12.62 
l :i. 74 
14.62 
15.67 
11.10 
ld.93 
2J. 22 
22.22 
2 ..... 4 7 
2b.72 
3C • 11 
34.31 
41. 13 
GNP 1 N 
QYL..b8B2 
( tH LL l UNS) 
(. 'J 7 
0.71 
·;. 7 '~ 
v.77 
0. d:". 
:: • 8 3 
',. q 1 
:s.u5 
.; • 8 7 
c.~~ 
1. 0 5 
1. 1 ~ 
1 • 2 _j 
l. 36 
1. 48 
l • {) 7 
le 61:3 
1.63 
DO.-:>U-
bAI1£~--
(MILL!C~S) 
3. j ., 
3 • ii -~ 
3. "i : 
3. t 4 
3. 7 ·:: 
3. '1 7 
3 .... 2 
4. l l 
4o23 
4.Jt: 
l~ • 5 ·; 
4. 6(:; 
4. tJ 1 
4 .9 tl 
5. l <:; 
5.]::: 
5 • ") , 
5.7~ 
5 • LiY 
6. ~ . . j
6. ') ·~ 
F XCHAN.JF.: 
--2~I.;; __ 
( ·t./UN IT) 
,·,. ·"'66 ....... 
...... ,f: 6 ~· 
,., • ·"'f:6f.~ 
"':. ('66~; 
;.. • '?66C 
.'''!. ,.,66:"'. 
'.'.'. "661'7 
f'.066•) 
r:. •"66C 
t:.0660 
(~. b~ 51 
r.,..556 
Ce<'556 
I'.\ .')556 
f'·.")55b 
(',. 0556 
O.G556 
f' e 'l556 
G.0556 
et.('.'4()1 
n.0396 
--------------------M~XICU-----------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
19oD 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
l 97<j 
1971 
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC GNP IN 
~YBB~~~.Y. QQbb88~ 
(BILLIONS) (blLLI~NS) 
52.3(} 
5d.61) 
58.4<' 
11.so 
87.3() 
~~.30 
li4.20 
127e2Ci 
136.20 
154.lC 
163.80 
1 77.50 
192.2ri 
224.6v 
244.70 
274.!;>0 
304.30 
332.HC 
374 e9C 
418.70 
452 .4 0 
b. i::; 
be77 
6.75 
6.42 
b. ·~o 
7.94 
<.J. 14 
1 ~;. 1 !:I 
1 :· • 9 ~~ 
12.33 
13.1 c 
1 ~. 2<· 
15.38 
17.97 
19. ,:,a 
21.9u 
24.34 
26. 62 
29.99 
33.5( 
3(1. 19 
P;JPU-
b~.Il.k.~--
( ,·4 I LL I C f\ S ) 
27. (_l 4 
27.flS 
2a.1r 
?_·~. b 1 
3r-. s c 
31.5c 
32.61 
3.3. 7(: 
34.66 
3 A.. -. 5 
37.27 
38. 5 1+ 
39.4'; 
41.25 
42.6S 
44.15 
45.67 
47. "'. 7 
4 7. t~ 2 
40 •.. <; 
5'1 • ·'.! ; 
f::XCHANGE 
__ BAI.£: __ 
($/UNIT) 
, • 11 56 
f'. 11 5t:> 
r:.1156 
n.')898 
<'· ('!8'J'J 
0.!'.'8(•0 
ti.rar,., 
,., • ' 18( 0 
(... :aco 
0 • •".! t'H.i 0 
c.oso0 
0.080(' 
'1.C8CC' 
:".care 
.~ .• ( 8:') c 
:'. r.:sct:1 
'.;.rBC" 
"•'.'A(''l 
('. t 8<' n 
n. ( 8t")t'l 
"~.~.~r~o 
llO 
-------------------µARAGUAY----------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1950 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1906 
1967 
1~68 
1969 
197() 
1971 
GNP IN 
DO,'-'LS TIC 
~l,,!E~t!::!~:!. 
(BILLIUNS) 
2.37 
4o3o 
7.135 
1 (. 8 3 
14.28 
17 od8 
22.85 
26. 1 c 
2.9.33 
34.36 
39.52 
45.13 
47.90 
5'.1. 78 
55.2 ') 
58.'' 2 
61. c 5 
64.16 
08 .55 
73.11 
82. 1 1 
Gl\JP IN 
J.!Q~bAB~ 
(BILLIONS) 
(1.39 
C.47 
;1. J~ 
).41 
~-;. 4 r: 
r. 31 
'). 3 3 
~. 28 
J.27 
'). 3C' 
r;. 3 2 
:; • 3 7 
,)9 39 
C.42 
(: • 4 ~) 
'). 1 1 
\J. 12 
11. 5 1 
ri. !:)4 
0.58 
c.65 
PUPU-
b~~lk~-­
( Ml LL IC I\ S) 
l. 4 ~ 
1 • 4 h 
1. 5''. 
1 • 5 ~ 
lo5c 
1 • 6 1 
1 • (:; ~~ 
1. 6 <; 
1. 7:.:. 
1.75 
1 • B,. 
1.8~ 
1 • 9 1 
l • <; 7 
2. 0 3 
2. r c; 
2olc 
2. 2 :~ 
2.31 
2. 39 
: XCHA N<» 
__ S.61.E __ 
( 1i /UN I I ) 
·~ • l h b ~' 
"l. l '. 7 6 
~- • c :3 7 4 
( • ( 2 84 
<"'ol"l72. 
('.~14? 
r • '.) 1:: 9 
[ • !".(' •;J? 
,.. .t;. 87 
0.1;"82 
o.;'"'~P.? 
c.1:·s2 
1'.l.C'~:> 
')o'.;.;;3? 
c.rr-2·"" 
(' • r .. ~ ? r. 
•.c.~79 
"•'':"·79 
) • ( ( 79 
--------~------------PE~U------------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
l96C 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
l96d 
1969 
1 97(: 
1971 
GNP IN 
O.JMESTIC 
~~tlB.~.t:!~! 
(BILLIONS) 
i;;.lt.; 
21.10 
22.70 
2::,.3:. 
28.90 
32.4 0 
35.5 J 
3g.~j:,) 
46.3C 
55.:SC 
6~. 3'·:· 
71 • 7C 
78.70 
95. \) 0 
1 1 3. <,) c 
134.CC 
15?..a~~ 
181.3J 
19'3.J0 
227. 5C'· 
262.5. 
GNP IN 
!&b.bAB~ 
(BILLIONS) 
1. 2 9 
1.35 
lo 14 
1. 38 
1. 52 
1. 7() 
1 • a a 
1. 65 
lo 67 
2. '-· 5 
2. 3;2 
2.67 
2.93 
3.54 
4.21 
4. t> 1 
j. -)5 
4obd 
:.:>. 12 
::: • 8d 
6.78 
POPU-
bAil~ti __ 
(MILLICl\5) 
8.12 
a.?7 
8. 4 3 
8 • (, ') 
A. 7 c; 
9. 4 (~ 
9.7j 
1 .~ ..... 2 
1 ..... 32 
1,., • b 3 
l').gf, 
1 1 • 3 ' 
11 • b 5 
l 2. ,") 1 
12 • ·F; 
12.77 
l 3. 1 7 
13.')<: 
1 4. ,"' 1 
i::XCHANG~ 
__ B.ATf:. __ 
($/UNIT) 
, ....... t"'fi54 
,,. • r,h 4 1 
c 0 r5•)2 
c.r,:)2b 
-.0:::.2c-. 
·1. r·s ?h 
r: • t'\ti 1 7 
,~ • <: .: ~_.., 1 
: . • ' .17 ·, 
c • 11 ,l 7 :I 
"'.Ml1.:> 
.~ • ~ .. 3 7 I 
r•i'5-1?-
• -~4 4 
I • r .'? ~ j 
- • t·- .--:-. '=' r-s 
111 
--------------------URUuUAY----------------------
G:'-IP IN 
DOMESTlC 
Y~6.!i ~1!£iti~t:!~Y 
(BILLIONS~ 
19!:>1 Ne A• 
1952 I'~• A• 
19'.:>3 Ne A• 
1954 N.A. 
1955 4.59 
1956 ·:;. 1 ~ 
1957 b. 1 ·~ 
l95d 6.or 
195~ ::l. cl 4 
1 Q6(; 13.54 
1~61 17.2...J 
1962 l 8. ·r 1 
1963 22.17 
1964 32.26 
lQ65 51.86 
1966 9H.Z.2 
1967 164.47 
196d 36 J. 4 :5 
1969 492..·::>C 
l 97"J 5 96. 20 
1971 7 '54. 4 1 
GNP 1 rJ 
.QQ~\s.~!i2 
( b I L L I U N :; ) 
N.A. 
Ne .A• 
'~•.A• 
N.A. 
l •• ~ ::> 
l. Jt> 
1. 4 7 
( • ·) '.:> 
r, •BK 
1. 2 (': 
l. 57 
1.70 
1. 5 7 
1. 64 
,. 
• 75 
l. 2 8 
'··. 8 3 
1. 1+4 
1. •;I 7 
2 •. 1d 
3. ~· 2 
PCJPU-
b~1l~D--
(1-4lLLTCl\S) 
2. j '', 
.2. j,.., 
2. l ·-
2. 4 : 
2. j. 
2. 5 :.i, 
2 • c5 >. 
.? • c· 1 
?. • -:. '.: 
2. 7 1 
., • 7 ~' 
2. 7 .._. 
2.62 
~?.f': 
EXCHANG!" 
__ 3!!It __ 
($/UNIT) 
('.4167 
,, • 1t' 3.6 
'.! • .128') 
(\. 3145 
, .. • ?725 
11. 2632 
; • ?4 1 2 
r.1437 
('. (;-,,:9(, 
r. 0 •' c3 <;•·) 
r.r·:qrig 
/. ~q 1 ! 
'"' • i 7 !" ij 
- • -. ·) (' 7 
.•. l 4:, 
•. • l 3 l 
(.. (·- 5t' 
'l. () ~ 4 ...... 
'"'\. ,,,,. 4...., 
------~------------VENEZUELA---------------------
GNP IN 
OLJMESTIC GNP IN POPU- EX-::.HANG'-: 
t.~~a ~1!8!:1:;,~~y .QQb.b.~B~ bAllQ::! __ __ :it..!.t. __ 
( ci ILL IONS) (t:IILLIONSI ( MILL TCI\~) ( J; / ul\. IT ) 
1951 11. 6 3 3.47 ::>. 1 1 . ::c. e;;; 
1952 12.::i3 3. 74 5 • .3 c; ... • 2 '..)....,, (") 
1 <_,53 13.J5 .3. 98 5 .6 ,2 ·~ .• 2.) . .:5 ) 
1954 14.77 4.41 ::i. 8 ':: "' • 2 1·1 t-? C:-1 
iq55 15.99 4.77 6. '\ ~ " ..,, ~ • 2..:i b 5 
1".'.)56 17.9 3 5. 35 6. L: ·1. 2-=' R:~ 
1957 2C 060 (.). 15 6. ':) 7 .·· . :'9f.; ') 
1958 d2.49 (>. 7 1 6. t3 ~ . • ,:!. '..~'-),I~ 
1959 23.67 7. .... 7 7.,... ; ,, . ·.2c~ t~ :::> 
196"1 23. ~ 7 ., • -~· 4 7. J::; ,. 
'• 
'>·~ !-\ ·"; 
1961 24 .68 7. 37 7 • ·j 1 ·:.2985 
1962 ~c.,.o~: 8. v "· 7. '~ 7 r. 2Q8') 
1963 29. _) j 8. 7'5 El • 1 l1 -.2':..55 
1964 32 .... 1 l. 21; 3.4 -~ r .?22? 
1965 34 .4 3 7. 65 8. 71;_ 0.2222 
1966 36. 1 2 g. (',3 9. !' ., ('t.?~2;' 
1967 38.35 80 ~ 2 9. 3'.: 1.2??,2 
1968 38.78 8.62 9'. (, ., r- • ::>?? .> 
1969 4·': • S4 9. (' 1 1,... ~ 4 - ;J ....... ,.) •"") .. • • - (_ <. I 
1970 44 • 1 5 <J. d 1 l·i.4' -::.2~2?. 
1971 49. 1 5 10. 9 2 1 lj. 6 
-
c.2-:>?> 
112 
113 
--------------------FINLANu----------------------
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC vNi.J IN FOPU- t" XCHA NGE 
Y.~AB ~~8.B~t:H~! QQ'=.b.A8~ !aA!.lht::! __ __ 8.~I.t;;: __ 
<tHLLluNS) (BILLI:JNS) (MILLICf\S) ($/UNIT) 
1951 1. sa 3. 42 4. (' 4 ('1.4-~]d 
1952 8015 3. :,4 4. n ,.. ('. 4 348 ., 
1953 d .(· 5 .:; • .j(., 4. 1 2 ·". 434"3 
1954 a.94 3.39 4. 1 :'3 <'. 4348 
1955 '). 9{' 4.30 4 "' • c.. _; c .434d 
1956 1 1 •. :: 1 4. 79 4.?.~c .~.4348 
1957 12.co 4. t35 4.3? ,., • 4" 42 
1958 12 .9 2 4 •. '1 4 4. C'I ,, ._~,. Jl 25 
1959 14.Co 4.39 4.3<:; , .. , • 312S 
196q 15.E<l 4. ':i4 4. 4 ~ ~.J125 
1961 17.'.:J9 5. ::)(, 4. 4 7 ;} • 31 2 <:, 
1962 18.Bl :::>o d8 4. 5··· (. :.n 25 
1963 2'"• 4 7 be 4 I': 4. 54 1.3125 
1964 23.4~ 7. 3) '" . :-, ,::.~ ('\.3125 
196'5 2:>.70 ~. c _j 4. f, l n.312"> 
1966 27.6 3 do 63 4. l; 4 .~,. -3125 
1967 29.90 8. } 7 4.b7 r. 31'.' ". 1 
1968 33.87 a. \:'\6 1.j.. 6 ·.:; o.23a1 
1969 ..id. 3d 9. 14 4.7C l"l.2381 
1970 43.19 1r:.2d 4.61 0.2381 
1971 47.21 11. 24 4."'? 0.2381 
-------------------GRE~CE------------------------
GNP IN 
DLJMESTIC GNP IN pr1Pu- EXCHANGE 
YEAR ~bLBES:t!!~! QQb.!..~8~ b~llkt< __ __ £3.AT£ __ 
(dlLLIONS) ( UI LL IONS) ( 1"1 I LL T C f\ S ) ($/UNIT) 
l9Sl 39. 3C• 2.62 7.(,': C.0667 
1952 41.20 2.75 7.73 IJ."667 
1953 54. 1 0 2.~s 7.82 c. ('14("o 
1954 62.70 2.. 09 7. :) <; 0.0333 
1955 72. 20 2. 4'."' 7 .9 7 («1"1333 
1956 84. 1 :: 2.. 80 8 I".., . - r.;333 
1957 9J.40 3. :· .. l 8. 1 ·: t').~'333 
1958 94.30 3. 1 4 8. l 7 (' .r;331 
1959 98 .co 3. 2. 6 B.26 1).C333 
1960 105.60 3.52 e.::., (" ·"333 
1961 ll'-;lod0 3. <)9 '3. 4 ~ '.) .~333 
1962 127.70 4.2'::> d.4S ~-"333 
1963 141.lC 4.70 8.48 ..... ()113 
1964 157.6J ~.25 8. ':i l ~. ,., ~i3 3 
196!:> 176.90 s. ti :;I 3.55 Oo•'l33'i 
1966 1 96. 1 :; b. 7:J 3 '3 • f' l i:::.0333 
1967 211.3:) 1. ".4 i-l ,. 7? ,, • -~ j 3 3 
1968 22b.60 7.5S u'.11~ ,., • 0 )3 j 
196(} 258.2·:· K. o:- .~. 7 7 "·0333 
197') 286.2 1) ?.53 ., • 7 q IJ."3"'3 
1971 325.3'.'.:1 1 1 (. 0 3 [;.d'i ""of\3033 
--------------------TURKEY-----------------------
1951 
195~ 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1961} 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1963 
1969 
l 97C 
1971 
GNP IN 
DOMt:STIC 
~Y.B!3.bt:i£ '.! 
([JILLluNS> 
12. 2 7 
14.32 
lo.82 
1 7. 1 l 
21. ') 6 
24.33 
3).53 
3'3.51 
47.73 
so. 9 7 
53.72 
60 •.JO 
69.< 2 
74.2.C:' 
93.58 
1 04 • ( ·.'. 
114.7~ 
127.49 
l 4o • '-) 2 
192eC4 
G;'JP IN 
QQb.b.~~~ 
(l1ILL1LlN:~> 
4e38 
'=>. 1 1 
6. :' l 
6. 1 1 
7.52 
Geb9 
1c.90 
13.75 
1 7. c ~ 
14. c 2 
5.97 
6. 7 "~ 
7. b 7 
8.24 
o.sc; 
1 :: .• 40 
11.56 
12.75 
14. l 7 
1 j. 6, 
1 2. t~ 
POPU-
h!.'!.ll[~-­
(MILLICl\S) 
21.3': 
2?. ') 7 
<.3.?l 
.? 3 .136 
24. 4 4 
,?:,.2c; 
25.r~.e 
26.74 
?"7.C)l 
2·~.24 
28. 9 :· 
3' •. ~::; 
31 • 1 5 
31. q "1 
32. 7 2 
Jl.5li 
34.J~ 
35.?J 
J6. 1 "' 
r:: XCHA ~Gr 
__ :i,_'1I.~-­
( '5 / 0 'J I T ) 
i' • -~"; l 1 
. 
. 
(\. :L_,71 
r: • .-:, ,-, 7 1 
c· • -~5 7 1 
~·.3"'i71 
:' • 3'.S 7 l 
,·, • J~) 7 1 
'.'. 3':'> 71 
,_ .• 27:~1 
r.1111 
•• 1 1 1 1 
el 1 1 1 
'' • l 1 1 1 
:..1111 
,.. • 1 l l 1 
,.. • l l 1 1 
r.!111 
'ollll 
;".•('Cf?f-. 
( •' r'>tJ7 
-------------------IC~LANU-----------------------
GNP I f\J 
DOMESTIC 
YE~!3 ~!d!3Bf:~b.Y 
(dlLLliJNS) 
1951 2. :,4 
1952 2.03 
1953 3.~Y 
1954 3.79 
1955 4. 4 ;'l 
1956 s. 1 _j 
1957 !,) .4 4 
1958 6e39 
1959 7.24 
196" h. 39 
1961 9. ()l·.: 
1962 1 l • 5 7 
1963 13.78 
1964 17.61 
1965 21. 2 4 
1966 2.;.4g 
1 "167 25. 17 
1968 27 .52 
1969 33.85 
19 70 42.40 
1971 53.21 
GNI~ IN 
Q!.!b.b~ 8:2 
( ;JI LL I U Ne> ) 
., • 1 b 
(j. 1 7 
,·_. 2 1 
~. 2 3 
' • ?. 7 
(,.. 3 1 
c.33 
,:_ •• 3 '::I 
(_•. 4 4 
;~. £:. 7 
'.'. 3 2 
... 4 l 
' ·~--. 4 9 
• ::.9 
,_,. 45 
• '3 l 
·,. Jd 
;,. 46 
'). u l 
POPU-
b~.Il~~--
(MlLLICf\S) 
,..., • l s 
" .• l'J 
·:· • 1 s 
~- • 1 5 
,.. • l :': 
,- • 1 ( 
,. • 1 t: 
., • l 7 
c • l 7 
\~o1'i 
(" • l -" 
( • 1 c 
·~ • 1 q 
"I • 1 ''; 
c • 1 ,; 
,... . ., . 
. - '· 
r. • .c.?. _, 
(' • ? 
.l. ? 
t',.? 
~ XCHl\NG'·-' 
__ 26.It __ 
(J;/Ut~IT) 
........ ~112. 
•. f-_; 1 ? 
• ( 0 1 L: 
• • c_:f. 1 2. 
i • ,~. c· 6 ? 
: • ;_' c 3? 
"" • '. 2 :! .::i 
,,..., • -~~ 2 ] 2 
- .-?3? 
.• ,' l 7 ~; 
,, • " 1 1 3 
'•''11~ 
. 1 l ) 
-.'.,114 
114 
------ ---- ---- ---- -- I ;..·E.Lft.f'J.J-- - -- -- ------------ ---
G.'o!P lN 
DOMESTIC 
y~~B ~!.H:iB.~tK :! 
( B l LL lD 1-.1 S ) 
1951 :) • 4 1 
1952 0.4 7 
1953 (.\. 51 
1954 ) • 52 
1()55 '." e54 
1956 J. 5::) 
l g57 ,.. • 5 7 
195q .. , • ·:; 9 
1959 :· e63 
1960 r: e60 
1961 ~ e 7 1 
1962 c· e 77 
1963 C.83 
1964 ~e94 
1965 1 • G l 
1966 1 • \. r) 
1,967 1. l 5 
1968 1. 31 
1969 1e4 n 
1970 l .65 
19 71 l. 67 
GNP I l\i 
UOb.l..~d,~ 
( fj I LL I tl N S ) 
1 e 1;:, 
le 31 
le44 
1. 45 
le 51 
l • ::>3 
le~.;9 
1 e ,, ~ 
l e 7 '.j 
le d6 
2e ( ·) 
2. 1 t'l 
2e32 
2ebJ 
2eti2 
2. ·~7 
3. l ') 
3. l 4 
3. 5t> 
3. ':. 7 
4.~4 
PcJi:-iu-
!::,Ail~~-­
(AILLICl\S) 
2. 9i.::j 
.~ e q 4 
2 • -:L? 
?. • 9 :·; 
(:! • f-, ~~ 
2. :'3 ': 
2 • /'] ~: 
2. 3 l 
2 •. ~;.: 
2. >:~ -~ 
2. ?°3 ~ 
2.. 9 :_""' 
2.41 
2.92 
2. qt+ 
? • ,, 7 
EXCHANGE 
--B~If __ 
($/UNIT) 
2. ~c 1H~ 
2. arc r 
2.9;1,,;(1 
2. I)() 0 (\ 
? • F3': 0 0 
?. • a•:• co 
2. 8~ (' (' 
2 e R( Cf. 
2. i'i'· c r~ 
2 • 13'."' !'.' c 
2. a:1 ll n 
2.fV(.•r' 
?.t'i·····r 
;;~ • q ·"" (' (' 
2. s .. · r' '." 
2.7 1'·7" 
? • 4·. ,.., ,.. 
?. • 4."' ( I') 
?.4'·<.r 
2o4 n,... 
--------------------S~AlN------------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
196~ 
1961 
1962 
196:3 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
1970 
1971 
GNP I 1-.1 
DOMESTIC 
~!.!EB~~~:! 
(tilLLI:JNS) 
NeAe 
NeAe 
NeAe 
337.1)0 
37'1.tlO 
4 32. (. 0 
5'Jo.on 
5 82. [ ;) 
6 l'4 .r-: (' 
62·:> .o•:, 
·rr:i7.C') 
817e\.O 
964.(~C 
11)8d.0('1 
1287 • .::0 
1477.1'0 
1632ef'O 
ldl'.':.>.CC 
2~11.01'. 
2258.:C 
2539.f)i) 
GNP I tJ 
QQL..b8d§ 
(13ILLluNS) 
Ne Ao 
N.A. 
Ne A• 
8.65 
9.65 
11. c 9 
12.22 
13. ~d 
1 ;•. 76 
1,·. 34 
l l .• 7<1 
l J. 6.2 
lo.I\· 
ia. i 7 
2le49 
24. tJ 7 
2,7.25 
25.79 
28.74 
32.27 
36.2.~ 
POl-'U-
!..All~~-­
< 1vl I L L I C I"\ '.:: l 
2'3.47 
2i3e71 
28.q~ 
29.21 
29. t+ 5 
2q.7,-
29.q5 
3' • 2 .-
3.'1. 4~; 
3"..7! 
31.~7 
3 1 • ~ c; 
31.72 
32 • .' E 
}2. 3 •j 
3~.7.3 
3.1.ft' 
~ ~. 4 J 
'3'3 .1E 
34. 1 ~ 
::xCH/\Nc;•· 
__ ci~ls __ 
($/Ll~-JIT) 
...... · .. 2~ 7 
~ .r.?r)·r 
r·er?4Z~ 
~ • . ? :? '~} 
~.-17f; 
... - 1 6 7 
r.-·167 
.~ l(i7 
·· •. :11 r-, 7 
·~. n 167 
..... 16l 
r • r· l 6 7 
.. ~.-'167 
"•r14_, 
.).0143 
-::.r.14," 
( . ... , 1 4 ·~ 
115 
----------------BRITljH GJIA~~------------------­
GNP IN 
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
l 96rJ 
1961 
1962 
1963 
lg64 
l 96:3 
196t> 
l'H> 7 
1968 
lqC,9 
1971'\ 
1971 
DOMESTIC 
~~tiB.~.t::!.~Y. 
(t:llLLIUNS) 
N.A. 
'J. 1 7 
0.18 
., • 20 
) • 2 1 
•:;. 2 2 
.... .2 J 
·). 2 2 
c • .2 J 
'). 27 
'· • 3 ·) 
•) • .3 t' 
;.) .28 
(" • 3 l 
c·. 34 
(,. 3b 
:'.. 4 4 
.;,' .4 6 
(). 4 9 
('. 5 3 
G~~t-J IN 
!J!.!b.b.~!3.~ 
(LlLLIONS) 
NeAe 
i). 1 . ..) 
-: • 1 l 
,,' • 1 2. 
J. l 2 
r • 1 3 
'. 1 3 
;; • l 3 
.::, • 1 .3 
.- • 1 0 
.• 1 7 
., • l 7 
.~. 1 6 
~ • 1"3 
• 2 ·" 
·J. 2 l 
J. 2 3 
J. 2 2 
!. • 2 o 
p,·Ji->•J-
b.:!IlL~-­
(MILLICl\S) 
·~ • 4 ..... 
0.4:: 
r • IJ. t.: 
l"I • ·~ 7 
, .• 4 <; 
C' • ~ c 
~ • ·3 1 
r • ·~ ;~ 
; • ·) l 
~i • t-. '.) 
(1 •• _-, ,...:; 
r, • 7 
•'°:' • 7 I~ 
,-.,, • 7?. 
,-. • 7 4 
F XCHll, ~JG-
__ }~l~-­
(J;/UN IT) 
r.st-1.J: 
·~ .58::'3 
J.5M.33 
•• 56 3 3 
:.5.:133 
•".'. c..>d3 3 
~. ')8 3 3 
";.5~'>3.3 
'.··.5~3~ 
·:·. 58 3 ~ 
l~.583J 
"'•")f\"'13 
(·.5h,1.~ 
r:.5'3::'.? 
{') .5833 
r 0 5R.33 
0 • Sd 3 3 
:~ • 5 .. - C' ::-· 
----------------OUMlNICA~ ~EP.------------------­
GNP IN 
1951 
1952 
l 9:i 3 
1 c,,54 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1Qo6 
t9o7 
1g6~ 
1969 
19·1 •. 
1971 
lhJMESTIC 
~~B.8.&~~Y. 
(tJILLIONS) 
(~. 5 (j 
{' • 5 1 
C.54 
.:: .55 
o .oJ 
I~<. 7 Ci 
,; • 7 I 
\). 6 9 
I.. 71 
C.67 
.:·. 8 7 
·..:.CJ 9 
1•0 B 
j. 94 
1 • :, 4 
l. ': 8 
1 • l 7 
1.29 
1.45 
1 • b (; 
GNI-' IN 
QQb.b~E.ii 
(L-$ILLIONS) 
(). 4 ~ 
(".::) ·, 
c.?1 
0.54 
,·;.s:; 
·:. 63 
..• 7 "" 
~. 7 l 
;_" • 0 r; 
' .• 7 1 
: • 6 7 
·'. d 7 
) • -,I') 
l.(.[, 
';,. ·} 4 
1. ' 4 
l • ( d 
1. 1 7 
l. 29 
1 • 4 s 
1 • o\, 
P1JPu-
b~Il£~-­
( ,.j I L L I C I\ S ) 
2 • ;: 1 
2.2c 
2.37 
2. 4:: 
2. 6 3 
2. 7., 
2. 8 :3 
2. ~-:: 
3 • • 4 
3. 1 5 
3. 3 l 
3. t1 1 
J. 5 1 
3.72 
I 
3. 8 --~ 
3 .9 s 
4 •. · f; 
4 • 1 F. 
EXCHA"JGE 
__ B~lli __ 
($/UNIT) 
!.'.'.',~,./'\ 
1 .o,.cc 
1.C~01) 
le'"'<'(.!0 
1. 0C·,(•(l 
i.rtQ(' 
1.rro0 
1. ('".(!f:: 
1.rccr 
1 • r- ,• 0 (" 
1 • r.•r r-.n 
1."rr·n 
i.~rr'(' 
1 • C'G C. ,... 
t.1'~('.() 
1 • :~ 1""'· c"' 
1 •''.":CC 0 
1. 10 00 
le0f'('I(' 
1.,...oon 
1.rl'"C'.:J 
116 
---------------------HAITI-----------------------
1951 
1952 
195.3 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1<)63 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
196;,} 
197('1 
1971 
GNP IN 
OOMt.STIC 
~!::!B.S.Ef:H~ !'. 
( dlLL IONS) 
1 .66 
le75 
1 .6) 
l. 8 .J 
1. 76 
1. 9 1 
le&O 
1 .94 
1. 85 
le90 
led5 
2. c 1 
1. 95 
1. 9 2 
1. Q6 
i.95 
l.91 
1.97 
2.c 4 
2. (' 5 
del9 
GNP [ l'J 
Q.Qlzk~.ti~ 
(lilLLION::>) 
('.. 3 3 
( • .j::, 
";. 34 
'). 37 
~. 35 
'.i. 38 
,::. 36 
•:;.39 
0.37 
.., • 38 
:.37 
" • 4 i; 
'). 3 9 
ll. 3o 
( .• 3g 
~~·. 39 
0.38 
-~. 39 
'."!. 4 1 
i'. 41 
(:. 44 
POPU-
bAilkt;: __ 
(/v!ILLICNS) 
3. 4 l 
·~. 4 t 
3. "::: 
., c ;:J 
·-'. ·J '.J 
3. 6 c; 
j. 7 1 
3. 7 (> 
3. 8 :: 
3. 9 .) 
3. cc; 
4."' 7 
4. 1 '::i 
4.23 
4 • 3 1 
4.4 
4 • 4 ,. 
4 • 5 '3 
4. 6 1 
4.77 
4. e 1 
':XCHA~JGC: 
__j_A. T .;_;: __ 
( J; / U~~ I T ) 
.'\. 2' ......... 
·~· • 2. r' f' . . -, 
-'7. • ?r r -
.. ··• ? ...... () ,..., 
r- • ?· ..... r. r 
,.. • 2 ~·- -~ ."'1 
-·. 2t· i,; ""'I 
..... "') •·. ~ ,.., 
--------------------JAMAICA----------------------
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC GNP IN PDPU- C:X~HA\JGF: 
Yti.~!3. ~!lBB.~~~y !l.Q!..laAB.~ bAllk.~-- __ :3.i!l[ __ 
CBILLIJNS) (blLLIONS) (MILLICNS) ($/UNIT) 
1951 ::;:. 1 d ('. 25 1 .4 : 1 • t; i'" , .... 
1952 :: • 2 1 0.29 1 • 4 :: 1 • 4 ::' .r i 
1953 0.23 0.32 1 .48 1 • 4'" . . -. 
1954 o.~6 0.36 1 • 5 1 1 4- '",. . . . 
1955 0.2.9 (". 4 1 1. s 4 1 • I+ I" ': ~· \ 
1956 .;.33 o. 4 7 1 .56 l . '•( ,. ,, 
1957 c. 4 i) o.s6 1 • s c; 1 • 4~ ,_~. ('· 
1958 0. 4 1 0.58 1 • '5 7 1 . {'" ........ " ,'"\ 
1Q59 0.42 0.59 1 • 5 'J 1 • ~ ..... ,• . ...,·j 
1961) 0.45 0.64 l • l 3 1 • 4.-. .... :""I, 
1961 ,-.. • 4 9 c.oa ! • 6 :: 1 • 4C r ~ 
1962 
.,.'. ':.:> 1 i). 7 1 1 ' ;;. • D __, l .4· ,.., ... 
1963 :: .54 '~. 70 1. 7 ": 1 • 4 - ·;r· 
1964 G .5 9 C· • 83 1 .1~ 1 • 4-r' ~ f) 
1965 : .• 6 4 (!. 89 1 • 7 r; 1 4l'' , ... : . " 
1966 .j. 6 8 J .9:::i 1 • "3 ~ 1 • 4 I"· i' ·"" 
1967 ..; • 7 3 1 .c 1 1 fl "' . . 1 . '7 6 ,, 
1 '}08 (;. 7 9 
' 
• ·~ :::> '1 . ·) I 1 • ?- ( ~ 
1969 \~. 88 1 • '16 1 ~ -:~ 4 1 • -~ {~ l"'.I ·"' 
1970 .~. 98 1. 1 7 1 . (~~ 7 l • 2 .. ~ _,...,.... 
1971 1 • 1 .!. 1 • 35 1 • 9 (~ 1 .~?1"'9·~ 
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--------------------PANAMA-----------------------
1951 
1952 
1953 
1954 
1955 
1956 
1957 
1958 
1959 
196'' 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
1966 
1967 
1968 
1969 
197Q 
1971 
GNP IN 
DDMESTIC 
~l.18..8.£DJ~ t. 
(BILLIONS) 
(;. 26 
·O. 28 
:J. 2 9 
.) • 3 1 
0.33 
(). 36 
J.37 
('. 39 
(). 4 0 
,J.4~ 
0 •'SC 
v.55 
•). 60 
J.64 
I)• 70 
c.78 
\~. 8 4 
(; .92 
1. (: 2 
1. 1 3 
GNP 1 ·'I 
QQb..!..~!i~ 
( B l LL I J N :; ) 
(}. 2 f3 
c. '.::.9 
"" • 3r 
~:. 3 l 
\) • .3 3 
f'. 36 
·.~. 3 7 
'j. 39 
(' • 4 .) 
C.45 
(•SC 
Ci• 5~ 
0. 6;: 
0.64 
C.7C 
0.70 
(' • :3 4 
1. c 2 
l. 1 3 
PrJPU-
!,,~I1£t:: __ 
(MILLICl\Sl 
' • f\ :~ 
r • e !: 
• <:;i .... 
r • ~--• .3 
,.,, • 1-;4 ~-; 
1 • ~ 
1 • - " 
1 • r c 
1 • - :; 
l • l -
1 • l 7 
1 • ., l 
l • 2 7 
1 • < l 
1 •. ) '·: 
1 • 3 <) 
1 • 4 1 
l •Ip~ 
EXCHANGE 
__ ::!!!!i. __ 
($/UNIT) 
l •'""C" 
le:"!"'(\~ 
1.roi_r: 
1.r<'.'C<) 
1.f<CO 
lo''·f(''' 
lei'·(.'!"<) 
1. ·~'. f·-r1 
1 • .,.,,.,, r ·"i 
lo'1:.f"\ 
1 • 1:"'·:' r ,., 
1.• ... r('·" 
1 • :,.. :- ,-a, 
i.c·11~ 
1 .ri.-..(.i" 
1 •. - - ,.. ., 
i.•~·--r~ 
t.:~r·I') 
-------------------T1~INIDAD----------------------
GNP IN 
DOMESTIC uNP I !\,I POPU- EXCHJ\NGf: 
y~~8 ~l.!EB.gi::Kt. QQ!..!..~f:!~ b~.I.1£~-- __ ,:i~l[ __ 
(dlLLIONS) (UlLLIJNS) (MILLICl\.'3) ($/UN l T ) 
1951 u. 3 \) c. 18 0. 6 '5 , .. • 5R "".' -~ 
1952 1.1.34 0.20 ..., • 6c -: • :)8 J j 
195.3 0.37 0.22 r'.F.8 .• • ~5 H :~ -~ 
' 
1954 '). 4 1 J.24 .. • 7 .-1 .. •SB::.-~ .. 
1955 0 .4 7 0.27 (; • 7 2 - • '.:>:-L! 3 
"· 
1956 '). 5 2 o. 3( ( • 7 ·'.! ,.. .·=;r>.-:3 
1957 c.59 I) • 34 .. : • 7 f; r • ::>6 3., 
1958 u .6 7 c.39 (' • 7 <; :, • 5 ,:\ :1 3 
1959 () • 7 3 r. • 42 :_•. 8 :~ "·~)e3 3 
196, 0 .6 3 ·~. 37 ·""; • t1 ~ Le 5.C:l3J 
1961 1,.1 .89 0.s2 .~ 7 !"•St:-'.-~ ., 
1962 (i. 95 c.55 ; .• <~() ,• • ::>H --~ ~ 
1963 l • ;) 3 o.or ·~,. 9? •::::. H:-" .''1 
1964 1 • 10 o.64 ('. 95 J • J l ~ .1 :~ 
1965 l. 1 7 .,. 68 r.c;7 ;:.·.~')L~~,:., 
1966 1 .30 c.76 (' • ~.; r; r_. • :::; p :-~ ~ 
1967 1. 34 V• 77 1 . ,. 1 /" .~7f.4 
196 '3 l. 5v 
'· 
75 l • r 2 • ~) r• '· "' 
1969 1 .52 o. 76 1 • (' 3 . ·:;( ' 
197(' 1. 59 '.). O::'• 1 . ' -, • 5- ( 
1971 1. 8 3 0.92 1 . ' 3 , , .... ,. • ")> ' .•, 
Sources: Direction of International Trade (18), Direction 
of Trade (19), and International Financial Sta-
tistics (20), various issues. 
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APPENDIX C 
DISTANCE BETWEEN SAMPLE COUNTRIES 
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M~GtNT1"'1A 7591 727 11 b71Pi 6blJ 1 t> 9 7 1 6Llbc.l {>., z 1 l371 I) <J '.l '' 
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~-4 .... ~ • c ., ,, fl.,-. t1 :\t:L,J~ ~>.(~~~t:f i;~ R!" A• tTq,.'f :·i£ r !"I• A-.:S• '._lf ; .... 
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f3RAZ1L 3253 .41130 l.!557 4524 4 6 81~ 3578 
C~ILE 4 174 ·3462 34:i3 3210 26ib 3818 
CULOMBI/\ 1522 638 139 2 742 5S2 1838 
ECWl\DOR 2382 1670 1641 1If18 82 1~ 2026 
Mt:::XICO 3221 . 1790 241.lO 1l!1 0 1663 2352 
PARAGUAY '1254 5181 5r;5s 5524 ·~oas (>887 
P£RU 2Cf08 2190 2167' l 941.1 13~0 25S2 
URUGUAY 38ll0 622S 6196 5973 ~267 c,se 1 
\1£NEZUEl.A 821 496 155ti 1331 693 1939 
fINLAND 509~ 5037 5177 5;506 . 5840 5058 
GREECc 4090 5100 5308 5 '142 . $902 lj 9 81 
TURKEY 5362 $'::i53 5761 5139:; 6355 51.134 
IC El.AND 5263 5(15£1. 50E12 5796 4098 5335 
Ir<EL.AND 3875 3817 3957 Ll08o 4620' 3838 
SPAIN 3686 4877 4085 4219 ·4679 37':)8 
BR,. C.UIANA 0 2404 2.375 1334 _ 1$15 376 
DUMlt-iIC RP 2401.1 0 453 1.130 802 681 
-
HAITI 2375 4S3 0 277 817 1053 
JAMAICA 1334 430 277 0 551 1003 
PANAMA 1515 1302 817 551 0 11~9 
TRINIOAD · 31b b8l 1053 1003 1159 0 
Sources: Brown, Robert T., Transport and the Economic 
Integration of South America (11), and U. S. 
Department of the Navy, Distance Between Ports 1--' (42). N l.O 
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Country 
United States 
Canada 
Belgium 
France 
Germany, F.R. 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Denmark 
Norway 
Portugal 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Greece 
Turkey 
Iceland 
Ireland 
Spain 
131 
TABLE XVI 
LIST OF NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES 
Neighbors 
Canada, Mexico 
United States 
France, Germany, F.R., Luxembourg, 
Netherlands 
Belgium, Germany, F.R., Italy, 
Luxembourg, Switzerland, Spain 
Belgium, France, Luxembourg, Austria, 
Netherlands, Denmark, Switzerland 
France, Austria, Switzerland 
Belgium, France, Germany, F.R. 
Belgium, Germany, F.R. 
Germany, F.R., Italy, Switzerland 
Germany, F.R. 
Sweden, Finland 
Spain 
Norway, Finland 
France, Germany, F.R., Italy, 
Austria 
Ireland 
Norway, Sweden 
Turkey 
Greece 
United Kingdom 
France, Portugal 
Country 
Costa Rica 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
British Guina 
Dominican Republic 
Haiti 
Jaimaica 
Panama 
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TABLE XVI (Continued) 
Neighbors 
Nicaragua, Panama 
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua 
El Salvador, Honduras, Mexico 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua 
Cost Rica, El Salvador, Honduras 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, 
Uruguay 
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, 
Peru 
Argentina, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, Venezuela, 
British Guina 
Argentina, Bolivia, Peru 
Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Panama 
Venezuela 
Colombia, Peru 
United States, Guatemala 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil 
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador 
Argentina, Brazil 
Brazil, Colombia, British Guina 
Brazil, Venezuela 
Costa Rica 
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DETERMINATION OF THE EQUALITY OF THE ESTTMATED 
PREFERENCE DUMMY PARAMETERS IN 
THE DIFFERENT MODELS 
The three equations developed and estimated in Chapter IV have 
some elements in common: a) the dependent variable; b) the explanatory 
variables for gross national product of the importing and exporting 
countries, distance between the countries and the dummy variable for 
neighboring countries; and, c) the dummy variables for gross trade 
creation within the preference groups. 
A procedure was developed to test the equality of the estimated 
coefficients for the preference dummy variables in the three different 
structural equations (4.3, 4.4 and 4.5). If the null hypothesis of 
equality cannot be statistically reje~ted, then it implies that the 
underlying structural relationships described in the more basic forms 
(4.3 and 4.4) are not affected by the addition of all the preference 
dummy variables in (4.5). 
1< 
Rewrite (4. 3): 
";'\ 
In this appendix the subscripts one through four refer to the 
EEC, EFTA, CACM and LAFTA respectively. In (4.3-4.5) these preference 
variable subscripts were greater by one. 
The null hypothesis is: 
H : a.. 
0 l. 
a. . 
l.O 
(i = 1, ••• , 4) 
where: 
a.. =estimated coefficient for P .. in (4.3). 
l.O l.l. 
The test statistic used to test the hypothesis is: 
F 
a.,4, n-k 
where: 
and C is a 4 x 4 matrix of the form: 
ell c12 c13 cl4 
c 
c21 c22 c23 c24 
c31 c32 c33 c34 
c41 c42 c43 C44 
where: 
th 1 -1 C. . is the ij . element of (X X) . Two sample years were 
l.J 
arbitrarily selected for this test--one corresponding to the pre-
135 
integration period (1955) and the other falling in the post-integration 
period (1965), respectively. 
The results for 1955 are shown below: 
ESS 1961. 6320 N - K = 1100 
N = 1109 ESS/n-k = 1.7833 
K 9 
0.0599 0.0043 0.0074 0.0038 
0.0043 0.0271 0.0031 0.0009 
c = 0.0074 0.0031 0.0787 0.0052 
0.0038 0.0009 0.0052 0.0195 
Equation (4. 3) Equation (4.4) 
pll 0.3459 0.7155 
p22 o. 2774 0.5764 
p33 -0.1731 -0.0710 
P44 -0,7837 -0.6041 
A2 = [0.3696 0.2990 0.1021 0.1796] 
A3 = [0.0241 -0.0476 -0.4917 0.0473] 
where: 
Equation (4.5) 
-
0.3700 
0.2298 
-0.6648 
-0.7364 
A2 and A3 correspond to the differences between the estimated 
coefficients of equations (4.3) and (4.4), and equations (4.3) and 
(4.5) respectively. 
then: 
Now, the F statistics calculated for A2 and A3 are: 
F test of (4.4) = 6i:~~~~4 = 0.8716 
F test of (4.5) = 3.5044/4 1. 7833 0.4913 
Since F(0.05 , 4 ) = 2.34, the null hypothesis cannot be 
' 1100 
rejected, implying that the coefficients from the three equations 
I 
cpme1from the same population. 
I 
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The same procedure was followed for 1965: 
F test of (4.4) 4.2204/4 = 1. 3951 0.7564 
F test of (4.5) 5.7520/4 = ----'--1.3951 1.0308 
Again, it is impossible to reject the null hypothesis at the 95 
percent level of statistical confidence. Hence, there is evidence that 
observed differences in the estimated value of the GTC coefficients 
correspond to random disturbances and that they came from the same 
population. 
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TABLE XVII 
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND PREFERENCE FORCES ON TRADE FLOW 
ESTIMATED BY MODEL (4.3): 1951-69* 
Variables Coefficient 
log log log of 
Year Constant GNP GNP DIST DNEIGH D22 D33 D44 D55 Determination m x mx mx 
1951 4.3111 0.8024 0.8102 -0.6570 -0.5812 -0.2184 0.2290 -0.4713 -0.8908 69. 77% 
(31.1191) (30. 0166) (-9.8223) (2.8363) 
1952 4.6310 0.7804 0.8076 -0. 7146 0.4883 -0.2309 0.1315 -0.1006 -1. 2988 68.34% 
(30. 8058) (29. 7705) (-10.6077) (2.3204) 
1953 5.0028 0.7552 0.7454 -0.7430 0.5381 0.0090 0.0523 -0.6605 -1. 2235 70.57% 
(33. 7964) (31.5455) (-12.9442) (2.8195) 
1954 3.8382 0.7685 0.7660 -0.6143 0.5655 0.2817 0.2280 0.0436 -1. 3017 68.49% 
(33.6900) (31.6790) (-10.9369) (3.0200) 
1955 4.1513 0.7584 0.7422 -0.6517 0.3856 0.3459 o. 2774 -0.1731 -0.7837 66.46% 
(33.2546) (31.1518) (-11.5658) (2.0472) 
1956 4.3143 0.7617 0.7524 -0.6767 0.3145 0.3426 0.2647 -0. 2921 -0. 7129 66.74% 
(33. 2000) (31.4162) (-11.9144) (1. 654 7) 
1957 3.7339 0.7532 0.7446 -0.6016 0.4207 0.4422 0.2993 -0.1680 -0.7908 65.48% 
(32.5558) (30.6534) (-10.4632) (2.1988) 
1958 3.6029 o. 7471 0.7348 -0.5892 0.5368 0.3843 0.3220 -0.2233 -0. 6371 66.86% 
(30. 9024) (31.9410) (-10.5756) (2.9109) 
1959 3.5343 0.6730 0.7172 -0.5422 0.5541 0.6980 0.2633 0.1432 -0. 9101 63.87% 
(28.2956) (30.3181) (-9.7289) (3.0868) 
I-' 
VJ 
l.O 
TABLE XVII (Continued) 
Variables Coefficient 
log log log of 
Year Constant GNP GNP DIST DNEIGH D22 D33 D44 D55 Determination m x mx mx 
1960 3.9781 0.6669 0.7136 -0.5890 0.5166 o. 7117 0.1904 0.0289 -1. 0914 65.12% 
(28.5713) (30.7268) (-10.5244) (2.9170) 
1961 4.2920 0.6758 0.7399 -0.6454 0.5452 0.6216 0.2182 0.0931 -1. 2853 66.90% 
(29.0805) (32.2040) (-11.7274) (3.1651) 
1962 4.2233 0.6797 0.7192 -0.6267 0.4291 0.7269 0.1563 0.3818 -0.9244 67.75% 
(30. 5756) (32.3701) (-11.9769) (2.5759) 
1963 3.8947 o. 7110 0.7856 -0.6289 0.3335 0.8181 0.2515 0.7108 -0.5250 70.16% 
(33.4262) (36.3366) (-12.4074) (2.0679) 
1964 4.1396 o. 7105 0.7475 -o. 6496 0.3379 0.8219 0.2881 1.2909 -0.4252 70.84% 
(34.8199) (36.1845) (-13.2945) (2.1628) 
1965 4.0625 0.6985 0.7647 -0.6484 0.2976 0.8846 0.3340 1. 6054 -0.2244 69.75% 
(33.2665) (36.1845) (-12.7461) (1. 8532) 
1966 4.3618 0.6803 0.7391 -0.6744 0.2342 0.9669 0.3397 1.7058 -0.1042 69.82% 
(33. 5381) (36.2362) (-13.5880) (1.4763) 
1967 3.7528 0.6744 o. 7677 -0.6156 0.3405 1. 0291 0.4834 2.0473 -0.0091 69.52% 
(32. 6438) (36.8707) (-12.0274) (2.0712) 
1968 3.3415 0.8167 0.8449 -0.6617 0.4058 0.8312 0.5193 2.7855 -0.0827 70. 90% 
(38. 6 702) (39.4024) (-12.2253) (2.2583) 
1969 3.2001 0.9186 0.9601 -0.7479 0.3564 0.6920 0.6092 3.4000 0.2925 70.47% 
(40.1671) (41.6049) (-12.4107) (1. 7126) 
#'' I-' 
t-values in parenthesis. ~ 0 
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Variable 
or 
Statistic 
Constant 
log GNP 
m 
log GNP 
x 
log DIST 
mx 
DNEIGH 
mx 
D22 
D33 
D44 
D55 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E 5 
H2 
H3 
H4 
Coef. of 
Det .** 
TABLE XVIII 
IMPACT OF ECONOMIC AND PREFERENCE FORCES ON TRADE 
FLOW ESTIMATED BY MODEL (4.4): 1951-69* 
Year 
1951 1952 I953 1954 
4.55 4.56 4.83 3.42 
0.78 o. 77 o. 73 0. 72 
(26.59) (26.37) (28.26) (2 7. 7 5) 
0.80 d.80 0.75 0.75 
(26.43) (26.20) (27.24) (27 .11) 
-0.68 -0.69 -0. 71 -0.58 
(-8.89) (-9.07) (-11.20) (-9.33) 
0.56 0.53 0.59 0.61 
(2.69) (2.48) (3. 09) (3.29) 
-0.16 -0.30 0.04 0.60 
0.26 0.04 0.05 0.50 
-0.58 -0.23 -0.76 0.16 
-0.86 -1.44 -1.29 -1.11 
0.03 o.oo 0.17 0.38 
0.05 -0.15 -0.11 0.14 
-0.45 -0.37 -0.40 -0.25 
0.22 -0.11 0.01 0.20 
0.09 0.01 0.19 0.49 
-0.03 -0.11 -0.12 0.01 
-0.17 -0.10 -0.04 0.17 
0.70 0.69 o. 71 0.69 
" ~. ' 
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1955 
3.62 
o. 71 
(27.15) 
o. 71 
(26.28) 
-0.60 
(-9.57) 
0.45 
(2.40) 
o. 72 
0.58 
-0.07 
-0.60 
0.42 
0.19 
-0.27 
0.12 
0.53 
0.06 
-0.09 
0.68 
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TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 
Constant 3.98 3.17 3.27 3.21 3.60 
log GNP o. 71 o. 71 0. 71 0.66 0.65 
m (26.87) (26. 78) (27. 61) (24.78) (24.90) 
log GNP 0. 72 o. 71 0.70 0.69 0.68 
x (26.25) (25.45) (26.84) (25.89) (25. 86) 
log DIST -0.65 -0.55 -0.57 -0.54 -0.57 
mx (-10. 36) (-8. 70) (-9.24) (-8.66) (-8.94) 
DNEIGH 0.36 0.48 O.S7 0.56 o.ss 
mx (1. 90) (2.51) (3.09) (3 .14) (3. 09) 
D22 o. 72 0.88 0.80 1.12 1.11 
D33 0.58 0.67 0.68 0.66 o.ss 
D44 -a.so 0.01 -0.07 0.43 0.24 
Dss -a.so -0.54 -0.39 -0.S6 -0.82 
E2 0.48 O.S7 0.47 0. 3S. 0.44 
E3 0.13 O.lS 0.15 0.19 0.24 
E4 -0.29 -0.13 -0.25 -0.01 0.02 
ES 0.14 0.11 0.23 0.12 0.26 
H2 O.S3 0.62 0.65 0.65 O.S4 
H3 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.24. 0.08 
H4 -0.12 -0.01 0.08 0.06 -0.24 
HS 0.21 0.03 0.10 0.30 0.07 
Coef. of 
Det. ** 0.68 0.67 0.68 0.65 0.66 
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TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 1961 1962 1963 1964 196S 
Constant 4.02 4.16 3.88 4.07 4.lS 
log GNP 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.69 0.68 
m (2S. 06) (26.70) (28.49) (29.26) (28.23) 
log GNP 0.70 0.69 0.76 0.74 0.76 
x (26. 96) (27.06) (30.32) (30.67) (31. 07) 
log DIST -0.62 -0.63 -0.64 -0.6S -0.68 
mx (-9.80) (-10.64) (-11.07) (-11.66) (-11. 72) 
DNEIGH O.S9 0.44 0.34 0.3S 0.28 
mx (3. 38) (2.62) (2. 07) (2.21) (1. 7 4) 
D22 0.87 0.96 1.07 1.03 1. 09 
D33 0.43 0.36 0.48 0.47 0.54 
D44 0.16 0.40 0.79 1.37 1. 71 
Dss -1.lS -0.76 -0.34 -0.27 -0.02 
E2 0.26 0.23 0.28 0.2S 0.22 
E3 o.os 0.03 -0.06 -0.06 -0.09 
E4 -0.14 0.01 -0.03 -0.07 0.02 
ES 0.09 0.21 0.07 -0.06 -0.0S 
H2 0.47 0.4S 0.43 0.40 0.44 
H3 0.01 0.01 0.12 o.os 0.09 
H4 -0.23 -0.17 -0.09 0.06 0.18 
HS 0.07 0.12 0.33 0.32 0.49 
Coef. of 
Det .** 0.68 0.68 o. 71 0. 72 0. 71 
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TABLE XVIII (Continued) 
Variable 
or Year 
Statistic 1966 1967 1968 1969 
Constant 4.S5 3.90 2. 77 2.30 
log GNP 0.66 0.6S 0.81 0.84 
m (28.63) (27 .52) (32.21) (30. 32) 
log GNP 0.74 o. 76 0.81 0.88 
x (31. 42) (31. 38) (31. 67) (31. 94) 
log DIST -0. 72 -0.66 -0.60 -0.61 
mx (-12.89) (-11.47) (-10.18) (-0.73) 
DNEIGH 0.20 0.31 0.48 0.49 
mx (1. 2 6) (1. 91) (2.6S) (2.39) 
Dzz 1.19 1. 30 1.30 1.31 
D33 O.S7 o. 74 0.80 1.04 
D44 1.82 2.lS 3.41 3.41 
DS5 0.14 0.24 o.os 0.36 
E2 0.23 0.25 0.23 0.49 
E3 -0.11 -0.04 0.03· 0.16 
E4 -0.04 -0.17 0.06 -0.59 
ES 0.03 0.05 -0.28 -0.60 
H2 0.49 0.51 0.66 0.94 
H3 0.12 O.lS 0.21 o.so 
H4 0.31 0.11 0.09 -0.09 
HS 0.54 O.S6 0.06 -0.04 
Coef. of 
Det.** 0. 71 o. 71 0. 72 0. 72 
~~ 
t statistics in parenthesis. 
** Coefficient of Determination. 
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TABLE XIX. 
NUMBER OF SAMPLE OBSERVATIONS AND SAMPLE SIZE AS A 
PERCENT OF TOTAL POSSIBLE, BY YEAR 
----
YEAR OBSERVATIONS PERCENT OF 
J_ 9 5] 776 43.79 
1952 820 46.28 
1953 921 51. 98 
1954 1017 57.39 
1955 1109 62.58 
195G 1114 62.87 
1957 1119 63.15 
1958 1151 62.92 
1959 1034 58.35 
1960 1031 58.18 
1961 1035 58.41 
L962 1028 58.01 
L963 1094 61. 74 
J 96/1 1101 G2.13 
1965 1113 62.81 
1966 1117 63.04 
1967 1117 h3. 04 
1968 1277 12.07 
1969 1459 82.34 
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* TOTAL 
-- - - ·--------------··~-
* Total possible is 1722 observations. 
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TABLE XX 
ACTUAL TRADE FLOWS AMONG PREFERENCE GROUPS AND THE 
U. S. AND CANADA: 1951-69 
149 
·--------------·-~-----------
Year Importing Group U.S. & C. EEC 
Exporting (;rc)_l!jl_ _____________ .. _ ..... 
EFTA CACM LAFT1\ 
-·----··--·-- ·----_-_--_-_-_-_-_-_ - millions of dollars 
l q 51 U.S. & C. !+969.10 2079.00 2685.30 L 7 3. 00 2894. 70 
EEC 836.90 1834.60 2849.10 19.80 784.00 
EFT/\ 1275.50 1789.50 2578.10 12.80 769.40 
CACM 204.70 10. 80 10.80 6.00 0.80 
LA FT A 2701.50 867.00 928.90 8.20 511.20 
1952 U.S. & C. 5452.60 2120.40 2431. 90 182.20 2913.60 
EEC 767.70 1923.20 2517.30 .n. 90 72 L 70 
l<:FTA 1267.10 1935.30 2401. 90 16.30 71!+. j () 
CACM 200.10 18.60 8.70 6.80 2.00 
LA FT A 2819.30 696. 00 580.80 7.70 469.50 
1953 U.S. & C. 5763.10 1877.00 2160.90 / L2. 50 24 79. YO 
EEC 1177. 70 3937.00 3131. 30 39.60 798. 70 
EFT/\ 1496.90 2460.50 2438. 70 19.70 479.90 
CACM 234 .10 48.80 13.70 L0.40 
LAFTA 287 4. 30 812.70 706 .10 9.20 SSL l 0 
19.54 U.S. & C. 5451. 50 2443.30 2182.90 234. 50 267'3. IO 
EEC 1068.70 4550.00 3706.30 52. 20 96). Oil 
EFTJ\ 1332.50 2632.00 2606.00 22.70 545.0ll 
C1\C:M 234.20 71. 90 23.90 13. 30 I+. 90 
Li\FTA 2775.40 1106.00 793.60 11. 20 5 58. l)i) 
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TABLE XX (Continued) 
Year Importing Exporting Grou12 Group U.S. & c. EEC EFTA CACM LAFTA 
- - - - - - - - - millions of dollars ------
1955 U.S. & c. 6180.80 2671. 30 2948.50 265.00 2691. 40 
EEC 1300. 70 5110.69 4353.59 34.40 735.00 
EFTA 1483.60 3015.60 2779.10 25.10 619.00 
CACM 228.80 105.00 24.70 12.80 5.50 
LA FT A 28 71. 00 1141.90 904.80 13. 60 743.80 
1956 U.S. & c. 7150. 80 3446.90 3121. 60 278.10 2976.40 
EEC 1656.40 5896.48 4752.20 41.40 659.90 
EFTA 1819.20 3541. 90 2984.90 28.30 639.50 
CACM 214.90· 104.00 27.60 13.50 4.50 
LAFTA 3205.90 1435.40 1001. 90 15.20 624.90 
1957 U.S. & c. 7110. 30 4240.60 3409.20 296. 80 3773. 80 
EEC 1796.80 6560.19 5526.28 64. 70 1025. 30 
EFTA 1881. 30 3796.10 3187.20 31.00 781. 40 
CACM 227.20 140.40 32.20 16.50 8.40 
LA FT A 3339.20 1515.50 1159.40 15.90 701. 00 
1958 U.S. & c. 6398.10 3230.20 2 781. 30 278.20 3201. 80 
EEC 1930.00 6276.09 5207.49 68.80 1143. 90 
EFTA 1983.80 3633.30 3036.10 35.60 702.20 
CACM 222.70 133.40 28 •. 60 20.60 7.20 
LAFTA 3096. 20 1355.60 1071. 30 16.10 1287.00 
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TABLE XX (Continued) 
~-----· 
Year Importing Exporting Group Group u.s. & c. EEC EFTA CACM LA FT A 
- - - - - - - millions of dollars ------
1959 U.S. & c. 7373. 70 2984.30 2853.50 247. 70 2978. 70 
EEC 2713. 80 8082.98 5620.88 83.00 1239.40 
EFTA 2499.70 3944.40 3242.00 29.90 690.70 
CACM 193.50 129.50 27.60 27.00 6.50 
LA FT A 2891. 00 1440.80 1154.90 14.60 631. 40 
1960 U.S. & c. 6948.10 4276.60 3844.20 260.10 3166.40 
EEC 2563.10 10155.99 6575.39 101. 00 1388.30 
EFTA 2277 .10 4512.70 3732.30 32.70 761. 20 
CACM 194.10 117. 00 27.30 31.90 5.50 
LAFTA 3149.60 1609.40 1165.10 13.40 654.30 
1961 U.S. & c. 7167.60 4543.10 3501.60 240.30 3303.70 
EEC 2543.90 11704.87 7163.18 97.90 1539.00 
EFTA 2207.50 4946.98 4050.10 31. 60 847.70 
CACM 214.80 119. 30 25.40 35.70 6.10 
LAFTA 3705.20 1643.90 1090.19 13.30 581.79 
1962 U.S. & c. 7709.40 4929. 89 3501.90 267.30 3139.30 
EEC 2767.40 13442.57 7637. 77 105. 80 1577. 00 
EFTA 2349.40 5562.88 4340.09 36.30 770. 20 
CACM 225.70 132.20 29.50 47.20 15.50 
LAFTA 3308.60 1939.20 1177. 79 15.60 627.09 
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TABLE XX (Continued) 
Year Importing ExEorting Group Group U.S. & c. EEC EFT!\ CACM LA FT A 
- - - - - - - millions of dollars - - - -
1963 U.S. & c. 8534.97 5488.59 3684.20 303.10 3110. 52 
EEC 3059.97 15713. 37 8149.98 118. 40 1400.57 
EFTA 2617.65 6174.78 4837.09 45.00 753.55 
CACM 258.94 138.70 38.60 64.50 1. 44 
LAFTA 3658.10 1994.20 1183.50 27 .10 719. 68 
1964 U.S. & c. 9664.95 5934.39 4496.60 349.70 3545.09 
EEC 3460.37 18044.87 9187.99 134.10 1417.07 
EFTA 2817.32 6610.57 5682.99 50.00 732.21 
CACM 280.63 176.10 50.90 104 .00 1.00 
LAFTA 3753.76 2168.80 1240.90 34.90 841. 63 
1965 U.S. & c. 11091.09 6278.99 4622.50 381.30 3538.94 
EEC 4090.89 20435.58 9983.98 152.20 1458. 77 
EFTA 3314.01 6944.68 6234.78 60.50 754.81 
CACM 328.65 197 .10 48.90 132. 50 ] • '30 
LAFTA 3845.08 2320.60 1264.10 38.70 979.76 
1966 U.S. & c. 13512.32 6656.09 4781.90 400.00 3901. 02 
EEC 4995.23 22933. 77 10579.18 145.20 1656.96 
EFTA 4030.86 7302.38 6808.18 59.90 810.18 
CACM 355.00 212. 90 62.10 170.00 4. 34 
LAFTA 4073.73 2414.90 1274.50 42.70 994.76 
153 
TABLE XX (Continued) 
------
Year Importing ExEorting Group Group U.S. & c. EEC EFTA CACM LAFTA 
- - - - -
- - millions of dollars - - - -
1967 U.S. & c. 15332. 71 6506.20 5034.70 427.70 3899.53 
EEC 5366.57 24232.58 11009. 38 152.20 1762.75 
EFTA 3960.30 7167.57 7403.48 68.90 894.28 
CACM 347.65 204.90 57.30 207.60 3.38 
LAFTA 3933.93 2432.70 1293.80 43.70 964. 72 
1968 U.S. & c. 18262.47 7159.49 5498.69 411. 4 7 4349.59 
EEC 6890.27 28.421.18 11712.98 143. 32 1906.00 
EFTA 4571. 77 7951. 66 7736. 48 60.49 1024.44 
CACM 391. 66 229.10 59.70 251. 27 2.87 
LAFTA 4377. 77 2340. 90 1256.50 54.13 1081.14 
1969 U.S. & c. 20921. 46 8159.49 5779.50 396.07 4520.79 
EEC 6920.73 36313.87 13040.94 157.13 2124.83 
EFTA 4805.67 9673.27 8958.48 70.60 1093.60 
CACM 419.42 235.90 58.28 254.55 4.00 
LA FT A 4271. 39 2801.40 1422.97 59.23 1306.96 
Sources: Direction of International Trade (18), and Direction of 
Trade (19)~various issues. 
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TABLE XXI 
ESTIMATED TRADE FLOWS AMONG PREFERENCE GROUPS AND THE U. S. AND 
CANADA ASSUMING NO INTEGRATIONS: 1961-69 
Year Importing Exporting Group Group U.S. & c. EEC EFTA CACM LAFTA 
------- - - millions of dollars - - - -
1961 U.S. & c. 9302.38 6541. 77 3915.80 221. 69 3631. 85 
EEC 4563.53 5635.04 12325.30 199.04 2790.52 
EFTA 2678.50 6212.59 4408. 96 53.45 1089.98 
CACM 256.64 162.67 29.18 32.62 4.24 
LA FT A 4789.07 2434.81 1310.56 21.79 762.74 
1962 U.S. & c. 10005.55 7098.73 3916.13 246.60 3451.12 
EEC 4964.47 6471.62 13141. 90 215 .11 2859.42 
EFTA 2850.68 6986.05 4724.65 61.40 990.33 
CACM 269.67 180.26 33.89 43.13 10. 78 
LAFTA 4276.45 2872.18 1415.86 25.56 822.12 
1963 U.S. & c. 10857.67 8493.24 3788.81 185.02 3087.89 
EEC 5826.42 5852. 75 14409.89 256.12 2540.03 
EFTA 3075.52 7475.80 4099.28 64.55 858. s J 
CACM 261. 23 174.97 43.57 25. 43 (). 90 
LAFTA 4451. 06 2837.83 1335. 85 58.39 649.50 
1964 U.S. & c. 12295.16 9183.09 4624.28 213.46 3519.30 
EEC 6588.81 6721.17 16245.19 290.08 2569.96 
EFTA 3310.12 8003.42 4816.16 71. 73 834.19 
CACM 283.10 222.15 57.45 41.01 0.62 
LAFTA 4567.46 3086.29 1400.64 75.20 759.56 
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TABLE XXI (Continued) 
Year Importing Exporting Group ---Group U.S. & c. EEC EFTA CACM LAFTA 
------ - - - millions of dollars - - - -
1965 u. s. & c. 13830.02 10441. 71 4371. 62 154.00 3172. 52 
EEC 8267.74 5888.95 18139.32 350.30 2646.12 
EFTA 3770.31 8105.76 4113. 37 73.60 761. 93 
CACM 279.94 230.03 54.23 22.55 0. 73 
LA FT A 4404.35 3172.83 1339. 71 109.63 608.69 
1966 U.S. & c. 16849.18 11068.81 4522.37 161.55 3497.11 
EEC 10095.52 6608.86 19220. 69 334.19 3005.61 
EFTA 4585.87 8523.27 4491.67 72. 87 817.83 
CACM 302.39 248.47 68.87 28.93 2.44 
LA FT A 4666.25 3301. 76 1350.73 120.96 618.00 
1967 U.S. & c. 18740.55 11627 .27 4378.71 114. 30 3156.79 
EEC 11511. 98 5402.70 20553.83 372. 70 3198.16 
EFTA 4362.82 8065.25 3802.47 71. 09 799.84 
CACM 250.03 221.23 62.44 15.24 1. 72 
LAFTA 4242.02 3195.67 1287.47 162.75 412.58 
1968 U.S. & c. 22321.48 12794.78 4782.24 109. 96 3521.12 
EEC 14780.51 6336.55 21867.42 350.96 3458.05 
EFTA 5036.44 8947.56 3973.50 62.L+l 916.26 
CACM 281.68 247.36 65.06 18.45 1. 45 
LA FT A 4 720. 61 3075.08 1250.35 201. 61 462.37 
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TABLE XXI (Continued) 
Year 
Importing 
Group u. s. & c. EEC EFTA CACM LA FT A 
- - - - - - - millions of dollars - - - - - - - - -
1969 U.S. & c. 25065.10 15670.50 4622.41 70.03 3304.83 
EEC 15757.55 6263.88 25017.93 409.38 3855.86 
EFTA 5126.36 10493.60 3581. 93 61. 77 866.64 
CACM 254.69 235.64 62.40 8.06 1. 83 
LAFTA 4335.93 3535. 72 1329.55 290.03 384. 77 
VITA 
Ivarth Palacio 
Candidate for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Thesis: THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN AND LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC 
INTEGRATIONS ON TRADE AMONG MEMBERS AND WITH THE 
UNITED STATES 
Major Field: Agricultural Economics 
Biographical: 
Personal Data: Born in Trujillo (Valle), Colombia, December 6, 
1946, the son of Luis and Lilia Palacio. 
Education: Graduated from Colegio Nacional La Salle, secondary 
school at Florencia (Caqueta), Colombia, November, 1967; 
received Diploma in Economics from the Universidad del 
Valle, Cali, Colombia, December, 1972; received the Master 
of Science degree in Agricultural Economics from Oklahoma 
State University, December, 1974; completed the requirements 
for the Doctor of Philosophy degree in July, 1977. 
Professional Experience: Research Assistant, Department of 
Agricultural Economics, Oklahoma State University, 
Stillwater, Oklahoma, from September, 1974 until July, 
1977. 
Organizations: American Agricultural Economics Association; 
Southern Agricultural Economics Association. 
